Table of contents 
Executive summary7.
I. Introduction 3 
1 Aim and expected outcome of the study 9 
1.1 Aim9 
1.2 Objectives9  
1.3 Utilisation of the study 9 
1.4 Expected outcome 11  
2. Methodology of the study 11  
2.1 Terminology 11  
2.2 Selection of literature 11 
2.3 Research methodology 11 
2.4 Time frame and location of the study12 
3. Structure of the report 12
II. Internal situation of Somalia and Somaliland 12 
1. Political, economic and social situation in Somalia and Somaliland 12 
2. Civil society of Somalia and Somaliland 14.
III. Somalia and the international community 14 
1. Levels of international assistance 14 
2. Main actors in the international community and their interaction 14  
2.1 UN and Somalia 15  
2.2 OAU/AU and Somalia 16 
2.3 IGAD and the Somali peace process 17 
2.4 G8 and OECD 18  
2.5 EU and Somalia18 
2.5.1 General remarks 18  
2.5.2 EU Council of General Affairs and External Relations conclusions on Somalia19   
2.5.3 EU development policy 19 
2.5.4 Cotonou Agreement 20 
2.5.5 European Development Fund 22  
2.5.6 EC Strategy for the Implementation of Special Aid to Somalia 22.
IV. EU member states and Somalia 24 
1 General remarks 24  
2 EC and its member states 24  
3 EU member states’ overall strategy assisting Somalia and Somaliland25 
4 EU member states’ view on the EU co-operation and strategy26 .
5 EU member states’ observations and views on neighbouring countries and regional organisations 27 
V. Recommendations 27  
1 Observations and recommendations at international level28  
1.1 Giving Somalia and Somaliland higher priority 28 
1.2 Member states view on the role of the EU28 
1.3 Member states co-operation 29  
1.4 Integrating with the African Union 29 
1.5 Using the innovations of the Cotonou Agreement 29 
1.6 Strengthening strategic development assistance 30 
1.7 Integrating the Diaspora 30 
2 Observations and recommendations at regional level30 
2.1 Supporting the peace process 30 
2.2 Fostering regional integration 30  
2.3 The war economy, drugs and small arms trafficking 30 
3 Observations and recommendations at Somali internal level 30 
3.1 More information needed31 
3.2 Focusing on special sectors31 
3.3 Expectations of local NGOs31  
3.4 Building structures and strategic alliances 31 
3.5 New types of NGOs 31  
3.6 Questions to Somali civil society 32 
VI. Conclusion 33 
Bibliography 34
Annexes 36 

-List of abbreviations

ACP Africa Caribbean Pacific
AU African Union
CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy
CPN Conflict Prevention Network
CSO Civil Society Organisation
DAC Development Assistance Committee 
EC European Commission
ECHO European Humanitarian Office
EDF European Development Fund
EEC European Economic Community
EU European Union
FAO Food and Agriculture Organisation
G 7 Group of Seven
G 8 Group of Eight
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GNI Gross National Income
HDI Human Development Index
HIPC Highly Indebted Poor Countries
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross
IGAD Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IGADD Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development 
ILO International Labour Organisation
IMF International Monetary Fund
INGO International Non-Governmental Organisation
IPRSP Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
M Million
MEP Member of the European Parliament
NY New York
NEPAD New Partnership for Africa’s Development
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation
NAO National Authorising Officer
OAS Organisation of African States
OAU Organisation for African Unity
OCT Overseas Countries and Territories
ODA Official Development Assistance
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PR China People’s Republic of China
SACB Somalia Aid Co-ordination Body
SADC Southern African Development Community
TACIS Technical Assistance for the Commonwealth of Independent States
TNG Transitional National Government
UK United Kingdom
UN United Nations
UNCHR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
UNFPA United Nations Population Fund
UNIFEM United Nations Development Fund for Women
UNPOS United Nations Permanent Office for Somalia
US/USA United States of America
USAID United States Agency for International Development
USD US Dollar
WFP World Food Programme
WHO World Health Organisation
WTO World Trade Organisation

This report was prepared for Novib Somalia by Professor Brigitte Fahrenhorst. It was edited for Novib Somalia by Marguerite Garling and Verity Johnson. Any errors and omissions are the responsibility of Novib Somalia. Thanks are due to the embassies, the EC Somalia Unit, the SACB and other organisations who participated in this study for their cooperation and time.

Executive Summary

This study on donor policy and development assistance towards Somalia and Somaliland aims at providing information to Somali civil society on the nature of the international community, the provision of development assistance and the internal coherence of donor policies and imple­mentation. It focuses on the EU (EC and member states) as collectively the largest donor to Somalia and Somaliland. It serves to explain the character of the EU and its constituent member states’ activities (within the framework of the international community) and also outlines their views concerning the future development of Somalia and Somaliland. To enhance co-operation between the international community and Somali civil society, the study outlines donor organisations’ needs and concerns and poses some challenges to Somali civil society.

The study is integrated into the larger programme of Novib Somalia and accompanied by a second study on the mapping of the civil society in Somalia and Somaliland. The expected outcome of the two studies (and other activities initiated by Novib Somalia) is a Somali civil society col­lective vision paper for the reconstruction of Somalia and development of Somaliland and the collective commitment of the international com­munity to the Somali civil society vision. Having had no state structures for several years the situation of Somalia is unique and requires the consolidated and concentrated support of the international community. In the absence of functioning state structures and as part of the social transformation process that Somalia is undergo­ing, civil society in Somalia is emerging and playing an increasingly important role in taking over the roles and responsibilities tradition­ally undertaken by the state. Civil society organisations are providing services, becoming political actors as channels for representation and are the partners of international development agencies. Therefore, both parties – civil society organisations and the actors of the international community – need better information about their partners’ specific char­acter, strengths and potential. This report is aimed at providing the basis for Somali civil society and administrative bodies to better understand the EU, the broader international community, and their decision-making processes.

The findings of the study are mainly based on interviews conducted with the EC Delegation in Nairobi, the embassies of the EU member states and other important actors of the international community. The study took place in the summer of 2002. Because the Somali reconciliation process is still ongoing some of the findings may have undergone further development by the time the study is published.

The member states’ individual policies are in line with overall EC policy and activities due to the joint formulation and agreement of the EC Strategy for the Implementation of Special Aid to Somalia strategy by all EU member states. As an overall strategy member states have agreed to accept the territorial integrity of Somalia, although attitudes towards Somaliland are varied, and to support the emergence of peace and stability in Somalia and the whole region. The member states evaluate their approach and that of the EC in assisting Somalia and Somaliland as coherent. Taking into account the political diversity within the EU member states themselves, small differences in development assistance and policy will and should always remain. There are advantages in this diversity.

Specifically with regard to development assistance, the member states are in practice mostly following the “peace dividend” approach by pro­viding the larger part of their assistance to Somaliland and peaceful parts of Somalia. Member states mostly channel their development assistance through international NGOs or UN organisations. All member states mentioned their uncertainty in deciding on local Somali co-operation partners and the difficulties of knowing who is representing whom. Nevertheless, more direct contact is wanted. It is noted that in conflict-ridden Somalia many decisions are made by the member states under conditions of uncertainty and are in practice greatly influenced by the physical insecurity in Somalia. Mechanisms should be institutionalised to provide information to the EC and the EU member states on Somali internal development and on the needs and strengths of the development stakeholders. The proposal to form a non-state actors forum is a step in this direction. The stakeholders should also participate in formulat­ing strategic approaches to contribute to a comprehensive development strategy for Somalia and Somaliland. To guarantee full involvement of all stakeholders single actors must be strengthened through cooperation (e.g. umbrella groups).

Somalia and Somaliland are not classified as focal countries and there­fore most member states do not formulate Country Strategy Papers for Somalia/Somaliland. Nevertheless it would be beneficial for member states to develop strategic approaches for Somalia and Somaliland, despite the limited resources available. Strategic assistance should not only focus on supporting single activities but should clearly place em­phasis upon the long-term development of stable structures. To support an extensive and sustainable development approach the administrative structures must be integrated as development partners and not be weak­ened by the exclusive financing of NGOs. In order to achieve the most effective and sustainable impact, mechanisms must be institutionalised to bring administrative bodies and NGOs together to develop common planning tools and to allocate responsibilities. The donor community should assist this process. Yet, for NGOs and CSOs the scope of their activities is limited due to their frequently low capacity, their specific objectives and their often-isolated target groups. To really assist CSOs in their own institution-building a range of supportive measures must be implemented:
* Long-term supervision to assist capacity-building
* A combination of short-term project financing and longer term institution-building
* Financial adaptation to the slow growth of capacity (no over-funding)
* Support for integration into regional networks in order to facili­tate exchange of information and to open up the possibility of wider perspectives New types of NGOs should emerge in Somalia and Somaliland that could strongly contribute to:
* Formulation of a Somali development strategy and action plans
* Demands for social and political change and development
* Communication with donors to foster a more comprehensive and strategic development approach
* Planning, programming, monitoring and evaluation of develop­ment activities
* Informing the Somali population, as well as the international community, on development, human rights and political issues
* Development of political and strategic alliances with regional and international NGOs (e.g. policy “watch”-NGOs, not only donor-NGOs)
* Participation in regional and continental decision-making pro­cesses regarding Somalia and Somaliland.

Many member states pointed out that there is a need to shift from humanitarian and emergency relief to development assistance. This strategic approach should be formulated with the new mechanism of the non-state actors forum proposed by the EC. Special emphasis should be given to assisting the development of the health and education sectors. The next priority should be the development of water supply and agricul­ture. Assistance should also be focused on demobilisation. Most member states noted the need to help erode the power of the warlords and to implement the arms embargo. The militias should be offered incentives to dissuade them from continuing violence, including demobilisation with attached incentives.

The member states share a common position regarding the frontline states and IGAD, which is to strengthen their role in the peace process by supporting the development of a joint position. The international community as well as the Somali stakeholders should not only focus on the internal development of Somalia and Somaliland, but also on regional integration.

The findings, analysis and recommendations of this report were dis­cussed at a one-day conference on ‘Donor Assistance, Policy Coherence and Civil Society in Somalia and Somaliland’, in January 2003. A brief summary of the discussions and conclusions of this forum are incor­porated as section 8 (pages 45-47) of the annexes of this report. A full workshop report is available from Novib Somalia.

These two studies aim to achieve greater understanding of Somali civil society and its relationships with major stakeholders concerned with its growth and development. These stakeholders include; the Somali people and the communities that civil society serves and represents; other constituencies within Somalia and Somaliland such as the private sector and emerging administrations; the Diaspora; and the international community. Specifically, through analysis of the findings of the two Novib studies, possibilities of better partnership between Somali civil society and the international community, jointly addressing gaps and op­portunities, adopting shared visions and strategies, should emerge. This enhanced relationship and understanding of civil society itself underpins the existing project interventions and will lay the basis for more effec­tive and appropriate planning and activities in the future.

1.1 Aim

This report consists of the study of . Firstly, it aims to support the peaceful development of Somalia and Somaliland by providing information to Somali civil society on the nature of the EU, the broader international community and its development assistance. The EU is the largest donor to Somalia and Somaliland. Secondly, this study aims to provide the EU and the international community with an independent perspective on the internal consistency of their development strategies towards Somalia and So­maliland and provide some recommendations and options.

This study serves to explain the character of the EU and its constituent member states and EC activities (within the framework of the interna­tional community) and also outlines their views as to the future develop­ment of Somalia and Somaliland. To enhance co-operation between the EU (EC and member states) and Somali civil society, the study sets out the needs and concerns of the member states and poses some challenges to Somali civil society.

1.2 Objectives

The objectives of the study are:
* To assist Somali civil society to understand the policies and operations of donors. This should help Somali representatives and external agencies to communicate with each other in a more informed manner.
* The study complements the Novib Somalia mapping of civil society organisations study. Taken together these reports aim to support the development of a Somali civil society vision and offer concrete steps and methods to achieve this vision, incorpo­rating the support of all civil society actors and the international community.

1.3 Utilisation of the study

The objective of the study can also be stated as ‘to provide a clearer understanding by all stakeholders of the current state, development and prospects for supporting Somali civil society in its efforts at reconstruc­tion of Somalia and development of Somaliland through their own efforts with support from external partners’.

The study thus addresses a number of audiences. The principal audience is Somali civil society itself with all other stakeholders therein being important audiences. The primary stakeholders are:
* Somali Civil Society

There is no agreed definition of civil society and in Somalia and Somaliland the case is especially contentious due to the struc­ture of society and absence of a central state against which civil society is usually defined. For the purposes of this research civil society in Somalia and Somaliland includes (but is not limited to):

- Traditional Elders (Clan leadership) 
- Religious leadership 
- NGOs 
- Other CBOs, such as rural associations, cooperatives, women groups, etc. 
- Somali Professional Associations 
- Somali business community, especially its organised sections 
- Somali Diaspora organisations already supporting projects inside Somalia and Somaliland or intending to do so.
 *   International NGOs working inside Somalia and Somaliland 
- INGOs with offices and/or projects inside Somalia and Somaliland (operational INGOs) 
- INGOs who are non-operational inside Somalia and Somaliland but provide re source support to Somali CSOs 
- INGOs intending to engage inside Somalia and Somaliland or provide support to Somali CSOs
 *   Somali Authorities and Administrations 
- The Somaliland Administration 
- The Puntland Administration
- The TNG Administration 
- Other Regional and Local Authorities
 *   Bi-lateral and Multi-lateral agencies 
- The EC 
- EU Member States 
- US and other non-EU governments supporting the reconstruction of Somalia and Somaliland 
- UN community and agencies 
- ‘Frontline’ African States 
- IGAD States 
- OUA/AU and its agencies

- Peace and Reconciliation 
- Governance 
- Human Rights protection and promotion 
- Role of Women and Gender Equality 
- Capacity of Somali civil society 
- Lobby and advocacy roles 
- Partnerships and cooperation with external agencies 
- Political support for Somali rehabilitation

* The conference should arrive at agreements within and between the different stakeholders participating and provide:
- Information on the scope, role and potential of Somali civil society organisations, including the Diaspora
- Better understanding of the roles and responsibilities of the different stakeholders
- Possible commitments towards support for Somali civil society
- Space for continuous monitoring of the development of civil society in Somalia and Somaliland and a sounder basis for dialogue with identified partners.

