Somaliland CyberSpace

The Academy Today Newsletter: Academy for Peace and Development - Issue 1,

The Academy Today - Issue 1, Vol.1, April 2007.
Academy for Peace and Development (APD)

http://www.apd-somaliland.org/docs/1apdt.htm

Contents of this Issue:

NEC on a Rope? The Need for Good Leadership

Just as the country emerges from one bruising unsettled political stand-off over the extension of the House of Elders, Somaliland finds itself once more plunged into a constitutional crisis. The President and the House of Representatives are at odds over the nomination and approval of a new National Electoral Commission, threatening to mark one more round of protracted political stalemate.

So far, the extension of the mandate of the previous National Electoral Commission by the House of Representatives on February 23 marked the peak of this latest political disagreement. The controversial move set the stage for yet another constitutional showdown between the President and the House, to take place before the Supreme Court. It resulted from a chain of events that began with a dispute over the process of selection of candidates for a new National Electoral Commission, following the expiry of the former commission’s term in January. From then on, the situation worsened in a series of tit-for-tat moves by the rival camps.

In the already polarised and entrenched political environment, where the key stakeholders perceive each other with deep distrust, and voices of reason are all too rare, a divisive performance in the formation of such an important and sensitive body as the National Electoral Commission may have major negative bearing on the democratisation process, for a number of reasons: firstly, elections looming large in Somaliland include the highest political office, the presidential post – thus, a lot is at stake, requiring broad acceptance of the process. Secondly, there is a perception that already the selection process of the NEC favours the incumbent government: the president nominates three candidates for the commission, the House of Elders (the Guurti) –often seen to be aligned with the president– nominates another two candidates, and the two opposition political parties are supposed to nominate only two. With such a system, it is even more vital that due process is seen to be followed, with specific attention paid to securing general confidence in the new commission. The third and final point is that a system in which the Opposition plays only a minor role in nomination, but is able to approve or reject each individual candidate through exercise of its majority in the lower House, a process that merely adheres to the rules without proactively attempting to build consensus with the Opposition is likely to result in stalemate; bogging Somaliland’s political system down in a time-consuming side battle, threatening to stall the electoral time table as well as major tasks such as voter registration.

Running elections involves the management of sensitive materials, which needs a broadly accepted NEC.

In the eyes of these challenges, the question is therefore how the diverse stakeholders with competing interests can achieve a competent, experienced and regionally-, clan- and gender-balanced commission that is broadly acceptable to all.

The best hope to overcome these challenges, as in previous situations, would be Somaliland’s traditional approach through consensus-based politics. In this particular case, it means holding a joint consultation of the stakeholders under the leadership of the President in order to reach a compromise on the nominees within the legal framework, but before they are submitted to the House for confirmation. Kulmiye, the leading opposition party, has long stated its acceptance of such consultations. Unfortunately, they never took off. Instead, the President, the Guurti and the chairman of UCID party (the other opposition party), nominated their respective choices, and Kulmiye withheld its nomination in protest, together triggering the above-mentioned tit-for-tat controversy.

Meanwhile, various quarters of society raised serious objections over the composition of the list of nominees. Women’s groups denounced the exclusion of women from the announced nominees, fearing that they might not even have one representative in the new commission. Elements of two major clans from the east of Somaliland, who were not included among the six nominees, made no secret of their opposition to the confirmation of the six candidates, unless the list was revised. Furthermore, the absence of all the previous members from the proposed new commission was a cause of concern for many observers. Not least, the donor community, who invested heavily in the previous elections, is deeply disappointed by the apparent lack of at least minimal continuity, and the resultant loss of hard-won experience.

The observed imbalances in the existing list of nominees put Kulmiye in an awkward position, and provided no good options. The party would have to kill three birds with one stone, that is: To come up with a nominee that addresses the gender issue, and the two missing major clans, and to safeguard experience. Selecting a female nominee from the Habar Jeclo clan certainly would have pleased women’s groups and probably Kulmiye’s main supporters, but the absence of the Dhulbahante from the incoming NEC would have politically alienated them further. The opposition party came under pressure from all interested sides, ultimately dividing the party leadership and making it even more difficult for Kulmiye to come up with a compromise choice.

Next Stop: Supreme Court.

