A paper presented by Dr. MOHAMED-RASHID SH. HASSAN at Somaliland Convention held in Los Angeles betweem 24-26th of June 2005

In this paper, First, I would like to look at the orgins of the Somaliland nation state. Second, The historical and the philosophical orgins of the state and third, the challenges and the posibilities for the Somaliland nation state.

The State which came into existence in 1960 as the result of the union between Somaliland and Somalia collapsed in 1991. Somaliland withdrew from the Union and declared its independence and sovereignity.

AFRICAN OPTIMISM AND FAILURE

For the Somalis like other peoples in Africa, political independence was the start of a new era and crucial watershed. The past was condemned as the memory of colonisation and oppression and the future was celebrated. The torch of the liberation flame was reflected in the speeches of the African nationalists, such as Nkrumah and Nyerere. The visions and struggles of earlier Pan - Africanists, W.E.B.du Bois and Marcus Garvey were revisited and revived, and Somalia was a part and parcel of Africa on the march. After forty-Five years both Africa and Somalia are in a completely different situation. Africa has experienced wars, famine, and violation of human rights and military dictatorships. Somali people suffered all these, but furthermore, they lost the state itself.

For Somalis the independence of 1960 and the union between Somaliland and Somalia was the first step of the realisation of the Somalis' perception of their nation-state, which comprises all Somali territories in the Horn of Africa. After nine years of civilian rule, the military seized power and provided Somalia with a dictator who ruled the country for twenty-two years.

In 1991 this dictator was overthrown by the combination of various armed opposition groups, supported by the determination of the Somali people, to see this Dictator and his regime go.

In Somaliland after the unilateral withdrawal from the Union, the business of state construction was put into operation starting with peace making and confidence building, while in the South the warlords, were unable to agree to share the power and hence rescue the state. Since, then Somalia has been in a state of anarchy and under several warlords whose political and economic support has been based on clan allegiances occupying the space of the nation state together with Islamic organizations with radical views. In Somalia still the Public is looking for a state that provides with them the basics of human requirements, such as sense of safety, protection of human rights etc. Morrow (1992) pointed out that "For Africans, the Somali situation constitutes yet another layer of the continent's worsening social existence and propulsion toward misery, death, and irrelevance (In Samatar, 1994, p.4).

Theoretical position

This paper endorses the view of Bayart and Migdal, which they substantiated in their works, "The State in Africa, the Politics of the Belly (1993)", and "Strong Societies and Weak States (1988)" respectively. These writers are often critical of the explanations given by the modernisation and dependency theorists, who have a tendency to portray African social conditions and changes only in relation to external forces.

According to Bayart (1993), colonialisation did not destroy the ability of African societies to provide their own strategies and pursue a form of development. He is critical of the advocates of modernism and dependency theories who have the tendency to ignore or neglect the local structures. These structures have internal dynamism despite the aggressive intrusion of globalisation. Migdal (1988)argues implicitly against modernisation theory’s preoccupation with the effect of centre on periphery and its lack of interest in the impact of the periphery on the centre" (p.xv).

FORMATIOM OF SOMALILAND NATION STATE

We can trace the orgins of the Somaliland Nation State mainly in two historical perids. First, The period starting from 1950-1960 the start of the search for national identity and independence. Second, the period started from 1991 after Somaliland took the historical action to withdrawal from the Union.

During the 1950s Somaliland politically minded people started to learn the art of poltical activism and organised the masses around political organisations until the independece was achived, in 1960.

In Somaliland earlier political history, three political parties came into existence.

The Somali National League (SNL), which emerged from welfare clubs "Kheyriya", first established in Burao 1930s, and later in Hargeisa. These social organisations were later transformed into more structured organisation named the Somali National Society (SNS) in 1947, which again transformed itself into a political party, the Somali National Party (SNL).

In 1955 another political party was established the United Somali Party (NUF) mainly consisting of various politicians who had broken way from the SNL. The NUF was established mainly as a response to the British transfer of what was called at that time Haud and Reserved Areas to Ethiopia. Also, just prior to the June 1960 first general elections in the country, the United Somali Party (USP) was formed.

Somaliland's political consciousness took momentum in 1954 mainly as a result of the Haud and Reserve Area issue. The political parties attracted a good number of educated people. (1) Some civil servants who were educated in the Sudan and Britain. (2) New arrivals from the Arab world, particularly Yemen (Aden) and Egypt. The latter group had been influenced by the political upheavals in the Arab world, mainly emanating from Nasirism. They injected a spirited patriotism into the parties and among the prominent activists from Aden group were Ibrahim Ali Dualeh and Ahmed Ismail "Duqsi".