1.4 Expected outcome

The expected outcome of the two studies (the Donor Assistance study and the Mapping of Civil Society) and the conferences is a Somali civil society collective vision paper and collective commitment of the interna­tional community to the Somali civil society vision. Thereafter detailed programmatic proposals should be developed by the stakeholders to achieve the aims and objectives outlined in the Somali civil society vision paper with clear time lines, outputs, partnership modalities and monitoring indicators.

2. Methodology

2.1 Terminology

In this study, the phrase “Somalia and Somaliland” is used to refer to the former territory of Somalia, which incorporated Somaliland. However this area is generally referred to as “Somalia” by most international actors as Somaliland is not recognised as a separate state. In terms of development policy and provision of assistance Somalia and Somaliland are viewed as one area. Hence many international actors refer to simply Somalia when denoting both territories. Novib Somalia attempts to differentiate Somalia and Somaliland in its own work. However when directly quoting or reflecting the views of other international actors the term Somalia may be used to denote all areas of the former Republic of Somalia. The terms “Somaliland” and “Puntland” are used when special focus is given to these entities.

2.2 Selection of literature

To carry out the study of donor assistance and development policy in So­malia and Somaliland, general papers produced by the UN, EC, OECD, OAU, IGAD etc, have been reviewed. In addition Somali sources have been utilised and papers provided by the interview partners were also analysed. A full bibliography is presented at the end of the text.

2.3 Research methodology

Questionnaires

A questionnaire (see Annex 3.1, page 7) was developed for use during the meetings and interviews in Nairobi with the various embassies, spe­cial envoys, the EC delegation, UN organisations and INGOs. A second questionnaire was developed for use in the interviews that were carried out with representatives of the EC Directorate General Development and EuropeAid/AIDCO in Brussels (see Annex 3.2, page 7).

Interviews conducted with the authorities of Somaliland focused upon their views, vision and recommendations to the EC and member states.

Selection of interview partners

Interviews with the EC delegation and the embassies of member states were the priority for the study. In addition other embassies and special envoys with significant relations with Somalia and Somaliland were interviewed, these included Egypt, Kenya, Norway, Switzerland and USA. International organisations such as UNDP Somalia and ICRC, international NGOs and other agencies including GTZ and USAID were included in the scope of the study. In addition, the consultant took part in some meetings of the SACB and NGO consortium. These additional interviews added to the depth of the study and served to contextualise the EU interventions.

The original intention was to discuss the development of Somali civil society and the EU co-operation policies not only with representatives from European countries but also with political decision-makers in all parts of Somalia and Somaliland. At the time of the consultant’s visit to Nairobi, in August 2002, it was only possible to visit Somaliland where the Minister for Environment and Rangeland, the Minister for Planning and Co-operation and the Minister for Foreign Affairs were interviewed in Hargeisa. Documents from the TNG in Mogadishu and the Puntland administration were consulted in lieu of actual meetings. In Brussels representatives of the DG Development and Europe Aid/AIDCO were interviewed.

2.4 Time frame and location of the study

The study took place from June to September 2002 in Nairobi, where the majority of international community actors concerned with Somalia and Somaliland are based. Somaliland politicians and decision-makers were interviewed in Hargeisa.

The British Embassy with responsibility for affairs concerning Somaliland is based in Addis Ababa and therefore could not be visited. This is also the case for some other countries with specific responsibilities for Somalia and Somaliland divided between their representatives in the neighbour­ing states, for example the US embassy in Djibouti has responsibility for Somaliland and the US embassy in Nairobi is concerned with the other parts of Somalia. The French embassy in Djibouti also specifically takes care of Somalia. The embassies of Ireland, Greece and Sweden could not be visited. Phone calls with the respective representatives showed that Ireland and Greece have no relationship with Somalia or Somaliland. The Swedish embassy is known to be engaged in Somalia and Somaliland but unfortunately was too busy to arrange a meeting. Representatives from both the British High Commission and Swedish Embassy attended the meeting to discuss the draft of this report. Their positions have thus been included in this report.

The IGAD secretariat is located in Djibouti and therefore could not be visited. The EC representatives in Brussels were visited in August 2002. The report on Donor Assistance was finalised in September 2002 and revised in February 2003, following the round-table conference on donor assistance and Somali civil society.

3. Structure of the report

The first chapter of this report outlines the objectives and methodology of this study. The second chapter provides a brief overview of the politi­cal and economic situation in Somalia and Somaliland. Chapter three deals with the relationship between Somalia and Somalil­and and the international community. Whilst the main focus of this study is on EU development assistance the EU is a part of the international community. To understand the decision making process of the EU it is important to set it within the context of the international community.

The fourth chapter deals specifically with the EU (EC and member states) and Somalia and Somaliland and is based upon the results of the research conducted in Nairobi and Brussels. Chapter five focuses on the recommendations made by the member state’s embassies and their concerns and uncertainties with regard to Somalia and a more effective engagement in Somalia and Somaliland. It also addresses recommendations by the consultant for the different stakeholders in this study.

II. The Internal Situation in Somalia and Somaliland

1. Political, economic and social situation in Somalia and Somaliland

The Socio-Economic Situation

Livestock is the mainstay of the Somali economy, followed by agricul­ture, fishing and light industry. Yet the pastoral economy has not been as productive in the last ten years as previously. The export economy has been depressed since the imposition of a ban on livestock imports from Somalia and Somaliland by the Gulf countries, which previously were the main export market (livestock exports including raw hides and skins represented 40% of the GDP and 80% of foreign currency earnings 1).

Food insecurity is present for several reasons, including under-utilisation of agricultural resources, climate conditions and civil unrest in Somalia.2 Other factors related to the civil war and lack of a central state also have an impact on communities, for instance unregulated industrial fishing by outsiders of Somali coastal waters has damaged inshore fishing com­munities. Much of the remaining export trade in Somalia, in commodi­ties other than livestock, is controlled by cartels linked to the warlords, thereby funding weapons imports and armed conflict. The closure, following the September 11 attacks, of the Al-Barakaat money-transfer company threatened to cut off the pipeline of remittances from Somalis overseas, which represent many times the volume of foreign aid going to Somalia and Somaliland and keep thousands of families and households afloat.

Somalia faces many challenges; since 1990 many schools have closed and a whole generation of young people have missed out on education. Literacy rates are amongst the lowest in the world (adult literacy rate: 36% of men over 15 and 14% of women3). The breakdown of the public health system, the collapse of water and sanitation systems (less than 5% of the population has secure access to clean water throughout the year) has dropped the average lifespan down to 44.6 years for men and 47.8 years for women.4 Somalia is one of the poorest countries of the world and is classified as a Least Developed Country. Somaliland also suffers from lack of development and faces huge chal­lenges in terms of provision of services. However Somaliland benefits from a stable administration and much progress has been made in the last few years, particularly in the field of education.

The Political Situation

In 1960, the Somali state was born from the unification of two colonial territories, formerly under British and Italian rule. After independence, Somalia experienced nine years of multi-party democracy, twenty one years of oppressive and autocratic military rule and a further twelve years of civil war, that has led to the destruction of political and eco­nomic life, widespread displacement and poverty. This period has seen sporadic fighting between the many clan-based militia factions, resulting in fragmentation of the nation, proliferation of political factions and the emergence of localised political authorities.

In 1991, the international community responded to the crisis in Somalia with a humanitarian relief intervention prompted by serious famine in southern Somalia. However, when UNOSOM peace-keeping forces were drawn into the political melee beyond the limits of their mandate, the UN presence was widely discredited, and it withdrew ignominiously in 1995. Throughout the 1990s it was clan elders who proved to be key players in re-establishing Somali public administration, and initiating moves towards restored peace, political stability and social contracts between clans. Traditional clan elders are the main supporters of the regional state-like entities, namely the Republic of Somaliland and the Federal State of Puntland, and their political structures remain the most impor­tant functional structures to date. These same clan elders also supported regional economic revival in order to revitalise trade between regions in Somalia. The Transitional National Government, TNG, set up in 2000 after the Arta peace conference in Djibouti, in which traditional clan elders also participated, has proved to date capable of controlling only a few districts of the capital, Mogadishu.

Political consolidation since the mid-1990s has proved frustrating and slow for external and local stakeholders alike. Three distinct and pos­sibly incompatible approaches to this conundrum can be identified: first, the “building-block” approach to regional federalism, initially favoured by UNOSOM, the IGAD countries, many donors, and international NGOs. This has been criticised for encouraging clan-based divisions and secessionist tendencies. Second, the “peace-dividend” approach adopted by some humanitarian agencies, promising aid to areas where a peaceful “enabling environment” exists, and encouraging other areas to follow suit. One drawback here is that relief aid has proved a target for militia raids, so producing the perverse effect of actually encouraging conflict. Third, the “peace-building” approach favours bottom-up development, with comprehensive civil society participation at all levels, as a means to local and national consensus and ultimately reconciliation. This ap­proach is increasingly supported by regional and international stakehold­ers, and by the Somalis themselves.

Today, in the absence of a national government and state structure, Somalia is divided into three de facto entities: Somaliland in the north, Puntland in the northeast and Somalia in the South, administered by different governing bodies. Ongoing locally limited fighting, especially in the south and recently also in Puntland, continues to threaten the population and hamper development attempts. Only Somaliland has built a stable and peaceful administration, which aims to be recognised as a sovereign state.

Many attempts to come to a peaceful solution for the whole country have been made and failed. After the last peace conference, held in Djibouti in 1999, a Transitional National Government was formed and appointed until 2003, however the TNG has proved incapable of institutionalising and exercising state power. A new peace and reconciliation conference is to be held in October 2002, in Eldoret, Kenya (see chapter on IGAD and the peace process).

1 European Commission Strategy for the Implementation of Special Aid to Somalia, February 2002 2 European Commission Strategy for the Implementation of Special Aid to Somalia, February 2002 2. Civil society in Somalia and Somaliland

One of the most remarkable outcomes of the collapse of the centralised state and the ensuing civil war has been the birth of independent politi­cal, social and economic groupings with functions and operations cross­ing clan boundaries. These include local non-governmental organisa­tions (NGOs), social, religious and professional associations, and other interest groups working on behalf of women, youth and minorities.

The first wave of NGOs emerged in 1980 during the Ogaden war. Many more emerged at the beginning of the 1990s to channel and administer the resources that poured in to the country as part of the UNOSOM operation. However, many of these humanitarian relief organisations formed in the early 1990s did not survive for long, as they were primar­ily dependent on the international community, which largely withdrew in 1994/95. But, by the mid-1990s, the development of local community-based organisations, with a wider mission encompassing relief, develop­ment and advocacy activities, had become apparent. These organisations promoted regional networking and further extended their networking to other regions through umbrella organisations. Some are represented at the Somalia Aid Coordination Body (SACB) and the Nairobi-based NGO Consortium. Some civil society organisations have been able to participate effectively in community development projects because of their closeness to ordinary people and their knowledge of community needs. They have become important platforms for ad­dressing human rights and gender issues and peace-building.

III. Somalia and the international community

Having had no state structures for several years the situation of Somalia is unique and requires the consolidated and concentrated support of the international community. In the absence of functioning state structures and as part of the social transformation process that Somalia is undergo­ing, civil society in Somalia is emerging and playing an increasingly important role in enacting the roles and responsibilities traditionally un­dertaken by the state. Civil society organisations are delivering services, becoming political actors as channels of representation and are the part­ners of international development agencies. This role has been success­fully demonstrated in Somaliland. Therefore, both parties – civil society organisations and the actors of the international community – need better information about their partners’ specific character, strengths and poten­tial. This report aims to provide the basis for Somali civil society and administrative bodies to better understand the international community and its decision-making processes.

1. Levels of international assistance

International assistance can be differentiated into two levels: first, the diplomatic level of negotiations and agreements; and secondly, the level of concrete development assistance activities.

With the aim of promoting peace and development, the states of the world have developed many agreements (international law), rules and organisations. It is important for Somali civil society and administra­tive bodies to comprehend the complex interaction of the international community in order to better understand the possibilities and limitations of external actors supporting Somali internal peace and development. It is also important for Somali civil society and administrative bodies to reflect upon ways to better influence and play a stronger role in interna­tional decision-making and in the reconciliation and peace process. The most significant agreements and actors for Somalia and Somaliland are described below.

2. Main actors in the international community and their interaction This chapter aims to explain the complex decision-making processes within the international community. The political arena in the field of de­velopment assistance consists of various actors with formal or informal relations with each other. The main actors are briefly described in this chapter to give a brief overview of how decision-making procedures are interdependent and based on agreed co-operation. From discussions with Somali people and representatives it emerged that it would be useful to give some general explanation of the international system of co-operation and development assistance (see annexes also). Understanding the international system may prove helpful for enhanced understanding of the decision-making structures and mechanisms of the EC and EU member states concerned with the current situation of Somalia and Somaliland.