Despite the growing grievances over the composition of the list of proposed commissioners, the President forwarded the six nominees to the House of Representatives for confirmation. Initially, and with an overwhelming majority, the House of Representatives refused on procedural grounds to table the list for a confirmation hearing: It criticised the list as incomplete, and therefore referred it back to the eligible parties. The House resolution, which had the backing of MPs of all three political parties, was meant to send a strong message to the stakeholders, including the President, to get their act together and to come up with an experienced, competent commission, balanced in terms of gender and region/clan and acceptable to all.

But hopes that the window of opportunity resulting from the House’s decision would be used to resolve this controversial issue were dashed when the Parliament, on the initiative of a group of Kulmiye MPs, took another controversial step: The lower chamber of parliament extended the term of the old commission by two years after the legal advisor of House endorsed the move. Key opposition figures saw their extension of the Commission as an equivalent to the contested extension of the Guurti, which the President had supported earlier. Some MPs argued that their support for the move was intended “to raise the stakes“ and force the President and the Guurti to compromise with the Opposition and the Parliament.

Observers immediately doubted that this development would compel the President and the Guurti to negotiate or give in, rather seeing it as further escalation of the conflict. Meanwhile, many believe that a reasoned decision to reject all or some of the forwarded nominees in the course of a formal review process in the House, where the opposition parties claim to have the necessary votes, would more effectively force the President and the Guurti either to nominate alternative candidates or to compromise in other areas. But for some reason, Kulmiye and the Parliament do not appear to have considered this option.

Many people, including moderate members of Kulmiye, saw the controversial extension of the old NEC as a strategic mistake and counter-productive. It looked obvious that the party’s interest lay with the progression of the electoral process in order to hold the crucial elections on schedule. The tit-for-tat tactics however risk derailing the process and providing the incumbent government with justifications to postpone elections. Furthermore, a continuation of the political “trench war“ is ultimately seen to challenge the country’s political stability.

Photo. Shukri Bandare, the only woman in the previous NEC, in action during the parliamentary polls in 2005.

Each side has its own standpoint on the ongoing crisis. Senior government officials close to the President maintain that his three nominees were selected in good faith and that he had no influence whatsoever on the Guurti nominations, as charged by critics. Furthermore, the President reportedly felt that the opposition had the opportunity to block any nominees – including his – in the course of the process at the House of Representatives, where they have the majority. He is believed to favour the plain legal procedure over pre-procedural consultations, even if this is unlikely to produce a broadly accepted NEC.

On the other hand, Kulmiye’s hardliners offer their own rationale. They perceive the current deadlock as an extension of many previous confrontations, where the President mostly succeeded in getting things his way. The stalemate is not considered an isolated incident, but part of the pattern in which the government allegedly disregards the opposition political parties’ viewpoints and concerns, failing to consult on sensitive national issues in which they have a stake: “the President does not recognise or understand that the political parties are national institutions that have a role in policy-making“, stated a senior official in Kulmiye. These elements in Kulmiye believe that they have the right to play hardball with the President and to confront him head-on “as a natural reaction“ because they feel provoked. In wider perspective, however, it seems that it is one thing to give the President a hard time, and quite another to achieve tangible concessions from him.

The stand-off over the formation of a new Commission took another twist when the government actively discharged the old members of NEC from the scene. This became a focal point of political wrangling on February 19, as the President instructed the old commissioners to hand over the office to the Director General of the NEC. In their response, the old commissioners characterised the President’s approach as inappropriate and disrespectful. They also advised the President that their legal status was still in dispute, since the House had extended their term. Finally, they stated they would only hand over the office to another legal commission, rather than to a representative of the executive. Political observers saw this last public statement of the old NEC as unnecessarily provocative, further aggravating the situation.

Photo. Former NEC Chairman Axmed Xaaji Cali Adami, UCID Chairman Faysal Cali Warabe and Vice-President Axmed Yuusuf Yaasiin (from left to right) at the signing of the Code of Conduct for the Parliamentary Elections. Consensus-based politics were the key to resolving many earlier challenges of democratisation.

After abortive attempts, including by the Academy, to reconcile the two sides, the President ordered the seizure of NEC’s premises. Three officials: the Head of the Civil Service Commission, the Auditor General, and the Accountant General, entered NEC’s premises in the absence of the old Commission and, along with the Director General, took stock of the furniture and the other equipment in the offices. Then they sealed the buildings and officially handed the responsibility to the DG of NEC.