The SNL took the initiative to negotiate with the United Somali Party (USP) and proposed a possible merger or alliance so as to avoid any clan conflict that might have repercussions in the forthcoming election. This was an important move in the context of the political situation of the time.

After some negotiations, the two parties agreed to join forces each one retaining its name, and formed a new party Somali National League / United Somali Party (SNL/USP).

There was one main political difference between the SNL/USP and the NUF. The SNL/USP demanded immediate independence to pave the way towards a union with Somalia, whilst the NUF was in favour of some delay before independence so that more preparations could be made, particularly in the field of administration.

This nation state only exited for four days and was not allowed to develop, because it was absorbed by Somalia. The whole institutions of the state, the government, the parliament and even the leaders of the political parties took a flight to Mogadishu, leaving behind the Somaliland population and never come back.

The struggle, the efforts and the engagements that gave rise to this nation state though only existed for four days is in my view, constitutes an important aspect of Somaliland’ nation state. This reminds, me that nowadays, we view this period somehow, negatively, for instance, we don’t celebrate 26th June, as we should, and I don’t understand why not. We have to seriously discuss this matter. If we don’t give the respect that 26th June deserves, we may be denying an aspect of our history and our nationhood.

After 1991 serious steps were taken for the formation of Somaliland nation state. The struggle of the SNM and the struggle of so many Somlailanders, groups, individuals,outside the country and inside the country, including the Ufo group provides the background of the the formation of the second Republic.

What were the reasons that lead Somaliland to withdraw from the Union?

Some reasons are well known, particularly to the participants of this conference.

They were as a result of the persistent violation of human rights, and brutality of the military regime of Siyad Barre particularly to Isaq population, which can only be described as genocide. But there are other reasons, which are not known to many people.

THE ORIGINS OF NORTH / SOUTH MISTRUST

More than seventy years of British and Italian rule left behind some distinctive characteristics, attitudes, opportunities and way of life in each territory.

In June 1961, a referendum on the new constitution was carried out. The North, particularly the SNL strongholds, rejected the constitution expressing their dissatisfaction with the central government in Mogadishu. This was followed in December of the same year by a coup d'état embarked by some of the highest-ranking officials from the North led by Lieut. -Col. Hassan Abdullahi, (Kayd), a graduate from Sandhurst Military Academy in Britain.

Immediately after independence, some high-ranking officers from the South were transferred to the North. These officers were originally from the Italian police forces, since there were no military forces in the South. They did not have proper military training, but were quickly promoted to higher ranks. Although the coup was largely seen as a rejection of this injustice in the internal military promotion system, nevertheless it reinforced the mistrust that was already developing between the North and the South, even in the earlier years of the Union, the coup failed and those who were involved were eventually arrested and jailed, but were later released after one year because of a loophole in the law. The two countries, British Somaliland and Italian Somalia, had separate laws at the time and there was as yet no unified law with which these officers could be tried, Northerner officers' oath, to Queen Elizabeth of Britain was still intact. A few weeks later after the failed coup took place, the Interior Minister at that time Mr.Abdirazak Haji Hussein, arrived in Hargeisa and made a speech in which he reportedly said the following: "I was not thinking that so many people live in Hargeisa”. "Ma aan moodayninin in waxaan oo dad ehi Hargeisa u soo hoydaan". And "You were only one region in the past and we made you two regions". "Maxaad la qaylinaysaan hal gobol ayaad aheydeen, hadana waxaaan idinka dhignay laba Gobol". The Somali Landers, who always regarded themselves as a separate country before the Union of the two countries, conceived the remarks of the Interior Minister that he was deliberately underestimating their status and belittling their role in the Republic.

The following night, while the minister was in town, the SNL/USP general secretary, Mr. Jama Salah, a radical Socialist orator, levelled a critical attack on the Minister. He reminded him that such remarks would make the Northerners angry and give credibility to complaints of the northern military Coup leaders. There was no doubt that the Minister misread the feeling of the public in Somaliland and his remarks further alienated many people.