2.1 UN and Somalia

Article 4 of the UN Charter stipulates that membership of the UN is open to all states that accept and are capable of fulfilling all obligations deriving from membership. Somalia is a member of the UN, yet, at pres­ent, the country lacks stable state structures; moreover, it is divided into several territorial entities, some struggling for independent international recognition. New members of the UN are admitted on the recommend­ation of the Security Council after a majority vote of at least two-thirds in the General Assembly. Since the five permanent members of the Security Council are endowed with veto rights, admission presupposes a consensus among the great powers.

According to the preamble of its Charter, the main aim of the United Nations is to preserve world peace both through the global organisa­tion itself and through regional agreements. The main bodies of the UN are the General Assembly, where every member state has one vote, and the Security Council. Permanent members of the Security Council are France, China, the Russian Federation, Britain and the United States vested with one vote each and a veto right to block decisions. Six other states are elected for a two-year period as non-permanent members of the Council. The Security Council concerns itself essentially with all matters related to peace and security.

Recently a Contact Group for Somalia was established in New York and Nairobi in accordance with the Security Council Presidential Statement of 28 March 2002. In addition, Somalia has delegated an observer to the Council. Secretary-General Kofi Annan describes the tasks of the Con­tact Group as follows: “the Contact Group should be established along the lines of the ambassadorial meeting of external actors on Somalia that used to be convened for the exchange of information and coordination of peacemaking efforts on Somalia among external actors”.5 The Security Council “invites the Nairobi branch of the Contact Group, inter alia, to promote the completion of the Arta peace process, including through the IGAD initiative…; to support the implementation of the pilot peace-building programme…; to elaborate practical ways and means of facilitating exchange of information through engaging various actors in the region, including the community of non-governmental organisations. The Council further underlines that the primary purpose of the New York branch of the Contact Group should be to support the Secretariat’s work on Somalia with the view to ensure that the situation in the country is given due consideration by the United Nations”.6

The UN Security Council has debated the situation in Somalia several times and adopted resolutions and statements. The most important reso­lutions are Security Council Resolution 733 (1992), which implements an arms embargo on Somalia, and 1407 (2002), which requests all states to report on measures they have in place to ensure the full and effective implementation of the arms embargo. Thus, the Security Council, as well as the Secretary-General, indicated recognition of violation of the arms embargo. The members of the Security Council “urged all regional actors to give their unequivocal commitment to the peace efforts for Somalia in good faith and to refrain from any negative actions, including those that may compromise the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Somalia”.7 Subsequently the UN has established a Panel of Experts to investigate enforcement of the arms embargo.

Resolutions are only recommendations and are only incumbent upon members. Because the UN is a union of member states and not a supra­national organisation, it has only limited powers to enforce such resolu­tions. It is an intergovernmental organisation and so its policy is derived from the policies of its member states. Nevertheless, the UN can inter­vene in the form of mediation or peace-keeping missions (as in Somalia) and when cases of international or regional crises threaten international peace and security, even in non-member countries (UN Charter chapter 7). Today, the UN claims to be ready to support Somalia through the deployment of a post-conflict peace-building mission. However, first the internal security conditions must permit the mission.

In response to the ongoing violence and the separation of Somalia into several entities, the Security Council reaffirms in its presidential statement “its commitment to a comprehensive and lasting settlement of the situation in Somalia, reaffirming its respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and unity of the country”.8 The Security Council also declares its support to the Arta peace process, described as the “most viable basis for peace and national reconcilia­tion”.9 Different members of the Security Council expressed their views that support to the efforts of the transitional Government in Somalia ‘was the best way of ensuring the country’s unity and territorial integ­rity’ (France); ‘that strengthening the transitional Government would promote the country’s sovereignty and national integrity’ (Jordan, on behalf of the Arab Group); ‘that the Council’s efforts should focus on completing the Arta process’ (Egypt); ‘that the Arta foundations must be built upon’ (Libya); and ‘that the Arta peace process should be sup­ported’ (Norway).10 The Secretary-General Kofi Annan observed that the Arta peace process is still, unfortunately, incomplete.11 In general, all members express the view that the existence of a broad-based govern­ment in Somalia would be a great advantage for the stabilisation of the country.

Reconciliation and rehabilitation are the key concerns of the UN strategy for Somalia. As well as the Security Council, the Secretary-General is supporting the IGAD initiative to hold another peace and reconciliation conference in Kenya. The Secretary-General is appealing to Somalia’s leaders to end the suffering of the people and to negotiate an end to the conflict and expressing the need for consensus among Somalia’s neigh­bouring states.12 The Secretary-General also recommends that greater effort should be made by the UN to ensure that the “peace dividend” aspect of the targeted assistance is fully implemented.13

The Security Council, noting that problems in livestock exports have severely affected the humanitarian and economic situation in Somalia, has called on states that maintain the ban to take active steps towards the resumption of livestock imports from Somalia. An overview of the main UN bodies and their development activities in Somalia and Somaliland is given in this report (see annex 5.3, pages 11-18).

2.2 OAU / AU and Somalia

In 1963, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) was established with, inter alia, the purpose to promote the unity and solidarity of the African states and to defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity and independence (article II). According to the OAU charter, the member states affirm and declare their adherence to the sovereign equality of all member states, the non-interference in the internal affairs of states and respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each state and its inalienable right to independent existence. The member states agree in supporting peaceful settlements of disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation or arbitration and condemn all forms of political assas­sination as well as of subversive activities on the part of neighbouring states or any other states (article III).14

To better address the current needs in Africa and internationally the OAU has transformed itself into the African Union (AU), establishing new organs and bodies as well as formulating new objectives in its constitution. “Of crucial importance in the establishment of the organs of the Union is the challenge to move away from the overly state-centric character of the OAU and its concomitant lack of civil partici­pation. The cooperation of African NGOs, civil societies, labour unions, business organisations are essential in the process of cooperation and implementation of the Abuja Treaty, as was expressed in the Ouagadougou Declaration and provided for in the Sirte Declaration”.15

Some objectives adopted in the constitutive act of the AU are important to the Somali conflict, these include:
* achieve greater unity and solidarity be­tween the African countries and the peoples of Africa
* defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of its member states
* promote peace, security, and stability on the continent. 16

The approach of developing a union aimed at strengthening the continental integration of the African states implies in principle acceptance of defining conflicts inside one member state as conflicts inside the Union and therefore to be resolved at the level of the Union.

2.3 IGAD and the Somali peace process

Aimed at superseding IGADD 17, a revitalised IGAD, with expanded areas of regional co-operation, was established in 1996 by Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda. The mandate of IGAD is to co-ordinate the efforts of member states in the priority areas of economic co-operation, political and humanitarian affairs and food security, as well as environmental protection.18 (See also annex 5.2, page 11)

In 2001, during the 8th Summit, the Heads of State declared that they would encourage “regional associations among civil society institutions at the national level to enhance their contribution to the effort of promoting participatory democracy across the region”.19 In this regard it was agreed that an interface between the IGAD Secretariat and civil society organisations should be built. To facilitate this interface an inaugural consultation for an IGAD-CSO Forum was organised by IGAD in Octo­ber 2001.20 ­

5 S/2002/709, p. 5f With regard to the Somali conflict, the following objective of IGAD is important: “to promote peace and stability in the region and create mechanisms within the region for the prevention, management and reso­lution of inter-State and intra-State conflicts through dialogue”.21 During the 9th IGAD Summit in Khartoum, the Heads of State gave special attention to reconciliation in Somalia. They stated that Somalis were tired of conflict and division. Furthermore, the governments of the IGAD member states noted that the existence of a ‘failed state’ within the region impacted upon regional stability and development.22 On 11 January 2002, an IGAD resolution, adopted by consensus, called for Dji­bouti, Ethiopia and Kenya to coordinate reconciliation efforts under the supervision of the IGAD Chairman.23 The Ministers for Foreign Affairs of IGAD Member States met in Nairobi on 14 February 2002 to discuss ways and means of advancing the decision on national reconciliation in Somalia. The ministers underscored the need for intensifying the national reconciliation process with the aim of working towards a broad-based and all-inclusive government, while maintaining the sovereignty, territorial integrity and unity of Somalia. They established a technical committee comprised of the so-called ‘frontline states’ (Djibouti, Ethio­pia and Kenya), the IGAD secretariat and chaired by Kenya, to work out the modalities for a proposed National Reconciliation Conference for Somalia, to be convened by Kenya in September 2002.24 It was stated that the conference should include the TNG and all other Somali parties without conditionality.25 Although final participation is yet to be agreed, about 300 persons will be invited representing themselves as individuals and not as political groups or factions. External actors will be invited as formal observers.

After having had substantially different strategic approaches towards the state-building process in Somalia, Djibouti and Ethiopia are now more in agreement with each other. Whilst Ethiopia used to broadly disagree with the TNG as the government of Somalia, Djibouti strongly supported the TNG. Now, both countries are willing to hold a dialogue and have agreed on the procedures to be taken to hold the reconciliation conference.

The mandate of the forthcoming conference is not to appoint a new government but rather to agree on the way forward to achieve peace and reconciliation and the “construction of a viable Somali state, with appropriate, inclusive and durable structures and institutions for a decen­tralised government”.26 It is intended that committees will be founded during the conference process to formulate action plans according to the different development sectors and institutions to be built (such as consti­tution drafting, economic recovery, land issues, past human rights abuses, demobilisation and decentralised government). Donors have agreed to back these committees with technical expertise. The envisaged result of the first phase conference is the formulation of specific principles for the future peace process. A second phase conference, to be held after about four months, will develop concrete proposals and projects. Only in the last phase of the peace process will leadership roles and positions be discussed in connection with actual persons.

After the many failed Somali peace conferences that have taken place over the last decade, the qualitatively new idea of the coming conference is to make the participants buy in to the future peace process and agree on conse­quences and sanctions in the case of violation of the agreements.

2.4 G8 and OECD

G8 and OECD as organisations of the most industrialised countries influence the character and the amount of development assistance and are important actors within the international community. But, as neither organisation has a specific strategy or engagement with Somalia or So­maliland, the nature and role of both organisations is explained in annex 5.4 and 5.5, pages 18-24, rather than here.

One of the tasks of OECD is to collect data on development assistance provided by its member states. Analysis of this data demonstrates that whilst the amount of overseas development assistance received by Afri­can countries had increased overall since 1996, Somalia and Somaliland are amongst the least supported countries (2000: US$ 104 million)27. When this is put in relation to the population of Somalia and Somaliland in 1999 (estimated at 9.39 million)28 this amounts to a transfer of US$ 14.91 per capita. Other countries with a comparable population gen­erally receive much higher levels of support per capita, such as Benin: US$ 39.12; Burkina Faso: US$ 30.55; Malawi: US$ 41.24; Mali: US$ 34.02; Niger: US$ 20.10.

2.5 The European Union and Somalia

2.5.1 General remarks

The European Union is the integration of 15 European states (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Finland, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, Spain, and the United Kingdom) originally founded to support internal European free trade and economic integration and to support the prevention of violent conflicts in Europe by increasing the complex inter-relationships between the member states.

10 SC/7323 11 S/2002/189 12 S/2002/189 13 (S/2002/189) 6 SC/7346 7 AFR/416, SC/7415 8 S/PRST/2002/8 9 S/PRST/2002/8 The European Commission (EC) is the executive body of the European Union. It implements the policy and legislation agreed by the European Union, including in the area of development assistance.

The EU is not a singular state in either character or action. Its member states delegate sovereignty to common institutions representing the interests of the Union. Accordingly, the EU is not represented as such at the UN. Individual member states of the EU are members of the UN in their own right. Nor is the EU a member of the G8, although the EC participates. The EU often has observer status at international institu­tions, except in areas where common European policies apply. Although the process of integration is ongoing, the EU has developed some supranational structures. There is no European Government as such, however, there are governing institutions of the European Union. The European Parliament shares with the European Council the power to legislate, the budgetary authority and the exercise of demo­cratic oversight over the European Commission (EC). The EC, inter alia, represents the EU internationally, including in the negotiation of international agreements. The EC has delegations to represent it in third countries, as in the case of the EC delegation to Kenya, also responsible for Somalia and Somaliland and based in Nairobi.

2.5.2 EU Council of General Affairs and External Relations conclusions on Somalia

On 1 February 2002, the Presidency of the European Union welcomed the IGAD resolution on Somalia and the decision to hold a reconcilia­tion conference in Kenya and expressed the readiness of the European Union to examine ways and means to support IGAD’s efforts to assist Somalis in achieving peace and reconciliation.30

In its 2447th Council meeting on 22 July 2002 the Council of General Affairs and External Relations concluded on Somalia: “The objectives of the EU with regard to Somalia are the restoration of peace and stability in all parts of the country; the respect for the sover­eignty, territorial integrity, political independence and unity of the coun­try, and the right of the Somali people to determine their own future consistent with the purposes and principles of the charter of the United Nations; the establishment of legitimate and effective governance structures; and the promotion of friendly and co-operative relations with other countries within the Horn of Africa region. The EU considers that the promotion and protection of human rights, the restoration of the rule of law, democracy and good governance in Somalia on a suitable basis, is the only effective way to provide social and economic recovery and to eradicate the threat of terrorism.”