This seizure and removal of the old commissioners could not have come at a worse time for the government, since it was already under pressure for its jailing and contested trial of three journalists who had been arrested on charges of slandering the President and his family. Though the public reaction to these incidents was rather mute, responses from the Somaliland Diaspora, and the International Community, who were closely monitoring the situation, were outspoken. In particular, the Diaspora noted that these unfortunate incidents marred Somaliland’s democratic credentials and observed Somaliland to be on a slippery slope towards autocratic rule. As for the International Community, it has been reported that they have expressed their deep concerns to the government, as well as to both chambers of Parliament, through personal channels, and some are in the process of reviewing their support to Somaliland’s democratisation process.

So far, mediation efforts to break the deadlock did not bear fruit. From today’s perspective, two steps appear necessary to clear the way for a breakthrough on this issue: 1. The Supreme Court’s nullification of the old NEC’s extension by the House of Representatives. This is likely to happen any time soon. 2. The rejection of all or some of the six current nominees by the House in the course of a formal review and confirmation process. Realizing this second step looks far more difficult, because it is not clear whether the opposition or the wider House is ready to accept a review of only six candidates. However, from the current position, it seems to be the only approach that would clear the road for subsequent consensus building, as the President argues that, for political reasons, he cannot withdraw his submitted nominees prior to negotiation. Ultimately, the opportunity for consultation would therefore arise only if and when the House rejects all or many of the current nominees.

In any case, March has now passed and the countdown to the local elections in December and presidential elections next April is on, yet the process is flagging. With no NEC in place or within sight, the voter registration process is effectively dead for the moment. The country has to face the prospect of local as well as presidential elections without prior voter registration.

The necessity to nominate a new NEC at this time has been known for years in advance. The on-going debacle is a classic example of the failure of Somaliland’s leadership – both in the government camp and on the opposition side – to reach a collective decision on a vitally important matter for the sake of national interest. Instead of cooperating responsibly to solve this pressing problem, we find the leadership engaged in a partisan point-scoring game. Moreover, with the NEC ’on a rope’, Somaliland’s sovereign cannot hold representatives accountable in a timely and qualitative manner.

Particularly at this critical moment in Somaliland’s history, we cannot afford to compromise on the fairness, inclusiveness or integrity of the democratic process. The future of this country is our common responsibility and we must proceed in a spirit of mutual respect, tolerance and accommodation. It is sincerely hoped that this will be taken into account as all parties strive to ensure that the window of opportunity is reopened.

A Note from Mohammed Saeed Gees, Executive Director of the Academy for Peace and Development

In close collaboration with its principal partner INTERPEACE, the Academy for Peace and Development (APD) has been involved at the heart of Somaliland’s efforts to build peace and a democratic state since its inception in 1999. At this stage, we are pleased to launch The Academy Today, a newsletter intended to provide you with timely, informative, incisive and objective analysis of “where things stand“ in Somaliland’s continuing state and peace building process. The Academy Today aims to bring issues to the floor that otherwise threaten to escape the attention of decision-makers and the wider public. By placing particular emphasis on longer-term developments, and comparing Somaliland’s challenges with those of other young democracies, we seek to take topics from the broader and non-partisan angle that we often find missing from the short-lived world of today’s media and politics. Yet after eight years of existence, it is also time for the Academy as an institution to inform the public more regularly of highlights in its activities and notable developments in its programmes. In 2006, we have taken a first step by launching our new website at

  • http://www.apd-somaliland.org We invite you to regularly check out the latest news about the Academy online. The page also allows you and others to subscribe to the mailing list that we use to circulate the electronic version of The Academy Today and other current information such as invitations to our public events.

    Analysis: The Dilemma of Introducing Constitutional Reform

    Somaliland’s constitution is under constant strain from various fronts. All too often, the power struggles between the executive and legislative branches over constitutional issues expose its serious limitations and deficiencies in crucial areas, such as the separation of powers and strong checks and balances. As a product of complex compromise between the executive and legislative branches in the mid-1990s, many aspects of the constitution fail to provide satisfactory or even clear solutions to challenges. Furthermore, the constitution contains numerous loopholes, omissions and contradictions. The development of clear and detailed secondary laws has not progressed very far, thus, regulatory frameworks, procedures and enforcing mechanisms remain undefined or in doubt. Often times, these are the roots of constitutional disputes that lead to protracted political stalemates and tension.