Northerners believed, while the Southerners were enjoying the fruits of the independence, they were excluded. The following poem, composed by a famous Northern poet, Abdullahi Sultan "Tima'ade", metaphorically addressing the Mogadishu parliament clearly summed up the feelings of the Somali Landers. In the poem, Tima'ade stated: "We are not a government which has surrendered but we thought it is the interests for both of us to be one single government, Your Excellencies. The harbour is for Mogadishu and Berbera harbour should be deserted without a single ship calling at it and all the coastal towns of the north to be left underdeveloped. These are two sets of treatments that are unacceptable, Your Excellencies". "Dowlad so gashay ma'ehine danteena laba diiday. Dunjigii Barlamaankow. Dakadii Xamar baa leh, Berbera daadku ha qaado, dooni yaaney ku leexan, Makhirkoos ha duloobo, duqeyddii barlamaankay labadaa kala daayaa"

1964 war with Ethiopia coincided with the first parliamentary election of the Republic and the euphoria of unity displayed during the war was severely undermined as a result of a massive election irregularity and vote rigging in many constituencies in the country. For example, in a small town called Aden Yabaal in the Southern part of the country, it was reported that the people who cast their vote and supported the ruling party, (SYL) was four times the population of the constituency. The same practice and even more disturbing had taken 1961 in Wanleweyn , during the vote for the constitution. It was announced that more than 100.000 voted yes for the constitution and supported the policy of the government of the day. The population of Wanleweyn was not even half of this number.

As a historical reminder of this event, the Somali Landers who were shocked at the scale of this political corruption then labelled the whole Southern population as Wanleweyn. From this day the nickname has been adopted consistently reminding people of what had had happened after the election.

The Republic inherited two contrasting civil service systems as a result of Italian and British colonial administrations. British left behind in the North highly qualified civil servant and a bureaucratic establishment. The civil servants had certificates and degree qualifications. By contrast the Italian colonial administration in Somalia had civil servants that enabled particularistic political interference. Furthermore, there were no clear and bureaucratically objective avenues for hiring, promotion, retention and dismissal. This created a lot of resentment and frustration in the minds of the Somaliland elite.

THE FORMATION OF THE SOMALI NATIONAL MOVEMENT (SNM)

The Somali National Movement (SNM) was formed in London in April 1981

The formation of the Somali National Movement (SNM.) was largely triggered by several factors. (1) The brutality and the Genocide of the military regime towards the Isaq population. 2) Since the formation of the Somali nation-state, the Southern political establishment downgraded the status of North and denied its uniqueness particularly since the military seized power. (3) Continuous constraints were put by Mogadishu central government on the business community in the North who were mainly involved in livestock trading and (4) the regional governors who were often Southerners were seen as oppressive and corrupt bribe-collectors. According to Brons (2001) “Political and economic discrimination against the Northern region had been a regular occurrence since the early post-independence years and turned into open hostilities and clan-related state terrorism directed against Isaq people”(p.186).

For instance, in the 1980s a group of intellectuals, including doctors, engineers and economists returned from abroad after completing their higher studies and started working in Hargeisa’s various government departments. They decided to improve the conditions of Hargeisa General Hospital. This drew the attention of the Hargeisa population who appreciated their actions, but made the regional military authorities nervous. They saw the popular support for reform as a challenge to their own rule. The group were all suspended from their jobs, tortured and arrested on November 2, 1981. Community leaders appealed for their release, but the government refused access even to their families. A plane took them to Mogadishu where they were transferred to a high security jail in Mogadishu called Labaatan Jirow and were detained there for more than eight years.

The group was accused of overthrowing the government and they were charged with high treason, under articles 54 and 17 of the military constitution, which implicitly means death sentence. They were released in 1989 when the regime was about to collapse.

As events unfolded the regime intensified its pressure on the Isaq population so as to isolate them for their support to the SNM, as well as other clans in the North. The 26th battalion, one of the strongest and best-equipped posts of the Somali armed force was stationed in the North. One of Siad Barre’ closest clan member and confidant, General Mohamed Hashi Gani who was promoted to the rank of General in a short period of time regardless of seniority, was transferred to Hargeisa to be the commander of this battalion. His main mission was to suppress any opposition, by using any means and methods he chose. General Gani was later replaced by the son in-law of Siad Barre, General Mohamed Morgan who continued this practice and imprisoned anyone who was perceived as an enemy. For instance, Morgan spelt out his strategy of suppression in a top-secret letter, dated 23 January 1987 and addressed to Siad Barre. The letter stated the removal of Isaq officers from the armed forces and freezing bank accounts belonging to Isaq clans specially those who were suspected as sympathisers to SNM.