The Council agreed to support the IGAD peace and reconciliation initia­tive on Somalia in the interests of safeguarding and consolidating peace and stability, establishing structures based on the sharing and devolution of power through the democratic process, establishing effective admin­istration throughout Somalia including an all-inclusive, broad-based administration and, in parallel, the consolidation of provisional regional administrations representing components of Somali society. As supporting instruments the EU:
* will use diplomatic channels that may lead to the appointment of an EU special envoy;
* could use, if appropriate, smart sanctions, targeting individuals blocking the reconciliation process and could provide positive incentives including targeted financial support;
* will continue implementing the “peace dividend” approach, giving special attention to the social sectors and especially to education, and greater attention to the equitable participation of men and women,
* could complement the “peace dividend” approach by a more active “peace building” approach, by providing financial and technical support, focusing on the early establishment of ef­fective administration including an all-inclusive, broad-based administration and, in parallel, the consolidation of provisional regional administration representing components of Somali society in order to encourage a bottom-up approach.

The EU will call upon the front line states and all other countries with influence in the different Somali parties and factions to allow progress in the IGAD negotiations and to refrain from any activity that could exacerbate internal conflicts and, in particular, to strictly abide by the UN arms embargo on Somalia.32

2.5.3 EU Development policy

The EU itself describes its development policy thus: “The objective of Community development co-operation policy is to foster sustainable development designed to eradicate poverty in developing countries and to integrate them into the world economy. This can only be achieved by pursuing policies that promote the consolidation of democracy, the rule of law, good governance and the respect for human rights. Putting equity in the centre of its policies, the Directorate General for Develop­ment gives priority to defending the interests of the most disadvantaged developing countries and the poorest sections of the population in economically more advanced developing countries”.33 Specific devel­opment policies are formulated in the following sectors: trade, sustain­able development and the environment, social and human development, water, education and training, forests, gender, regional integration, fishing, rural policy, health, private sector, food security, information society, support for NGOs/civil society, tourism and transport.34 The development policy focuses on economic development (improved eco­nomic situation, food security, debt relief, rural development, transport and social services) and integration (into the regional and world market) as well as institutional capacity-building. Every activity must have incorporated in it the horizontal aspects of human rights, gender equity, children’s rights, protection of the environment, conflict prevention and crisis management.35

19 igad.org/partners/nc.html 20 igad.org/partners/nc.html 21 igad.org/about/ob.html 22 S/2002/189 23 S/2002/189 24 The date of this conference has subsequently been postponed to 15 October 2002 and will take place in Eldoret, Kenya. 25 S/2002/189 14 OAU Charter 15 au2002.giv.za/docs/background/oau_to_au.htm 16 au2002.giv.za/docs/background/oau_to_au.htm 17 IGADD – Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development 18 igad.org/about/ma.html A basic principle in development policies is the recognition of owner­ship of their strategies by partner countries: “With that in mind, the most wide-ranking participation of all segments of society should be encour­aged and prime importance should be given to political dialogue with the partner countries”.36 Under the objective to decentralise development co-operation, the EU is following a more participatory approach in involving others, seeking to include local authorities, traders’ organisa­tions, local citizens’ groups, cooperatives, trade unions, women’s and youth organisations, teaching and research institutions and churches, in addition to the traditional NGOs. Indeed any non-governmental associa­tion likely to contribute to development.37 Nevertheless, governments remain the primary stakeholders in development co-operation.

There are different ways in which the EU implements development policy:
* multilateral: The EU signs agreements or conventions with a group of partners, such as the ACP countries. Additionally, ac­cording to international agreements, the EU supports interna­tional organisations, such as UN agencies.
* unilateral: The EU decides itself to facilitate the access of other countries to the EU internal market in order to support the economic development of these countries. In addition, thematic activities, for example, food aid, humanitarian aid or the fight against HIV/AIDS, can be supported as emergency aid.
* bilateral: The EU can agree with single countries on develop­ment co-operation.
* co-operation with NGOs: In order to involve civil society in economic and politically relevant decisions, the EU supports NGO activities, mainly through co-funding projects of Eu­ropean or international NGOs.

2.5.4 The Cotonou Agreement

Since 1963, several conventions have been signed between the EEC/EU and African, Caribbean and Pacific countries, such as the Lome Conven­tion. A fundamental aspect of these conventions is trade preference for export. In addition to economic and commercial co-operation, the second key element is development co-operation. In 2000, a new con­vention was signed, the Cotonou Agreement, which is now in force. The agreement is based on five interdependent pillars:
* A comprehensive political dimension: The key element here is to sustain an on-going political dialogue between the co-opera­tion partners and the EU with the aim of anticipating crises. Peace-building, conflict prevention and resolution policies are being developed and will concentrate on regional initiatives and integrating local capacities. The partnership implies respect for human rights, democratic principles based on the rule of law and transparent and accountable governance (good governance).
* Promotion of participatory approaches: The participation of civ­il society, as well as of economic and social actors, in the design and implementation of development strategies is encouraged. To guarantee full involvement NGOs shall be strengthened.
* Development strategies and giving priority to the objective of poverty reduction: Poverty reduction is the main objective underlying all five pillars. In an integrated approach policies should be formulated and implemented that integrate economic development (investment and private sector development, mac­ro-economic and structural reforms and policies, sectoral pol­icies), social and human development (social sectoral policies, youth issues, cultural development) and regional co-operation and integration (accelerated diversification of the economies, promotion and expansion of inter- and intra-ACP trade and with third countries, implementation of sectoral reform policies at regional level).
* Establishment of a new framework for economic and trade co-operation: This pillar supports ACP countries to participate better in the world markets and to comply with WTO rules. From the year 2008 trade liberalisation is envisaged.
* Reform of financial co-operation: The process and procedures of financing shall become more flexible and rational. A new system of programming aid by the EU will support planning security as well as greater responsibility for the ACP states. 38

Special provisions are made for the least developed, landlocked, island and post-conflict ACP states, including strengthening of regional co-op­eration, development of transport and communications infrastructure and the implementation of food strategies.

Essentially the new aspects of the Cotonou Agreement are: the enhanced political dimension; emphasised ownership of its own policies and ac­countability by the partner country; evolving the nature of aid towards budgetary assistance or sector programmes; making allocations subject to revision according to the need and performance;39 involving non-state actors; holding in-country dialogues; adding good governance to the fundamental elements of co-operation; and agreement that corruption and the violation of human rights can lead to the suspension of EC financing. 27 Table 3 in annex 5.5, pages 24 presents this data in full. 28 estimated by OECD 26 The Hon. Elijah Mwangale, Kenyan Special Envoy to the IGAD peace process, 11 September 2002 For each ACP state a single Country Support Strategy is to be developed in close co-operation between the EC and country representatives, as has been done for Somalia and Somaliland. This strategy shall reflect international commitments (UN conferences, development targets, OECD/DAC strategy) and shall support the establishment of a coher­ent and strategic framework ensuring complementarity and interaction between the economic, social, cultural, gender, institutional and environ­mental dimensions of policies.40 An operational Indicative Programme, covering the operations, complements the strategy and monitors what the resources provided by the EU are used for. The strategy as well as the Indicative Programme and the resource allocations are revised regu­larly. Regional programmes are part of the agreement and are subject to the same procedures.

Guiding institutions for the Cotonou Agreement are the joint EU-ACP Council of Ministers, the Committee of Ambassadors and the Joint Assembly, supported by an ACP-Secretariat in Brussels. An ACP-Civil Society Forum was established to provide a platform for civil society actors from the ACP countries to develop common positions relevant to ACP-EU co-operation, to strengthen the participation of CSOs in the co-operation framework, to facilitate dialogue between all relevant stakeholders and to regularly access, update and share information.41

The principal partners of the EU within the Cotonou Agreement are the governments of sovereign states. But the involvement of all stakeholders in the development process and their participation in the formulation of the country programming, under the auspices of the single partner coun­try, is explicitly part of the Agreement. Although the ratifying parties of the Cotonou Agreement can only be the EU and national parliaments, it was decided that Somalia, despite the lack of a recognised government, should be included in the partnership. The case of Somalia as a member of the EU-ACP partnership is unique. In relation with the Cotonou Agreement an ACP Civil Society Forum was established to provide a platform for civil society actors from the ACP countries to develop common positions relevant to ACP-EU co-operation, to enhance the participation of CSOs in the co-operation framework and to facilitate the dialogue between all relevant stakehold­ers as well as to regularly access, update and share information. 42

At the Somalia and Somaliland country level, non-state actors can en­gage with the EC Delegation at a number of entry points, these include:
* EC development strategy and National Indicative Programme: The development of these strategies entails exchange of information and debate around the country’s own development agenda and strategies. Adequate information flows between the EC Delegation and non-state actors are stressed in the program­ming guidelines to delegations from the European Commission.
* Strategies for specific sectors such as health and education.
* Accessing financial resources: The EC is unable at present to channel funds directly to non-state actors in Somalia and Somaliland due to the absence of a recognised legal system. However, the EC will explore possible ways that non-state ac­tors might receive support.
* Performance reviews: This looks at performance of pro­grammes on an ongoing basis. In case of poor performance, programmes can be adjusted or dropped altogether. Non-state actors can participate in these performance reviews. This gives them a significant opportunity to monitor use of Cotonou funds.
* Promotion of new public-private partnerships: The agreement seeks to promote partnerships in which different actors join forces to achieve common goals through task division.43

2.5.5 European Development Fund

The main instrument for financing EU co-operation with ACP coun­tries is the European Development Fund (EDF). The fund is negotiated according to the partnership conventions, around every five years. Cur­rently “the ninth EDF, concluded at the same time as the Cotonou Agree­ment, has been allocated € 13.5 billion … In addition, the unexpended balances from previous EDFs total € 9.9 billion”.44

There are two channels through which the resources of the EDF can be accessed:
* The Investment Facility, a revolving fund where returns flow back into the facility. This facility supports business activities by providing funding or guarantees;
* The Grant Facility, this finances a broad range of development activities agreed upon in the country or regional co-operation strategy.

According to decision 3/2001 the ACP-EC Council of Ministers (20 December 2001) earmarked grants for Somalia of € 50 million under the 8th EDF as interim finance and € 149 million under the 9th EDF. The managing and executive agents of the EDF are; the Chief Au­thorising Officer (the EC Commissioner), responsible for managing the resources of the Fund; the National Authorising Officer (appointed by the government of each ACP state and responsible for the prepara­tion, submission and appraisal of projects and programmes in close co-operation with the Head of the EC Delegation); and the Heads of the EC Delegation (representing the EC in each ACP state). The National Authorising Officer’s responsibilities include (in close co-operation with the Head of the Delegation) the complete settling and revision of tenders as well as the reporting on the operations covered by the National In­dicative Programme.

29 More information on the EC can be found at www.europa.int and specifically on the EC delegation in Nairobi at www.delken.cec.eu.int/en/eu_and_Somalia 30 S/2002/189 31 EU 2447th Council meeting, 10945/02 (Presse 210), http://ue.eu.int 32 EU 2447th Council meeting, 10945/02 (Presse 210), http://ue.eu.int 33 europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/development/mission_en.htm 34 europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/s05036.htm In the case of Somalia, having no functioning state structures, the role of the National Authorising Officer is given to the EC Delegation in Nairobi, on behalf of the Somali people. Therefore the EC and the EC Delegation as NAO channel the EDF financial support via international organisations.

2.5.6 EC Strategy for the Implementation of Special Aid to Somalia 45

Theoretically all trade, development, conflict resolution principles and horizontal principles of the EU are valid for Somalia. Somalia as a ‘least developed country’ has special status under the Cotonou Agreement. The circumstances of ongoing conflict and the breakdown of any central state authority require the EU to provide an approach appropriate to this situa­tion. This approach includes:
* Provision of humanitarian aid;
* Provision of basic assistance to the social sector through United Nations agencies, international organisations and non-govern­mental organisations (NGOs);
* Provision of aid on a political and economic level to neighbour­ing countries where there is a breakdown that threatens regional security.46

As part of the responsibilities of undertaking the role of NAO the EC Delegation has formulated a Strategy for the Implementation of Special Aid in Somalia (2002-2007), which includes the following aims:
* to contribute to the alleviation of poverty and to the promotion of a more peaceful, equitable and democratic society in Somalia as a long-term objective;
* to support sustainable improvement of the livelihood of the So­mali people – by enhancing food security and economic growth – and their improved access to basic public and social services as well as the establishment of good governance.47

The strategy identifies four priority areas of intervention:
* Enhancement of good governance

This element addresses administrative structures, parliaments and civil society through support to administrative structures in applying principles of good governance; support for the contri­bution of the civil society to the enhancement of good gover­nance; and contributing to reconciliation and sustainable peace building.

* Reduction of widespread vulnerability

This component aims to enable the population to develop their own strategies to cope better with the hostile situation through improving skills and knowledge for sustainable and effective management of natural resources; improve access to agricultur­al and pastoral infrastructure, inputs and services; and through better prevention, monitoring and control of emergencies.
* Access to social services

This section addresses the vulnerability of the population caused by the breakdown of the health and education services by sup­porting integrated public health programmes; improving health programmes to fight against contagious diseases; and through improving access to quality education.
* Economic growth and diversification

This part of the strategy addresses the absence of physical infrastructure and a legal framework to serve economic growth. Support to the sustain­able rehabilitation of transport infrastructure and for the establishment of regulatory frameworks and support services for private sector devel­opment will be provided.48

After almost a decade of experience as the largest donor in Somalia and Somaliland the EC formulated the following lessons learnt and identified principles for ongoing activities:
* Strict neutrality: no funding of regional administrations but programmes and projects benefiting the population
* Focus on the local level: direct participation of beneficiaries in project preparation and implementation
* Institution building: initiating and training of local institutions to manage their projects
* Consideration of local absorption capacity: size, number and complexity of the projects according to the local absorption capacity 35 europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/r12001.htm 36 europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/r12001.htm 37 europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/r12004.htm
* Support to the private sector: to fill the gap in service delivery in the absence of state structures
* Implementing partners should usually be European NGOs
* Technical assistance: preparation and supervision of implemen­tation of the projects by the EC Delegation in Nairobi
* Multi-sectoral delivery capacity: providing the capacity to meet multi-sectoral needs
* Gender mainstreaming. 51

The EC Delegation, authorities, communities and partners are involved throughout the project cycle (programming, identification, formulation, financing, implementation, evaluation). To include Somali non-state actors in an effective campaign against poverty the EC Delegation in consultation with Somali civil society, is preparing a study to evaluate whether a Somali non-state actors forum could be a viable and repre­sentative entity and to further explore ways to address the legal issues that limit direct access to EC funds by local institutions in Somalia and Somaliland.52

IV. EU member states and Somalia

Sections 3 to 5 of this chapter draw on the opinions expressed during the interviews with embassies, conducted by the consultant in Nairobi in June, July and September 2002. The recommendations made during these interviews are integrated in Chapter V.