    Furthermore, this situation is deteriorating because the safeguarding and mediating institutions of the constitution are losing their effectiveness. In the Somaliland context, the Guurti played a prominent and widely recognised mediating and stabilising role for a long time. While Guurti members and supporters maintain that the current Guurti would continue to play a stabilising role for some time to come, it has come under serious criticism following its self-granted mandate extension by four years in May 2006. Sceptics of the Guurti argue that an increasing politicisation of the Guurti has undermined its credibility as an honest and neutral broker between competing factions. The dispute over the mandate extension and the continuing lack of an electoral mechanism for the Guurti have also placed its future political status under scrutiny. The role of the Guurti in the new political arrangement - next to a popularly elected lower House of Parliament and President – is therefore under review.

    Moreover, the judiciary - more specifically the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court; the institutions that typically manage constitutional conflict in democratic societies - have rarely played an important role in the arbitration of such disputes. But with the increasing heat of the power struggles between legislative assembly and executive branch, it is being tested further, and is proving ever more unable to live up to the challenge. In the eyes of the public, the judiciary has so far proved neither independent nor competent to resolve constitutional disputes. The courts’ capacity aside, this is also a result of the lack of frameworks and mechanisms of proper judicial review, including a mechanism to ensure that the respective rulings are actually implemented.

    For Somaliland’s fledgling democracy, this constitutional environment is very discouraging. There is a need for a constitutional reform in order to continue the development of a positive regulatory framework for Somaliland’s politics, and to strengthen the very foundations of its constitutional democracy.

    The call for constitutional reform is not new. Already in 2003, barely two years after the constitution was ratified, analysts familiar with Somaliland politics were recommended a comprehensive constitutional review to further the country’s democratisation process. During the same year, a law review committee established by the Ministry of Justice with the help of UNDP identified the need to review Somaliland’s constitution. The committee categorized the task into three broad challenges, the need to: 1. Remove the transitional provisions, 2. Adapt ‘the text’ or the language used in some provisions and 3. To change ‘the substance’ of some provisions.

    But it was not until November 2004 that a first public debate on the issue took place, when the Academy for Peace and Development (APD) – based on months of consultations and discussions with key stakeholders – presented a research and dialogue proposal on constitutional review and reform to a National Project Group Meeting in Hargeisa. As part of the APD/INTERPEACE Dialogue for Peace, the conference brought together more than 80 delegates from the central and local government, the Houses of Parliament, civil society, and other concerned groups. The aim was to have a first national debate on the issue of constitutional review and to garner the support of all the key institutions for APD to facilitate this national exercise. The Vice-President of Somaliland, who opened the two-day meeting, weighed in with strong arguments in support of the proposal, stating that “our constitution is responsible for most of our political ills.“ It may have been only his personal view and position, because at the end of the conference, the proposal of constitutional review and reform was abandoned, following stiff opposition from the government. Three prominent ministries objected in an unusually strong manner, implicitly indicating how deeply worried they were about the proposed process. Among their claims was that the country could not afford a constitutional review during an election year, and that this sensitive matter should be left for the incoming elected House of Representatives to deal with.

    Initially, the results of the parliamentary elections in 2005 seemed to be a cause for optimism on the issue. Having the opposition political parties winning control of the House of Representatives seemed to offer the best chance of initiating reforms, possibly including a constitutional review. Many members of the opposition camp voiced enthusiasm for more and deeper reforms in order to develop better checks and balances between the three branches of government. But after one year in control of the House, the opposition has little to show in terms of political reform, except for a number of resolutions and motions calling on the executive to adhere to the constitution.

    Even if the opposition in the House of Representatives had initiated such reforms – as many had hoped – the chances of pushing these reforms through appear slim. Any changes introduced by the House – particularly the ones that would curb the executive’s power – would likely be rejected by the Guurti (the Upper House) and the President.

    Furthermore, the opposition MPs are unable to override such vetos since they do not hold two-thirds of the total vote. Nevertheless, critics argue that it would have been a positive development if the House had at least initiated a reform process, albeit its seemingly minimal chances of endorsement. Most importantly, such efforts would have enhanced the image of the House and would expose the executive to a substantial debate. Vigorous, evidence-based discussions in the public arena and the development of detailed proposals on such reforms in the House could have made it much harder for the Guurti and the Government to reject reforms in total.