While imprisonment and torture were going in the North, Siad Barre was trying to keep the Isaq members of his government on board. Sometimes, he sent some of them to the North to talk to the people and persuade them not to support or join the SNM. The Hargeisa population labelled these messengers Philip Habibs. This name originated from what the Somali Landers heard on the international radio stations. When the US Embassy in Beirut was bombed in the 1980s and many American Marines killed, Mr. Bush senior sent an American diplomat of Lebanese origin, called Philip Habib, to Lebanon to try and achieve some normality between the Lebanese radical forces and the United States.

The similarities of two situations were obvious. Like Phillip Habib, who failed in his mission in Beirut, Siad 's Barre messengers did not succeed either.

On September 29, 1988, a letter signed by 35 members of the Congress was sent to the then Secretary of State Mr. George P. Shultz to suspend all financial assistance to Somalia following numerous reports of massive human rights abuses by the military regime, according to (Washington Post, 1988) This was The first time that The United State came strongly against the military regime of Siyad Barre.

State and clan relationship

Clan networks were used during the struggle ultimately for the purpose of salvaging the state. Clans, or sub-clans by definition are not without conflict. The long dragging Somali civil in Somalia has provided a vivid example of this. After the downfall of the military regime, the two main warlords, General Mohamed Farah Aideed and Ali Mahdi Mohamed, who were fighting for the leadership of Somalia, belonged to the same clan, Hawiye. This did not help them to agree on the leadership of the country. The fact the two leaders belonged to two sub-clans, Habar Gider and Abgaal, further tore them apart.

In the Somalia peace conferences, clan considerations and clan division have become the corner stone of the Somalia nation state. This is in my view, this is a dangerous factor planted into the heart of Somalia nation state.

Clannishness has its role as an instrument for identification and even for social welfare purposes. Clan leaders have specific role to play in peace making and state construction, but traditional institutions such as “ clan system” cannot be a substitute for a modern state. As noted by Fagerlind & Saha (1997) the modern state needs participating citizens, who take an active interest in public affairs and who perform their duties as members of a community larger than that of kinship network.

THEORETICAL DEBATE: - Nationalism and Nation State

Let us think for a while, two concepts, Nationalism and nation-state. In the theoretical level the two are interlinked, but in practice they should be different. We conceive nationalism in this interpretation as an ideological movement or believe, while the state is more about actions such economical, political, social, and organisational engagements. The concept of secular nationalism was primarily associated with modernisation, industrialisation and capitalism. As an ideological movement it first arose in the countries of Western Europe: Britain, France and Germany around 1800, spreading later to central Europe and the Slavic countries, and then the rest of the world including Africa. Western or Central European versions of nationalism provide the criteria for subsequent types of nationalism.

African nationalism is generally seen as representing any organisation or group that explicitly asserts the rights, claims and aspirations of a given African people.

In this context, can we think about Somaliland nationalism, if we do how can we sustain it and experience it, because of there is no Somaliland nationalism it will be hardened to conceptualise and visualise a Somaliland nation state.

The definition and the role of the state have occupied the minds of political thinkers for centuries. Redhead (1984) defined the history of political thought as the history of the attempts over the centuries to answer the question, “Why should I obey the state?” The question has remained unchanged and still asked, regardless of the vast cumulative political experience over the years.

According to him the answers have ranged from several perspectives (1) Pragmatic - because, if I don't obey the representatives of the state it will cut my head off, (2) Theological - because it is God's will and I must obey it (3) Contractual - because the State and I have made an agreement (4) Metaphysical - because the state is the actuality of ethical ideas. The basis of the state as defined by Hegel "…is the power of reason actualising itself as will…. The state is the end of the dialectical process of history, the realisation of moral principles and concrete freedom. The development of the state is the development of absolute self-consciousness, the progressive realisation of freedom. The State is 'the march of God in the world'. The state is the whole of which the individual is part"(cited in Redhead, 1984; p.10).

The state, which historically originated in Europe, in its present form, largely grew out of warfare between various political units in the past. These political units brought with them the development of armies, bureaucracy and taxation, which were seen for many years as belonging to a particular group, often close to monarchies, as was the case in Britain and Holland (Coleman, 1995).

There was also an emotional aspect of loyalty built through an evolutionary process of democratisation and industrialisation. The state organisation gave rise to a national economy, a national standard of education, a national language, 'the myth of national history', territorial defence and territorial control. The essence of this is that the state would look after the individual, and the individual must obey the rules and the regulations of the state (ibid.).