1. General remarks

The formal relationship between the EU member states and Somalia is guided by international law and agreements. Country-to-country devel­opment co-operation is based on bilateral agreements between states. According to international law, the basic actor within the international system is the state vested with sovereignty and territorial integrity. International relations, i.e. relations between states, are characterised by legal and contractual agreed relations between sovereign states as well as by diplomatic contact and negotiation. The process of international recognition of states is formally regulated by international law but such a decision would always be the result of political considerations. From a legal point of view, the recognition of a new state is dependent upon the fulfilment of two pre-conditions: the actual existence of state structures capable of becoming a subject of international law; and the estab­lishment of official relations (which may not necessarily be diplomatic relations) with the new state by actors in the international community. From the political point of view, such decisions are taken on the basis of political interest or, simply, a fait accompli, i.e. the factual emergence of a new state. It is also important for a newly emerging state, how many and which members of the international community are ready to recognise it.

The breakdown of state authority in Somalia and the non-recognition of single entities (such as Somaliland) as sovereign states prevents of­ficial relations and direct or bilateral assistance. However, since NGOs can carry out their own projects and programmes in co-operation with local partners, they can use parts of the public development budget for Somalia.

2. The EU and its member states

As mentioned above, the EU is a union of sovereign states with some supranational institutions and is still in the process of further integration. Growing integration is reflected in the gradual transfer of more deci­sion-making powers to the EU, away from member states. This is a very sensitive area and is not easy to implement. In addition the EU is nego­tiating the enlargement of the Union to include a further 13 countries of which several may become members in the next 2-3 years. This implies an additional burden on the EU in terms of both finance and institutional reforms.

The sovereign member states of the EU, being also members of the UN and the OECD, decide on their development policies through their own parliaments and in agreement with the UN, OECD/DAC and the EC - and, of course, in co-operation with their partner countries. In some fields, decision-making power is partly delegated by member states to the EU, following the principle of subsidiarity. In line with the decon­centration process within the EU system, the EU also delegates some decision-making power to the local level, to the EC Delegations in third countries. Within the member states, development policy must agree with other policy fields, especially with foreign policy. Decisions made by the UN Security Council also affect the EU and the member states decision-making processes. The EU as an actor in the international community is integrated into international decision-making (see chart 1) and also depends on the decision-making of each member state.

In addition to formally agreed contracts, many other decisions are made through informal exchanges. Discussion of development issues within OECD/DAC meetings has a huge impact on development strategies as well as entailing the important function of peer review.

Some member states have special ministries for development policy and co-operation, others have development departments within their Min­istries of Foreign Affairs. Development policy and budgetary decisions are formulated by the different national governments and then have to be passed by the national parliaments.

38 europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/r12000.htm and europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/r12101.htm 39 needs criteria: per capita income, population size, economic and social development indicators, level of indebtedness and dependence export earnings. Performance criteria: progress in implementing institutional reforms, transparency and accountability in the management of resources, effective implementation of current operations, poverty alleviation or reduction, sustainable development measures, macroeconomic and sectoral policy performance 40 EC: the Cotonou Agreement 41 Saferworld/CPN 2002 42 Saferworld/CPN 2002 Many of the member states have particular historical relationships with third countries. These ties often contribute to specific additional support or interests.

In order to avoid funding small projects everywhere with no clear strat­egy and to make development assistance more effective and efficient, most of the member states have introduced strategic instruments for concentration and coherence of development assistance, these include:
* focal countries, where development assistance is concentrated;
* country strategy papers, focusing on selected fields of assis­tance;
* sector strategy papers, focusing on single sectors.

The EU itself is aiming for greater coherence by harmonising its poli­cies and institutions responsible for external relations and development co-operation. Coherency means not only to coordinate the development policies of the member states and the EU itself. The interrelationships between all countries are growing and becoming increasingly complex. The policies and regulations of one country affect all related partner countries. External relations and development assistance are not the only sectors influencing other countries: development assistance activities are not only implemented by the ministries for foreign or development affairs, but also by other ministries, such as health, environment, trade etc. Addi­tionally, the complexity of single sectors or fields of policy themselves is growing, leading to the development of more and more regulations. In the case of development policy, coherency means to harmonise the principles of development policies with the other sectoral policies, such as trade policy, environment policy etc.

The first steps to greater coherency within the EU include measures like the adoption of common country strategy papers and indicative programmes. Further there is a recognised need for the policies of the 15 member states to be harmonised in a permanent process. “Community development co-operation is to be co-ordinated with member states’ policies and, as far as possible, with major international donors (such as, for instance, the IMF and World Bank, member organisations of the UN family, the United States, Canada, Japan, Australia). These aspects of Community policy are enshrined in the Amsterdam Treaty (Article 177,6,180)”.53 These basic principles of harmonisation and coherency are complemented by the principle of subsidiarity. Subsidiarity means that the EU is mainly responsible for policies, measures and activi­ties where it has a comparative advantage over other donors (such as member states). Comparative advantages in particular situations could include; its size and authority, a particular field of competence, a situa­tion where it is more effective to co-ordinate efforts at a European level and where the EU’s interests are best served by action at the Community level.54

3. EU member states’ overall strategies assisting Somalia and Somaliland

The member states’ individual policies are in line with overall EC policy and activities due to the joint formulation and agreement of the EC Strat­egy for the Implementation of Special Aid to Somalia by all EU member states. As an overall strategy member states have agreed to accept the territorial integrity of Somalia and to support the emergence of peace and stability in Somalia and the whole region. As outlined above, the member states in general have developed instru­ments to make their development assistance more effective, such as concentration on focal countries and/or sectors. For most member states, Somalia and Somaliland are not focal countries and few states have formulated country strategy papers, have special budget lines or relation­ships.55 Some other member states (notably France, Italy and the UK) because of their historical ties with Somalia and Somaliland and the region have closer relationships and express a greater sense of respon­sibility towards the situation in Somalia. These member states are more strongly engaged in the future development of Somalia and Somaliland. Having a permanent seat in the UN Security Council, where Somalia is a case for constant review, France and the UK are particularly strongly in­volved. In addition, France is militarily present in Djibouti and therefore more affected by the internal developments in Somalia and Somaliland and the impact on neighbouring countries. In some member states a strong community of Somali refugees is taking an active part in internal debates, thus influencing the kind of development assistance provided.

All member states clearly state that only the Somali people themselves have the right and also the duty to decide on the future of Somalia and Somaliland. Donor countries and organisations should stay in the back­ground, providing assistance only. All Somali people should be involved in developing a political future for their country. Member states are wait­ing for a constitution to be drawn up by all Somalis. Some of them are offering their assistance but without having clearly decided who should be recognised as representative of the Somali people and therefore who could act as contact partner. Ongoing insecurity is also a factor in mem­ber states hesitation to engage more fully with Somalia.

The internal situation in Somalia is not stable and can change daily. New fighting in Baidoa and Mogadishu took place in July 2002, during the consultant’s visit, and the situation in Puntland remains insecure. The member states are fully convinced that Somali civil society is peaceful and really does want the war to stop and state that their focus is on assisting civil society organisations, especially women’s organisa­tions. Some states noted that as the Somali conflict does not have any real political objectives the violent internal conflicts cannot be under­stood as civil war, rather, that some 100 people are fighting for political and financial power over the heads of the peaceful majority. There is no common idea of how to deal with the warlords. In principle, instruments such as sanctions could be developed. Excluding warlords from the peace process could lead to more violent conflicts, yet integrating them provides them with a public platform and implies recognition for those wielding powers not legitimised by the Somali people.

45 Provided by the EC Delegation Somalia Unit in Nairobi 46 europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/r12104.htm 47 EC Strategy, February 2002, pp 18f 43 The Cotonou Agreement and Non-State Actors in Somalia: A Basic Overview 44 europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/r12102.htm The “peace dividend” approach is in general welcomed as an instrument to encourage against violent conflicts. Some countries interpret this approach as a strategy to strengthen support to “islands of peace”. Most member states in practice provide greater assistance to peaceful areas, such as Somaliland. Another reason for the greater support of Somalil­and compared to the rest of Somalia is the existence of stable adminis­trative structures thereby making co-operation easier. Should other parts of Somalia become peaceful and develop administrative structures then member countries state that they will also provide them with assistance.

The EU member states, in line with the UN Security Council and the in­ternational community as a whole, accept the territorial integrity of Soma­lia as it was post independence in 1960. Some countries remark that there is a slow trend within the international community towards recognition of Somaliland as a sovereign state. Many countries feel that the issue of Somaliland and other disputes of territorial integrity should be high on the agenda of the newly formed African Union.

As far as the internal development of Somalia is concerned, EU member states tend to recommend unity under a federal state with a central gov­ernment and local autonomy. They recommend that all entities should try to come together to find a commonly accepted solution. All member states pointed out that they would agree with any result of a general referendum transparently and democratically held by all Somali people. After the outcome of the last peace conference held in Djibouti the member states supported the Arta peace process and the resultant TNG. Two years later the member states note the lack of progress made by the TNG and that it has not fulfilled its mandate. The Arta process ends in August 2003. No clear strategies have been developed internationally to move the peace process forward. Some member states said it was important not only to build internal political structures and processes but also to invest in personalities and leadership.

For most member states development co-operation in Somalia takes the form of multilateral assistance providing emergency and humanitarian aid. Some member states fully defer their budget for Somalia to the EC for disbursement. Others tend to channel their funding via international NGOs (see annexes, Table 4, page 34).

4. EU member states’ views on EU co-operation and strategy

The EU member states recommended that the EC should take a lead role in the peace process. The EC is generally well accepted by all actors. As the biggest donor to Somalia and Somaliland the activities of the EC have a big impact. The budgets of the single member states are too small to really influence the situation. The EC has developed a good strategy to assist Somalia and Somaliland. The strategy and major projects are negotiated and agreed with all EU member states.

Using diplomatic channels, the EU (EC and member states) should encourage neighbouring countries to strengthen their co-operation to support the Somali peace process. It is recommended that the EU should use its political influence to assist Ethiopia and also Djibouti in joining the negotiations on conflict resolution and the common process of peace-building.56 This activity should also be supported by the US. Further­more, it is recommended that the EU use its influence as to the lifting of the livestock ban through diplomatic channels such as through the Gulf Cooperation Council.

Governance 11%
Economic Growth 15%
Social Sector 28%
Rural Development and Food Security 46% 
Puntland 15%
Somaliland 34%
South Somalia 20%
Countrywide 26%
Somaliland and Puntland 5%

The EC Delegation has started to host technical assistance meetings in order to exchange information with and between member states. The EC Delegation is praised for being open and providing information and contacts to the EU member states, though some member states recom­mended that there could be an improvement in information-sharing between the EC Delegation and the member states. Some member states also recommended strengthening co-operation between the member states themselves, which could be organised by the EC Delegation.

In general the coherence of the EC and the member states policy was as­sessed as satisfactory. Most of the member states felt there was no need for any kind of stronger coherence. They will always slightly differ in their own approaches, a diversity that is viewed as positive. The member states do not see the need to set up new mechanisms, procedures or structures of co-operation. The level of bureaucracy should stay low. Internally, member states are free to make use of special co-ordination dialogues whenever these are needed, for instance the UK and France started a specific dialogue on Franco-British co-ordination in Africa. On development assistance to Somalia and Somaliland, most member states recommended that the EC should focus on support to the health and education sectors. Many felt that direct contact with the Somali people should be improved.

5. EU member states’ observations and views on neighbouring countries and regional organisations

The ongoing conflicts in Somalia are affecting the whole region. Cross-border refugees and the small arms trade, a situation to which a solution must be found urgently, especially affect Kenya. Ethiopia is affected by operations from the Oromo Liberation Front initiated from Somali territory. Between Kenya and Ethiopia some common issues arise from their situation of cross-border incursions. In addition this commonality of feeling may be heightened by the fact that both countries are predomi­nantly Christian. Ethiopia has a particular interest in guaranteeing access to Somalia and Somaliland’s ports and to that end has initiated some economic and diplomatic relationships with Somaliland. It accuses the TNG of having ties with Al-Itihad (a fundamentalist Islamic organisa­tion) and providing sanctuary for terrorists, an accusation vehemently rejected by the TNG. The TNG claims that Ethiopia is disregarding the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Somalia by supplying arms to warlords and deliberately destabilising the country. Djibouti, as the main instigator of the Arta peace conference and supporter of the TNG, also complains of Ethiopian military interference in Somalia and insists on acceptance of the TNG as the only Somali government. To stabilise the region and to provide real support to the peace process, the neighbour­ing countries need to develop a common approach and refrain from destabilising activities. The co-operation demonstrated by Ethiopia and Djibouti in the preparations for the upcoming peace conference is widely welcomed and it is hoped that they will move further towards each other in support of the common solution-finding process.