    If Somaliland’s fledgling democratisation process is to be continued and deepened, and if the country should be spared further political stalemates, political reform including a constitutional review appears inevitable. Therefore, a comprehensive constitutional review is also among the recommendations put forward in the recent APD/INTERPEACE publication on the parliamentary elections (“A Vote for Peace“ http://www.apd-somaliland.org

    It is obvious that any specific measures of constitutional reform will always draw opposition from one quarter and support from another. But the key challenge at this stage remains to initiate a constitutional review and reform at all. Those who benefit from the status quo are likely to maintain a fundamental allergy to the very idea of change. For them, constitutional reform represents a threat to their influence or privileges. Others might belittle the idea as the desire of a few reform-minded ‘idealists’. Hardliners among the opposition political parties would probably see it as their chance ‘to get back at the government’. These various views not only complicate the initiation of any constitutional reform process, they also indicate the covert sources of opposition or support that proposals will receive, and the extent to which they may become the culmination of intense political conflict.

    Therefore, it will be essential to first bring all the key actors on board. An ad-hoc joint Constitutional Working Group could first lay the ground for a preliminary constitutional review. Their mandate could include: proposing workable ground rules; conducting a rough preliminary review of the constitution; and identifying key contradictions, omissions and areas of concern. One way of going about the actual review might be to start with the least controversial issues, such as the changes that are merely of a technical nature – agreed editing to some of the wording, or removal of outdated transitional provisions. Getting started and building the necessary confidence amongst the relevant stakeholders could then open up the prospect of tackling the real bones of contention.

    APD Insight: The Burco Dilemma Striking a Balance between Troubleshooting and Peace Building

    Sporadic clan confrontation in some parts of the country remains a security challenge to Somaliland. There has been a notable surge in the number of tribal conflicts in February 2007, including the potential to spread into Somaliland’s major urban centres such as Hargeisa and Burco. Most of them are over land and revenge killings. There were about four such clan disputes involving Somaliland’s rival clans in and out of Somaliland’s territory. The first involved two sub-clans of Warsangeli and Sa’ad Yonis of Habar Yonis, in Sanaag region. The accidental killing of a Sa’ad Yonis man in a car ambush by a Warsangeli man triggered this stand-off. In Sool region, disputes over land have led to clashes between members of Habr Jeclo and Dhulbahante sub-clans, which led to the death of four people and the wounding of nine. Another sub-clan conflict in Saaxil region pitted elements of Ciisse Musse (Habar Awal) and Habr Jeclo sub-clans against each other, claiming two lives. Finally, the incident causing the greatest fatalities took place around the town of Daroor, in Ethiopia’s Somali Region near the border with Somaliland, and it was between rival members of Habr Yonis and Eidagale sub-clans. According to news reports, 43 people were killed, 50 wounded, and scores of others fled. Though it took place inside Ethiopia, Somaliland bore the brunt of the conflict. Hospitals in Hargeisa and Burco received dozens of wounded.

    Many such confrontations are resolved through the mediation of the traditional elders, since the law enforcement institutions, and regional and local authorities are ill-equipped to manage these conflicts. Though the government allocates over fifty percent of its national budget to the security sector, in most areas of Somaliland, the force does not have adequate resources for even basic operational needs. Many stations lack transport and communications to keep order in case of such emergencies.

    But traditional mediation also requires resources to quickly dispatch carefully selected elders to the conflict zone, and the means to do so are hard to find. Whenever a conflict cannot be resolved locally, posing the danger of serious escalation, regional and local authorities and civic leaders lose a great deal of valuable time soliciting funds and other support for such peace missions. In desperation, they leave no stone unturned, but the danger of further violence looms until they succeed in mobilising the necessary resources.