The debate about the nation state took different dimensions as human civilisation progressed. Due to this background, for instance, B. Anderson (1991) defined the nation as follows:

"It is an imagined political community and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign. It is imagined because the members of even the small nations will never know most of their fellow members, meet them and hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion" (p.6).

The origin of a nation state in Africa can be traced mainly to three sources; (1) the African traditional and social system (2) The external factor, Colonial rule (3) and the liberation struggle against this rule. Cruise O'Brien draws our attention to how the state can be adapted to the African environment, but he stressed that more time is needed for its maturity, he writes:

The African state has now been adapted, tropicalised and steeped in the ethos and the rationality of social actors who have reshaped it to their own purposes. (In Manor, 1991, p.162).

State reconstruction in Somaliland

State restoration and re-construction in Somaliland in 1991-1993, particularly the success of the Borama conference is often credited to clan and religious leaders. Clan and religious leaders played a significant role in the process, but the statecraft reconstruction was put together by the civil society consisting of: - former civil servants, bureaucrats, technocrats, former ambassadors and military officials. The late President Mr. Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal, who was the first Prime Minister of Somaliland in 1960, and again the last civilian Prime Minister in the unitary Somali Government in 1967-1969, was elected in the Somaliland Borama Conference in 1993 because of his knowledge of the art of governance. Mr, Egal ‘s main contribution was to put in place the constitution of the Republic. a) The May 2001 referendum on the new constitution regarding the withdrawal from the Union with Somalia, b) December 2002 Municipal Elections and c) April 2003 Presidential Elections reinforced the process of state formation, but on the other hand some senior politicians have been often dragging back the country into clan politics ( shir beeleed). For instance, President Rayale was advised to delay the Presidential election of 2003. In my view President Rayale took a courageous decision to carryout the election. The Presidential election was a huge step in the direction of state formation and democratisation. At this point, we can also mention that the chairman of the Justice and Welfare Party (UCUD) Mr. Faisal Ali Farah, Fisal Ali Warabe who strongly often oppose the clan or Beel approach and supports the state approach and further democratisation in the country.

CONCLUTIONS

CHALANGES AND POSSIBILITIES

(a) CHALANGES:

Since Somaliland’s existence, those who often like to use the clan weapon challenge the Somaliland state. We can at least mention two occasions, first in 2001-2002, when a group of clan leaders who made their base in Buroa confronted the late President Egal’s government and the government almost used a force for its survival the second was January 2005, when the tradional council (the Guurti) made a challenge to the executive branch of the Government with an elected President. In this context, I am not commenting which side was right or wrong, I, just want to state that how dangerous it could be if we fail to understand, that behind every government stands a magic power called the state which holds together the wider society.

Somaliland state formation is not as yet complete in fact is just beginning. The believe in the tradional clan system is still predominant in the ideological, belief systems and social functioning of the society, and a society which still predominantly pastoralist this will remain with us for a long time. For a state to function, and function properly, however, it needs certain ethos culture and skills. It is here that the Diaspora is importantly needed to make contributions, if some of you return to the country.

(b) POSSIBLITIES:

We can mention several possibilities that Somaliland provides: -

Somaliland situates in a strategic place, it faces the Middle East where President George Bush wants to test his grand theory of Democratisation and fight against terrorism. In this context, we could persuade the United States Government to realise the importance of Somaliland for their sake.

Somaliland has a lot of economic potentialities, including petrol, Gas and mineral resources. Somaliland’s experience of peace and state building is a shining example in Africa. It has already given a practical answer to the African Renaissance theory and philosophy first developed by our beloved leader Nelson Mandela, built on self-reliance free and independence, what Prof. Igbal likes to call “Africa’s best kept secret.” REFERENCES

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Dr. MOHAMED-RASHID SH. HASSAN: (PhD in Political science. London University, School of Oriental & African Studies (SOAS), UK. M.A. in Social Anthropology. London University, School of Oriental & African Studies and London School of Economics and Political Science (SOAS & LSC) BA in sociology University of Grenwitch.UK. He is also a well –known journalist, and worked for BBC World Service, Somali Section as a producer and broadcaster over many years. He wrote numerous articles on Somaliland and the Horn of Africa. At present, Director of Africa Renaissance Center for Social Research, Media and Development ( Arecsmed) Hargeisa, Somaliland.
Contact : Email Address: rashid108@hotmail.com, Tele no: 00252-2- 517012, 00252-2-429498