All EU member states are clearly supporting the IGAD initiative. For IGAD to take the lead role in the peace process it needs to be strength­ened by the international community. The integration of Arab countries in joint activities should also be strengthened. All member states regret that the arms embargo is not being properly implemented. The internationally discussed view is that some countries are more or less involved in arm supply and armed conflicts. The EU member states welcome the initiative by the UN to send a team to evalu­ate the effectiveness of the arms embargo.

V. Recommendations

The recommendations made in this chapter address both the interna­tional community and Somali development stakeholders. Some of the recommendations were formulated by the EU member states themselves during interview sessions. They are clearly marked as member states recommendations. The other ideas are those formulated by the consul­tant and discussed with Novib.

1. Observations and recommendations at international level

1.1 Giving Somalia and Somaliland higher priority

The UN Security Council has recommended that programmes of as­sistance to Somalia should be increased in creative and innovative ways, wherever the security situation allows. In particular greater efforts to ensure that the ‘peace dividend’ aspect of targeted assistance is fully exploited are called for.57 The EU member states share the opinion that development assistance to Somalia and Somaliland should focus more on development in addition to humanitarian aid. The EU member states pointed out that Somalia and Somaliland should be more effectively supported. In general it was felt that the international community should demonstrate its commitment to the peace process more clearly. Some member states complained that too many members of the international community were still adopting a “wait and see” posi­tion and noted that without strong support there will be no progress.

The EU member states stated that the livestock ban, which is threaten­ing Somalia and Somaliland’s economy, should be a higher priority for discussion internationally, especially within the UN. It was felt that the EU and UN could act in a more powerful way through joint initiatives. Additionally, an EU-UN-Arab States dialogue should be instituted.

Some member states would like the international community to be more open in its approach and not to focus too much on the support to the TNG.

As a lesson learned from the Sudan peace process, the diplomatic pro­cedure of appointing Special Envoys for Somalia would be welcomed by the EU member states. Consultations without big public structures can be undertaken in an informal and discreet manner and may be more successful. The new Somali Contact Group in New York and Nairobi is welcomed by the EU member states and should be supported.

All interested countries should share their experience in assisting So­malia and Somaliland regularly and search for common ways to support Somali peace-building. For instance, the experience of Egypt and other Arab countries in co-operating directly with local communities without international NGOs as intermediaries (see annex 7, pages 40-44) can enrich the knowledge of the international community about Somali soci­ety structures as well as informing as to the weaknesses and strengths of potential co-operation partners.

It is important to mention that embassies generally take part in the politi­cal decision-making process of their particular country, especially by providing information, but at the end of the day the parliaments and the governments make the decisions at home. Even if the embassies judge Somalia or Somaliland to be a high priority area for engagement, the national parliaments and governments may place their priority on other topics or regions. In the case of Somalia and Somaliland, this is the case. To influence the international community Somali civil society needs to articulate its interests and to lobby the European countries themselves. This should be supported by the Diaspora and by international NGOs.

1.2 Member states view on the role of the EU

A short summary of EU development policy, drawing on the overview published by the OECD/DAC Peer Review Group, is provided in annex 5.6.3, pages 28-30. This offers a good assessment of the current objec­tives, institutions and procedures of EU development policy. The discussions with EU member states’ embassies on direct and immediate support to Somalia and Somaliland can be summarised as follows: The EU (EC and member states) should:
* Continue to represent a common approach of the member states and present a unified position;
* Assist and support the current peace process and the Somali Contact Group in New York and Nairobi;
* Hold negotiations with the concerned countries to lift the live­stock ban;
* Encourage the ‘frontline’ states, especially Djibouti and Ethio­pia, to develop and implement a common approach;
* Help implement the arms embargo, possibly by imposing sanc­tions;
* Strengthen implementation of the “peace dividend” approach.

1.3 EC and member states co-operation

The key findings of this study are:
* The strategy to assist Somalia and Somaliland formulated by the EC is negotiated with and agreed by all member states.
* The position of the member states is fully in line with this strategy as is also the case in the approach to support regional stabilisation and the peace process.
* The member states assess the co-ordination and information ac­tivities undertaken by the EC Delegation in Nairobi as satisfac­tory. Although some member states recommended strengthening the ties between the EC Delegation and member states, all of them reject the idea of setting up new co-ordinating institutions.
* The member states evaluate their approach and that of the EU in assisting Somalia and Somaliland as coherent. Taking into account the political diversity within the EU member states themselves, small differences in development assistance and policy will and should always remain. There are advantages in this diversity.
* Although three major member states involved (France, Italy and the UK) have developed somewhat different visions for Somalia and Somaliland, political differences are not as strong as suggested by outsiders. The common objective predominates; peace and stability for the region. The principal view is not to interfere in internal Somali decisions and to agree with any political decision accepted by the Somali people in a democrati­cally-held referendum.
* Specifically with regard to development assistance, the member states are, in practice, mostly following the “peace dividend” approach by providing the greater part of their assistance to Somaliland and peaceful parts of Somalia.
* Member states mostly channel their development assistance through international NGOs or UN organisations. All member states mentioned their uncertainty in deciding on local Somali co-operation partners and the difficulties of knowing who is rep­resenting whom. Nevertheless, more direct contact is wanted.

54 europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/development/mission_en.htm55 Since the compilation of this study, two member states have undertaken the development of a country strategy for Somalia, these are Sweden and Britain. 53 europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/development/mission_en.htm
* The member states and the EC are in line with the strategies of the international community as a whole.
* The member states recommend that the EU adopt a more visible profile in the public arena, in particular with regard to common positions. Within the UN Security Council the EC and the member states support a unified approach to the Somali peace process and greater policy coher­ence, to contribute to the achievement of a comprehensive and lasting settlement.58

It is noted that in the conflict-ridden Somali situation many decisions are made by the member states under conditions of uncertainty and are in practice greatly influenced by the physical insecurity of Somalia.

1.4 Integrating with the African Union

The AU has declared the promotion of peace, security and stability on the continent as a primary objective. As a union of states, conflicts inside one country should be addressed and resolved at the level of the Union. Resolution of the ongoing conflict situation in Somalia should be ad­dressed to the AU, by Somali civil society and by the various adminis­trative bodies.

1.5 Using the innovations of the Cotonou Agreement

One of the innovations of the Cotonou Agreement is the increased owner­ship of development strategy by the partner country, in part through active participation in the formulation of the Country Strategy and the supervi­sory post of National Authorising Officer. In the absence of a functioning state in Somalia, the EC Delegation takes on the role of the NAO on be­half of the Somali people. Somali non-state actors can and should engage with the EC Delegation in consulting and debating around the formulation of the Country Strategy, the National Indicative Programme and specific sector strategies, as well as around the monitoring, performance reviews and evaluation of strategy. Single project activities can be influenced and monitored in the same way.

Mechanisms should be institutionalised to provide information to the EC and the member states on Somali internal development and on the needs and strengths of the development stakeholders. The proposal to form a non-state actors forum is a step in this direction. The stakeholders should also participate in formulating strategic approaches to contribute to a comprehensive development strategy for Somalia and Somaliland. To guarantee full involvement of all stakeholders single actors must be strengthened through cooperation (e.g. umbrella groups).

The EC operates a policy of strict neutrality as the best way to guarantee benefit to the population. Therefore, the EC does not support any Somali administration. Section 3.4 of this chapter outlines the important role of administrative structures in representing the general public as opposed to a limited local community. For this reason flexible ways should be explored to channel financial support to administrative bodies indirectly. Some member states already provide financial support to international NGOs, which support the formulation and implementation of regional strategies administered by regional bodies.

1.6 Strengthening strategic development assistance

Somalia is not classified as a focal country and therefore most member states do not formulate Country Strategy Papers for Somalia. Nevertheless it would be beneficial for member states to develop strategic approaches to Somalia and Somaliland, despite the limited resources available. Strategic assistance should not only focus on support to single activities but should clearly place emphasis upon the long-term development of stable struc­tures. Many member states pointed out that there is a need to shift from humanitarian and emergency relief to development assistance. This strategic approach should be formulated with the new mechanism of the non-state actors forum proposed by the EC.

1.7 Integrating the Diaspora

Several interview partners mentioned the importance of the Somali Di­aspora, as both a source of financial support to Somalia and Somaliland and as a pool of highly educated and qualified concerned stakeholders. This competence should be used not only in support of projects initiated by the Diaspora. Programmes to facilitate the return and resumption of professional roles (medical doctors, teachers etc.), even temporarily, of the Diaspora should be developed and offered. The model of the return programme for the Eritrean Diaspora, which was supported by some donors, could be examined.

2. Observations and recommendations at regional level

2.1 Supporting the peace process

The member states hold a common position regarding the frontline states and IGAD, which is to strengthen their role in the peace process by sup­porting the development of a joint position.

56 Ethiopia and Djibouti have joined preparations for the peace conference in Eldoret. It will be important to the process to put in place mechanisms to encourage their continued support.

2.2 Fostering regional integration

In order to foster regional stabilisation more integrated approaches need to be developed. The EU has a comparative advantage in this aspect of supporting regional development and should take a lead role. The EU itself is a union of states and is going through a process of inter­nal integration and expansion to incorporate new member states. One internal concept in this process of integration is the idea of a “Europe of Regions”. This concept represents the strengthening of regional eco­nomic, social and environmental development in conjunction with the strengthening of regional and local capacities. Several programmes are implemented to this end including the Cross-Border Co-operation Pro­gramme. This programme supports border regions from different coun­tries to develop cross-border institutions and development strategies in order to overcome their borders and marginal position. It is envisaged as a result that new economic, social and cultural centres, developing new interactive dynamics and new identifications, as part of a regional and European integration process, will emerge.

The international community and also Somali stakeholders should not only focus on the internal development of Somalia and Somaliland, but also on regional integration.

2.3 The war economy, drugs and small arms trafficking

An important field of intervention for the international community is the complex background, of structures, actors and regional trade relations, which underpins and sustains the conflicts in Somalia and constitutes a ‘war economy’. Understanding and transforming the war economy, including the trade in drugs, as a finance source for small arms traffick­ing should be given a higher attention by the regional and international community.

3. Observations and recommendations at Somali internal level

3.1 More information needed

Most of the member states expressed the need for more knowledge on internal Somali processes and for more direct contacts with Somali com­munities. Mechanisms to exchange information between the member states, the EC Delegation, Liaison Offices, SACB, regional/local admin­istrations and NGOs/CSOs should be built, including regular meetings in Somalia and Somaliland. A mixture of institutionalised, formal and infor­mal contacts would help to build common understanding and agreement as it does at the broader level of the international community.

3.2 Focusing on special sectors

Most interview partners pointed out that all donors should give special emphasis to assisting the development of the health and education sec­tors. The next priority should be the development of water and agri­culture. Because of the breakdown of health and education provision the Somali population is weakened and highly vulnerable, in particular children and women. Due to the protracted conflict several generations of young people have been left with no formal education. Yet education is of great importance in sustaining peace and development. Assistance should also be focused on demobilisation. Most member states noted the need to help erode the power of the warlords and to implement the arms embargo. Militia should be offered incentives to prevent them from the continuation of violence, including demobilisa­tion with attached incentives.

3.3 Expectations of local NGOs

The EU member states felt that Somali civil society needed to be better organised in order to find their voice and to co-operate more directly with donor countries and organisations. Local NGOs should overcome their individual interests and sometimes narrow agendas in order to promote the peand have the general public as their constituency (especially Somalil­and). The governments develop and agree plans on a regional level and often have decentralised offices, civil servants and experts with special knowledge at their disposal, although the smooth functioning of these is hindered by the lack of resources. Because of the absence of any kind of higher education services for the younger generations and the lack of jobs within the government administration not only is the knowledge of former civil servants getting lost over time, it is also not being connected with and transferred to the emerging NGOs. To support an extensive and sustainable development approach the administrative structures must be integrated as development partners and not be weakened by the exclu­sive financing of NGOs. Successfully working state or administrative structures will contribute to social integration and therefore to peace. In order to realise the most effective and sustainable impact there must be an institutionalisation of mechanisms to bring administrative bodies and NGOs together to develop common planning tools and allocation of responsibilities. The donor community should assist this process.

3.5 New types of NGOs

In order to support national and/or regional integration and peace-build­ing, new types of local NGOs should emerge. As mentioned in the section on civil society in Europe (annexes, 6.1 and 2, pages 39-40), the development of civil society of Somalia and Somaliland should be furthered to enhance a broader approach towards identification or to express and address political interests. An example from Uganda shows that women are more sensitive to this approach: declaring themselves as citizens of Uganda and not only as members of specific ethnic groups, groups of women pointed out that they all have to suffer from and to fight against violence (“it does not matter from which ethnic group the raper comes from, the feeling of the women raped does not differ ac­cording to their ethnic origin”). Also, the statement of Somali women who declare themselves as an all-Somali inter-clan clan goes in this direction. New types of NGO should focus on regional or structural is­sues, and not on local or particular ones, outlining interests to all leading powers (husband, father, brother, local chief, warlord, minister, president etc.), to regional and international organisations (IGAD, AU, EU, UN) and donors.