    As a result, the Academy for Peace and Development (APD), particularly at its recently established office in Burco, receives a continuous stream of funding requests from regional governments, local authorities and civic leaders seeking support for interventions in the name of peace. The APD Burco office was established in 2005 with the help of INTERPEACE to initiate political dialogue in the region, particularly in the city of Burco. The aim is to rebuild community relationships at all levels, a process critical to the consolidation of peace and security in the Central and Eastern part of the country. These programmes pursue mid- to long-term goals in peace building – but recurrent immediate crises overwhelm the Academy with demands for direct funding and support for short-term mediation missions. APD faces difficulties providing such assistance to what sometimes are critical peace missions, because they are outside of its funding mandate. At times, the scenario puts the Academy in an uneasy situation: providing direct support can only be done from the Academy’s meagre own resources, affecting the organisation’s possibilities to invest and develop. But failure to assist crucial peace initiatives entails an even greater risk of damaging the trust of communities or losing the confidence of the public.

    In such situations, particularly when the mission in question is very critical, APD has to improvise in order to come up with some kind of direct support. Through this pragmatism, the Academy was able to provide assistance in resolving two of the recent conflicts. In Sanaag, APD not only gave direct support, but some of its staff also went to participate personally in the mediation process. Addressing the conflict in Togdheer, the Burco Office contributed transport for the mediation mission. Similarly, the Academy has provided direct assistance and at the same time led efforts to solicit funds for the abortive mission to Daroor. The latter failed after the Ethiopian authorities took over the management of the conflict.

    Several reasons explain why the APD office in Burco attracts the attention of community leaders who seek this assistance. The full name of the Academy contains the word ‘Peace’. Many see the organisation as a peace agency responsible for “fixing the peace“. APD’s past and present activities, facilitating political dialogue among regional actors, partly contributes to this misunderstanding. But ultimately, it is a matter of context: APD’s mission is primarily to deal with the structural causes of conflict, so that future violent conflict can be prevented. Addressing specific, immediate conflicts through mediation or facilitation of ceasefires remains the mandate of traditional and government leaders. Nevertheless, it is clear that the two challenges are interdependent. In a nutshell, efforts to rebuild community relationships cannot be successful while bullets are flying, just as a ‘fire-fighter’ approach to conflict resolution is unsustainable. Thus, in those parts of Somaliland where small-scale violent conflict continues to be a common and regular problem, the Academy is challenged to strike an effective balance between assisting in short term ‘troubleshooting’ and in long-term peacebuilding efforts.

    New Dialogue for Peace Publications & Films

    APD and INTERPEACE have finalised three reports summarising the findings of three entry point programmes that were undertaken under the Dialogue for Peace in Somaliland since 2004. The full reports (in English) as well as Executive Summaries (in English and Somali) are available at our website:>http://www.apd-somaliland.org/news/20061112dfppublic.htm

    A Vote for Peace. How Somaliland successfully hosted its first Parliamentary Elections in 35 years. September 2006. English, 74 pp. Download.

    Local Solutions. Creating an Enabling Environment for Decentralisation in Somaliland. October 2006. English, 43 pp. Download

    From Plunder and Profit to Prosperity and Peace. Resolving Resource-based Conflict in Somaliland. November 2006. English, 43 pp. Download

    APD and INTERPEACE have finalised three documentary films on three entry point programmes that were undertaken under the Dialogue for Peace in Somaliland since 2004. They are available in English and Somali from APD's offices. We will inform you through the website and The Academy Today once we have developed a channel to distribute the films outside of Somaliland.

    A Vote for Peace (Doorashada Golaha Baarlamanka) (2006) Documentary on the Parliamentary Elections in 2005. 41 min., Somali and English version.

    Local Solutions (Maamul-daaddejinta) (2006) Documentary on Decentralisation in Somaliland. 21 min., Somali and English version.

    From Plunder and Profit to Prosperity and Peace (Boob iyo Bursi ku doorso Nabad iyo Badhaadhe) (2006) Documentary on Resource-based Conflict in Somaliland. 31 min., Somali and English version.

    At the end of 2006, the Culture and Communication Unit of the Academy completed a participatory video on “Minority Exclusion in Somaliland“ and a video guide for participatory video training, in cooperation with Oxfam Novib (also see Short News).

    Furthermore, the C’n’C Unit currently produces a short film about UNDP’s Small Arms Registration Project in Somaliland. The purpose of the film is to raise awareness and to encourage society to legally register their their privately owned weapons.

    Short News: People and Programmes

    INTERPEACE and APD kick off Dialogue for Peace, Phase II Following the successful conclusion of the first phase of the 'Dialogue for Peace', INTERPEACE and APD decided to continue to work on the three entry points that constituted the previous Dialogue for Peace:
    # Democratisation
    #Decentralisation
    #Natural Resource-based Conflict #
    Launch of the Publications of the Dialogue for Peace, Phase I

    New Projects at the Academy

    In addition to and complementing the existing projects, funding for three new projects has recently been secured:
    Women in Peace Building and Decision-Making
    ‘Mapping’ the Peace Processes in Somaliland’s history
    Local Governance and Land-based Conflicts (Capacity Building Project)

    The next issue of the newsletter will introduce these new projects in detail.

    APD Office in Hargeisa.

    Participatory Video on Minority Exclusion at World Social Forum

    At the end of November 2006, non-governmental organizations from Hargeisa, Mogadishu, Garowe and Baidoa took part in a Participatory Video (PV) workshop by Oxfam Novib conducted with the support of the Institute for Development Studies (UK) and ‘Equal in Rights’ (Netherlands) in Hargeisa. The aim of PV is to empower communities through stimulating reflection and to experience exchange on rights-based development. During the workshop, the Somaliland Team, composed of members of the Academy for Peace and Development (APD), NAGAAD, Somaliland National Disability forum (SNDF), and Voice of Somaliland Minority Women Organization (VOSOMWO), prepared a PV titled “Minority Exclusion in Somaliland“. The 30-minute video focuses on the nature, causes and possible solutions of exclusion and discrimination based on gender and disability. Together with the videos of the other regional teams, this film was presented at the “Human Dignity and Human Rights Caucus“ of the World Social Forum (WSF) from January 20-25, 2007 in Nairobi.

    Opening Ceremony, World Social Forum 2007, Nairobi

    Boobe Publishes a new Book about the SNM and the Restoration of Somaliland’s Sovereignty

    “Dhaxal-reeb: Horaad“ - “Leaving a Heritage“ is the second book published by Boobe Yuusuf Ducaale, APD’s Programme Coordinator and former Secretary of Information and Secretary of the Central Committee of the Somali National Movement (SNM). It is a collection of long serial articles that Boobe had written for websites and newspapers between May 2002 and December 2006. These articles, both historical and analytical, concern the liberation war of the SNM and the overall reconstruction of Somaliland. The book is rich and eventful and covers a variety of themes related to history, politics, literature, culture and the life histories of the leaders and some of the rank and file of the decade-long liberation war of the SNM. The author describes "Leaving a Heritage" as an appetizer and a prelude to an upcoming historical book on the saga of the SNM, which will be called “The days that have passed us“. The latter will be printed soon as much of it has already been drafted.

    In 2006, Boobe Yuusuf Ducaale had already published the 2nd Edition of ‘The Life and Poetry of Timacadde’. The book has recently won the ‘Book of the Year 2006’ Medal of the Somaliland Writer's Association, awarded on March 3, 2007 in Stockholm, where Boobe will be represented by Cabdillaahi Fidar and Cabdillaahi Faarax.

    Details of the latest book: ‘Dhaxal-reeb: Horaad’ (Leaving a Heritage, Volume I), 517 pages in Somali, published in 2007 by Flamingo Printing Press in Addis Ababa.

    Boobe Yuusuf Ducaale

    Team News: Fellow wraps up Successful Stay with the Academy

    Christina Rosendahl, a student of Political Science from the German University of Leipzig recently completed her 7 week fellowship at the Academy for Peace and Development.

    Her stay in Hargeisa mainly served to conduct interviews for her Diploma Thesis on donor policies in failed and re-emerging states, focusing on the European Union’s engagement with Somalia and Somaliland. As part of her engagement with the Academy, Christina will write a discussion paper on “The European Union in Somaliland – Development Assistance in an Unrecognized State“. We are glad that Christina stayed with us as the first of a series of fellows who are planning to visit Somaliland this year.

    Christina with APD Team

    Imprint

    This newsletter is published by the Academy for Peace and Development, Hargeisa, Somaliland, in partnership with INTERPEACE. Views expressed above are the sole responsibility of APD. For further information, please visit our website at: http://www.apd-somaliland.org, where we also provide a pdf version of The Academy Today.

    To subscribe to or unsubscribe from the Academy’s electronic mailing lists, including the newsletter, visit http://www.apd-somaliland.org/mailing.htm.