Such organisations, Somali-”Watch”-type organisations, should be involved in monitoring, lobbying and commenting on local and donor activities, formulating regional strategies and commenting on inter­nal and regional development. The development of such NGOs could strongly contribute to:
* Formulation of a Somali development strategy and action plans
* Demands for social and political change and development
* Communication with donors to foster a more comprehensive and strategic development approach
* Monitoring and evaluation of development activities
* Informing the Somali population, as well as the international community, on development, human rights and political issues
* Development of political and strategic alliances with regional and international NGOs (e.g. World Watch, German Watch, Indonesia Watch)
* Participation in regional and continental decision-making pro­cesses on Somalia and Somaliland

3.6 Questions to Somali civil society

The following questions, formulated by the interview partners, need to be answered by Somali civil society in order to strengthen the communi­cation and information sharing with the international community:
* Member states felt that they had little knowledge of the internal Somali situation and processes. How could this knowledge gap be addressed?
* Member states felt that they had little knowledge of possible Somali partners and would find it difficult to judge which organisations and individuals were capable, legitimate and accountable. There was a fear that they could end up indirectly supporting warlords through their lack of understanding of ‘who is who’ on the ground. How can this situation be addressed?
* Member states felt uncertainty and insecurity as to how to strengthen the peace process. How could this lack of confidence be addressed?
* How can Somalia and Somaliland move higher up the political agenda of the international community?
* What should the main development assistance strategies in Somalia and Somaliland be?
* How can the international community support and strengthen the internal peace-building process?
* How can political decision-making at a higher level than clan be supported? How can socio-political consciousness-building in the Somali population be supported?
* How can regional links and identities be supported?
* How can external agencies assess the character and quality of Somali CSOs in order to judge their potential as co-operation partners? (what kind of knowledge is necessary, are there meth­ods or information providers that could be used by donors)?
* Of selected non-EU countries How can refugees be better rein­tegrated into the peace-building process? aceful development of all Somalia and Somaliland.

3.4 Building structures and strategic alliances

On one hand, NGOs and CSOs do have advantages in entering areas and development fields where no state structures exist or to which donors or international organisations do not have easy access. Yet, for NGOs and CSOs the reach of their activities is limited due to their frequently low capacity, their specific objectives and their often-isolated target groups. To really assist CSOs in their own institution-building a range of sup­portive measures must be undertaken:
* Long term supervision to assist in the building of capacity
* A combination of short term project financing and longer term institution-building
* Financial adaptation to the slow growth of capacity (no over-funding)
* Support for integration into regional networks in order to facili­tate exchange of information and to encourage wider perspec­tives. Some of these ideas are dependent on the adoption of new or more flex­ible budget regulations in order to offer long-term support. In addition to the input of civil society, the newly developed state structures within the different entities of Somalia (for political reasons these are called local or regional authorities) are broadly legitimate
* How can the Diaspora be integrated into the peace-building and development process?
* What are the capabilities and the limits of Somali NGOs and CBOs?
* Which sectors should be prioritised for support?
* Are there existing good development practices that could be used as examples?
* How can information flow between Somali actors and interna­tional actors be strengthened?

VI.Conclusion

This report has provided an overview of the structures and policies of the international community as a whole, with a focus on the EU (EC and member states). Further, the report has presented the observations and opinions of donor organisations at local level and formulated a series of recommendations and challenges posed to both the international com­munity and Somali civil society.

Following the presentation of this report to the round-table discussion on ‘Donor Assistance, Policy Coherence and Civil Society’ some proposals were made to meet these recommendations.

In response to the international community’s lack of information and un­derstanding of Somali civil society, it was suggested that further forums to allow dialogue and debate between donors and representatives of civil society should be instituted. This would have the benefit of making donor organisations more transparent, as to their decisions and require­ments, and accessible to Somali civil society. It would also allow the international community to gain greater knowledge of the Somali civil society sector and build relationships between the two groups.

A second proposal made at the meeting sought to address the constraints to direct funding of Somali CSOs. These constraints are both administra­tive and legal and related to the lack of information, mentioned above. It was felt that these constraints could be addressed through the estab­lishment of a small grants or ‘basket’ fund. This fund would be con­tributed to by a range of donors and administered by a panel of donors, INGOs and Somali civil society representatives. This joint mechanism would initiate a direct funding relationship between civil society and donors, allow organisations to establish credibility and a track record and open the door for bilateral relationships between donors and Somali civil society. Examples of such funds have operated successfully in Kenya and other African countries. This fund would also allow a debate on the necessary flexibility needed to build partnership in Somalia and Somaliland. Questions of local accountability and ownership as criteria for transparency and restitution modalities could be explored in this way. It is hoped that this study, the complementary mapping of civil society, and the forums for discussion that Novib has instituted this year will lay the basis for an ongoing dialogue and partnership between the interna­tional community and Somali civil society, based on understanding and knowledge.

Bibliography

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A single department handling the Commission’s external aid, 30 July 2002: europa.eu.int/comm./europeaid/general/mission_en.htm ACP-EU Courier: Lome IV Convention as revised by the agreement in Mauritius on 4 November 1995, No. 155 – January-February 1996 African, Caribbean and Pacific States (ACP): Introduction: europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/r12100.htm, 30 July 02 African, Caribbean and Pacific States (ACP): European Development Fund (EDF): europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/r12102.htm, 30 July 2002 African, Caribbean and Pacific Countries (ACP): Exceptional Aid for Highly-indebted ACP States: europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/r12103.htm, 30 July 2002 Commission’s Directorates-General and Services, 30 July 2002: europa.eu.int/comm./dgs_en.htm Co-operation with ACP countries involved in armed conflicts, 30 July 2002: europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/r12104.htm Cotonou Agreement: europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/r12101.htm, 30.7.02 Decentralised co-operation, 30 July 2002: europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/r12104.htm Development, 30 July 2002: europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/r12000.htm Development policy of the European Union, 30July 2002: europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/r12002.htm DG Development, 30 July 2002: europa.eu.int/comm./dgs/development/mission_en.htm DG Trade: Who is who in DG Trade, 30 July 2002: europa.eu.int/comm/trade/misc/whoswho.htm DG Trade: What we do, DG Trade Mission Statement, 30 July 2002: europa.eu.int/comm./trade/misc/mission_en.htm EC List of Ongoing Projects, EU Assistance to Somalia – Co-ordination Between Member States and Commission, Nairobi EC Delegation: European Commission Strategy for the Implementation of Special Aid to Somalia 2002-2007, Draft February 2002, Nairobi EC Delegation: List of all active projects of 2001, handout, Nairobi EC Delegation: The Cotonou Agreement and Non State (Civil Society) Actors in Somalia: A Basic Overview, Paper Presented at a Workshop in Hargeisa 2002, Nairobi EC Development Co-operation – Mission Statement: europa.eu.int/comm./dgs/development/mission_en.htm EC Developpement: L‘Union Europeenne, les Etats d‘Afrique de l‘Ouest et l‘UEMOA, Decembre 1997 EC Development: The Cotonou Agreement, l‘Accord Cotonou ECHO – Humanitarian Aid Office: Echo’s mandate, 30 July 2002: europa.eu.int/comm./echo/en/present/about4.htm ECHO – Humanitarian Aid Office: Financing, 30 July 2002: europa.eu.int/comm/echo/en/finances/finances1.htm EU Assistance Matrix, Extract from Strategy, handout, Nairobi EuropeAid Co-operation Office: Organigramme, 30 July 2002: europa.eu.int/comm./europeaid/general/struct_en.htm European Commission, 30 July 2002: europa.eu.int/institutions/comm./index_en.htm European Commission, EuropeAid Co-operation Office: Financing Proposal 8th EDF, AIDCO/234/02-EN European Commission: Feasibility and Project Preparation for Strength­ening the Capacity of Somali Non-State Actors within the Context of the Cotonou Agreement, Draft 2, 3 July 2002 EU: ACP States: Exceptional aid for highly-indebted ACP States, europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/r12103.htm, 30 July 2002 EU: ACP States: European Development Fund (EDF), europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/r12102.htm, 30 July 2002 EU: ACP States: Cotonou Agreement, europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/r12101,htm, 20 November 2001 EU: ACP States: Co-operation with ACP States involved in armed con­flicts, europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/r12104.htm EU: 2447th Council Meeting – General Affairs and External Relations, Brussels 22 July 2002, protocol: Somalia - Council Conclusions, 10945/02 (Presse 210), ue.eu.int/ External Relations Directorate General, 30 July 2002: europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/external_relations/general/mission_en.htm General Development Framework: Decentralised Cooperation, 30 July 2002: europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/r12004.htm General Policy of the European Union: Development Policy of the European Community: europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/r12001.htm, 30 July 2002 How the EuropeAid Co-operation Office operates, 30 July 2002: europa.eu.int/comm./europeaid/general/mission_fonc_en.htm Improving external aid management: a key component of the Com­mission reform, 30 July 2002: europa.eu.int/comm./europeaid/general/mission_amel_en.htm Institutions of the European Union: europa.eu.int/inst-en.htm Sectoral development policies, 30 July 2002: europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/s05036 The European Union at a glance, 30 July 2002: europa.eu.int/abc-en.htm The portfolio of activities of the EuropeAid Co-operation Office, 30 July 2002: europa.eu.int/comm./europeaid/general/mission_port_en.htm Vahl, Remco: Everything but Arms, in: The Courier ACP-EU, May-June 20, p. 30-31 UN Documents: AFR/416, SC/7415: Press statement by President of Security Council on Somalia, 24 May 2002 S/RES/733 (1992): Security Council Resolution: Implementing an Arms Embargo, 23 January 1992 S/2002/709: Security Council: Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia, 27 June 2002 S/RES/1407 (2002): Security Council resolution, 3 May 2002 S/2002/189: Security Council: Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia, 21 February 2002 SC/7426: Press statement on Somalia by Security Council President, 18 June 2002 SC/7346: Security Council 4502nd Meeting: Security Council, support­ing ‘incremental’ UN approach to peace-building in Somalia, endorses working mission to region, 28 March 2002 SC/7346: Security Concil, Supporting ‘Incremental’ UN Approach to Peace-Building in Somalia, Endorses Working Mission to Region, 28 March 2002 SC/7323: Security Council 4487th Meeting: Wide support expressed in Security Council for proposed peace, reconciliation conference on Somalia in Nairobi in April, 11 March 2002 SG/SM8091: Reconciliation, rehabilitation in Somalia are key concerns, says Secretary-General: Somalia’s leaders must rise above differences and put interests of peace first, 10 January 2002 SG/A/788: Winston A. Tubman appointed Head of Somalia Political Office, 25 February 2002 UNDP Somalia, Partnerships to Fight Poverty: UNDP in Somalia: Pro­gramme Presentation, 3 December 2001 UNDP Somalia: Draft: Area I-Civil Protection, Area II-Governance, Area III-Poverty Reduction, Handout UNDP Somalia: UNDP Delivery in Somalia, Year 2001, Draft, HandoutOECD documents: DAC Aid Peer Review of the European Community, oecd.org/oecd/pages/home/displaygeneral/0,3380,EN-home-59-2-non-no-no-59,00.html European Community’s Aid at a Glance, June 2002, oecd.org/pdf/M00030000/M00030848.pdf Net Official Assistance Flow from DAC Member Countries, oecd.org/pdf/M00030000/M0003848.pdf Net Official Development Assistance Flows from DAC Member Coun­tries, oecd.org/pdf/M00030000/M0003848.pdf DAC Guidelines for Sustainable Development, oecd.org/oecd/pages/document/print_template/0,3371,EN-document-nothe… Net Official Development Assistance Flows in 2001, oecd.org/pdf/M00030000/0003848.pdf Overview of the OECD: What is it? History? Who does What? Structure of the organisation, oecd.org/oecd/pages/document/print_template/0,3371,EN-document-0-nodirectorate-no-13-26640-0-,00.htm About OECD, oecd.org/EN/about/0,,EN-about-0-nodirectorate-4-no-no-0,00.html OECD’s Committees – Directorate of Bodies, oecd.org/oecd/pages/document/print_template/0,3371,EN-documents-nothe… OECD Member Countries, oecd.org/oecd/pages/home/displaygeneral/0,3380,EN-countrylist-0-nodirec…. IGAD documents: History of IGAD, igad.org/about Objectives of IGAD, igad.org/about/ob.html Mandate of IGAD, Mission of IGAD, igad.org/about/ma.html Operational structure of IGAD, igad.org/about/op.html Organisational Chart of IGAD Secretariat, igad.org/about/or.html IGAD Partners Forum, igad.org/partners/ Private Sectors, igad.org/partners/ps.html OAU/AU documents : Transition from the OAU to the African Union, au2002.gov.za/docs/background/oau_to_au.htm Significance of the Launch of the African Union, by Deputy President Jacob Zuma, Article Published in Sowetan Newspaper, 3 July 2002, au2002.gov.za/docs/keys_sa/ausignif.htm 1. Strengthening Somali Civil Society Organisations – Novib project summary Introduction NOVIB (Oxfam Netherlands) is a key member of the Oxfam Interna­tional family. Novib’s involvement in Somalia and Somaliland initially started with support for the development programmes of sister NGOs including Oxfam GB and ACORD. Since 1995 Novib has been more directly engaged with Somali civil society organisations (CSOs) and has funded several organisations, including CSO networks, comprising approximately 100 local NGO members all over Somalia and Somalil­and. Overall Novib’s engagement with Somali civil society aims at contrib­uting to the achievement of the following:
* The strengthening of all Partners in moving from an activity driven agenda towards becoming strong, proactive organisa­tions
* Building of the capacity of Partners, particularly network members, in the education sector in terms of vision, activity development and access to other donors
* Building of the capacity of partners in the sector of food secu­rity, especially pastoralist oriented groups (NRM network)
* Increasing of the lobbying capacity of Partners, particularly around the issue of illegal trade
* The linking of efforts to work towards a sustainable peace in the country in order to counteract the divided history, which perpetuates the conflict. This entails building a coalition that shares a joint vision of the future, inside the country, as well as presenting a harmonised reaction to outside actors
* The strengthening of women’s political inclusion The current project entitled ‘Strengthening Civil Society Organisations’ is largely funded by the European Commission. As a result of the ongoing conflict there is little conviction on the part of the international community that civil society in Somalia has the potential to play a role in re-building the country. Novib is one of the very few donors working closely with local organisations on a non-op­erational basis. A re-division of access to and control over wealth and power is necessary, and in turn requires that all sectors be addressed. As a strategic donor, Novib, with EC funding support, is not only able to establish direct linkages with a larger number of local organisations but also opts to do so on the basis of the principle of inclusion. This, in practice, means a preference for organisations that are not clan biased the business community, artists and performers. For the purposes of this project civil society can be defined as comprising all individuals or groups who do not posses legislative or executive powers, are unarmed and that actively pursue the well being of the society at large through peaceful means. Yet whilst civil society organisations have certainly expanded and contributed to the development of Somali society in recent years, civil society in Somalia and Somaliland continues to face several challenges. Chief amongst these are:
* Acquiring funding is a major problem for all NGOs and organ­ised civic groups in Somalia and Somaliland, a problem that is compounded by the nature of funding which, when available, tends to be given specifically for project activities and rarely for institutional development, although this is a critical need for the development of civil society structures.
* A related problem is that civil society organisations (CSOs) face issues of both visibility and credibility. NGOs have pro­liferated in recent years and vary widely in quality. As a result, the perception of local NGOs from inside the country as well as outside tends to be negative. This perception has led to a reluctance on the part of aid organisations to trust and therefore invest in the operational capacity of the local NGO sector. Even within the country the mushrooming of NGOs has negatively influenced the attitude of the private sector and political pow­ers.
* Leadership of CSOs is a key issue to be addressed. The leader­ship of currently existing CSOs is in general poor. Somalia and Somaliland has suffered a massive ‘brain-drain’ and therefore lacks skills in key areas. This lack of leadership capacity consequently creates weaknesses within CSOs, including poor transparency, accountability and service delivery.
* There is relatively little collaboration and cooperation be­tween the different actors in Somali civil society, in part due to the scarcity of both human and financial resources but also reflecting the divided history of the country. This leads to a lack of harmonisation and common strategy within the civic sector - resulting in duplication and failure to utilise available resources most effectively.
* Somali CSOs face a problem in the scope of their activi­ties. CSOs have had to focus on the provision of basic social services and have perhaps failed to fully develop in the areas which are traditionally important for civil society; the promo­tion of good governance, peace, democracy and human rights. The project This project aims to contribute to the promotion of a healthy civil Long term Project Objective (4 years) Civil society organisations are enabled to provide services and are able to defend the interests of their members and constituencies, while at the same time promoting the improvement and maintenance of good gov­ernance as well as peace in the country and establish working relations with both state structures and the private sector. Interim Project Objective (after 12 months) Somali development agents actively participate in the identification and testing of improved strategies for promoting the civil society sector and demonstrate enhanced understanding of the proper roles/functions, re­sponsibilities, ideals and position of civil society organisations in a more democratic environment. These objectives will be attained through:
* Awareness-building about all key issues of civil society and its relationships with state structures and the private sector.
* Institution building, training, gender equality and capacity building of NGOs
* Awareness-building and education on human rights and de­mocracy, including good governance, the strengthening of civil society, conflict prevention and promoting peace in society
* Promotion of inter-ethnic and inter-racial tolerance
* Innovative actions in the field of conflict prevention and resolu­tion Activities In the first year the programme will undertake a ‘mapping’ of Somali civil society. This exercise will include a field study of Somali civil so­ciety organisations including analysis of the strengths and weaknesses, and identification of key actors and sectors. This participatory research will include elements of capacity building, through the use of young Somali consultants to undertake the fieldwork thereby receiving on the job training, and through the linkages built between CSOs as a result of workshops and networking. The second part of the mapping exercise is a study of donor policies towards Somalia and Somaliland, which will identify gaps in development assistance and aim to facilitate the rela­tionship between international donors and national CSOs. In addition to the above exercise, Novib Somalia has developed a wide range of awareness-raising and capacity-building measures. Outputs A substantial number of representatives of NGOs, elders and profes­sional
* Report on the situation of Somali Civil Society (aggregated results of the mapping and consultations)
* Report on EC Policy and Assistance towards Somalia and Somaliland
* Progress reports of the Gender Working Group and Conflict Management Working Group
* Training reports will be submitted to NOVIB upon completion of each training course project evaluation reports 2. Terms of Reference BASELINE STUDIES AND ADVOCACY Part I: EU Assistance Study The EC is the largest multi-lateral donor to Somalia and Somaliland and its member states also individually contribute significant resources to development and relief in Somalia and Somaliland. The aim of the Policy Assistance study is to understand the development policies of the 15 EU countries and other significant actors, including the United Nations, United States and some Arab League and IGAD countries. The study will address policies, strategies and activities, the rationale for these policies and their impact as perceived and/or evaluated by these agencies. The output of the study should give us a report on the current status and indications of the likely future direction of policies and practices and the current amounts of financial outflow to Somalia and Somaliland. In the context of Novib Somalia’s broader aims, to strengthen Somali civil society organisations and facilitate the relationship between the international community and national actors, analysis of the results of the study will reveal the impact of these relationships on local organisa­tions and the scope for development of civil society capacity in Somalia and Somaliland. The results of the assistance study will complement the ‘mapping’ of Somali civil society organisations that Novib Somalia is undertaking. The information from the two activities will reinforce each other. Follow up activities will include:
* A conference in Nairobi to present and discuss the findings of the assistance study;
* A series of regional sessions followed by a national conference in Somalia or Somaliland to discuss the results of the two stud­ies. Objectives The objective of the assistance study is to research to what extent EU member states have coherent policies (both internally and externally) and/or are working towards improved coordination. It will assist the EU countries to better target assistance and formulate policy on Somalia and 4. Review of awareness inside Somalia and Somaliland of donor policies 3 Questionnaires 3.1 Questionnaire used in the interviews with the different embassies, special envoys, the EC delegation , UN organisations and INGOs carried out in Nairobi.
* Please explain your activities in and for Somalia and Somalil­and
* Do you have a strategy for Somalia/land? What is it?
* What kind of activities do you do in and for Somalia/land? What kind of assistance, isolated activities, programme of activities, in which sectors?
* What is the character of the activities/assistance?
* Who is your partner, who is supported by you?
* What is the amount of your budget?
* Do you know of good practices in the field of assistance?
* Do you have a long-term strategy or vision for the development of Somalia/land?
* Do you know about the support, assistance and strategies of the other EU countries?
* Do you cooperate with other EU countries? Are there like-minded country groups?
* What do you recommend EU Member States should do?
* Do you know about the support, assistance and strategies of the EU to/for Somalia/land?
* What do you recommend EU should do for Somalia/land?
* Do you think EU and Member States have a common strategy? Do you think that there is coherence?
* Do you think the arms embargo is being implemented?
* What do you think about the livestock ban?
* Who are the main actors for peace-building and stabilization of Somalia/land?
* What do you think about the strategies and activities of the neighbouring countries?
* Are other countries influencing the development of Somalia/land?
* What do you think about IGAD’s role and activities? Should IGAD be better supported?
* What are your general recommendations for Somalia/land?
* Somalia/land‘s political actors
* NGOs and civil society in Somalia/land
* EC and Member States
* International community
* INGOs
* Neighbouring countries
* OAU
* IGAD Most of these questions can be looked at on two levels: a more strategic level and the concrete level of assistance activities. 3.2 Questionnaire used in interviews conducted with representatives in the Directorate General Development and EuropeAid/AIDCO in Brussels Questions on DG Development
* In addition to the strategy paper handed out by the EC Delega­tion in Nairobi, is there any other kind of strategy for Somalia/land (such as Country Strategy Paper)?
* How does the EU decision-making process function with regard to Somalia/land? Who in Brussels is negotiating what with whom? Who is participating in the process, and how? Who has what kind of responsibility?
* Is there a regional strategy? What is the vision of the EU for regional stabilisation? Are there any negotiations on regional issues, any diplomatic relations with regional bodies?
* How is the EU supporting IGAD? How is the “Nairobi Peace Conference” supported?
* How is the DG Development involved in the ACP-EU negotia­tions? How is the DG Development cooperating with ACP decision-making structures?
* How are peace-building and peace-keeping issues integrated into the EU strategy towards Somalia/land?
* Is there any particular strategy for dealing with a failed state?
* How is the DG Development cooperating with EuropeAid?
* Is Somalia/land well represented in all kinds of EU-ACP nego­tiations and decision-making processes? Who is the negotiation partner?
* How do the decision-making mechanisms in development cooperation and EDF between the EC and member states work? Questions on EuropeAid/AIDCO
* What kinds of strategies, programmes and projects exist with regard to Somalia/land?
* What is the procedure for NGOs applying funds?
* Are there particular methodologies or instruments for Somali Civil Society? Are Somali NGOs undergoing the same proce­dure as any NGO applicant?
* Could there be any long-term agreement with Somali organisa­tions?
* How does the decision-making process on projects between the EC and member states work? General
* EDF procedures: Who is deciding about what? What is the decision-making mechanism between the member states? 4. Interview Partners Claus Derkowitsch Ambassador Austrian Embassy Doris Danler Deputy Head of the Mission Frederic Renard Ambassador Belgian Embassy and Sibille de Cartier d’Yves First Secretary Luxemburg Paul Harvey Deputy High Commissioner British High Commission Marjo Crompvoets Second Secretary Dutch Embassy Leonardo Garuglieri Administrateur principal EC DG Development Joaquim M. Salgueiro Roger de Backer Advisor EC Delegation Somalia Eric Beaume Advisor Unit Paul Simkin Technical Advisor Pat Johnson Governance ALAT Walid Musa Senior Political Advisor Paul Crook Liaison Officer, Somaliland EC Liaison Office Dr. Salah A. Halim Special Envoy Egyptian Special Envoy to Somalia Marja Simojoji Finnish Embassy Timo Olkkonen Second Secretary Yves Gounin First Counsellor, Deputy French Embassy Head of the Mission Sebastian Groth Second Secretary German Embassy Dr. Manfred van Eckert Regional Director GTZ German Agency for Technical Assistance – International Services East and Central Africa Stavoura Athanassiou Greek Embassy, could not be met Michel Dufour Head of Delegation ICRC Jürg Montani Deputy Head of Delegation Andre Le Sage Technical Advisor IGAD Joseph T. O’Brien Ambassador Irish Embassy, could not be met Carlo Ungaro Special Envoy Italian Special Envoy Antonio Cominiti for Somalia Elijah W. Mwangale Special Envoy Kenyan Special Envoy to Somalia Hilde Nilsen First Secretary Norwegian Embassy Dr. David M. da S. Laima First Secretary Portuguese Embassy Mr. Mateos First Secretary Spanish Embassy Eva Johansson Swedish Embassy, could not be interviewed Andrea Semadeni First Secretary Swiss Embassy Andrea Tamagnini Country Director UNDP Somalia Jeremy Brickhill Anne Juepner External Relations Officer Dr. Babafemi A. Badejo Senior Political Advisor UNPOS Glenn Warren Political Officer U.S. Embassy Ibrahim Farah Flynn Fuller USAID Somalia Jennifer Mully John Munuve Sudan Development Program Manager James Walsh Project Manager Charles D. Ward Makhtar Diop Country Director, Kenya, World Bank Eritrea, SomaliaLucas Ojiambo Economist Ahmed Hassan Afi Minister of National Planning Hargeisa and Co-ordination Mr. Awale Minister of Environment and Hargeisa Rangeland Minister for Foreign Affairs Hargeisa 5. Main actors of the international community and their interaction 5.1 OAU / AU 1963, the OAU was established with the following purposes: “Article II a. To promote the unity and solidarity of the African States; b. To coordinate and intensify their cooperation and efforts to achieve a better life for the peoples of Africa; c. To defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity and inde­pendence; d. To eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa; and e. To promote international cooperation, having due regard to the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. To these ends, the Member States shall coordinate and harmonize their general policies, especially in the following fields: a. Political and diplomatic cooperation; b. Economic cooperation, including transport and communica­tions; c. Educational and cultural cooperation; d. Health, sanitation and nutritional cooperation; e. Scientific and technical cooperation; and f. Cooperation for defence and security. Article III The Member States, in pursuit of the purposes stated in Article II, sol­emnly affirm and declare their adherence to the following principles: 1. The sovereign equality of all Member States. 2. Non-interference in the internal affairs of States. 3. Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each State and for its inalienable right to independent existence. 4. Peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation, mediation, con­ciliation or arbitration. 5. Unreserved condemnation, in all its forms, of political assassina­tion as well as of subversive activities on the part of neighbouring States or any other States. 6. Absolute dedication to the total emancipation of the African territories which are still dependent. 7. Affirmation of a policy of non-alignment with regard to all blocs.”1 With regard to the official external behaviour of the African countries towards Somalia and Somaliland, nos. 2 and 3 of the above-mentioned OAU Charter are the most relevant. Over the years, the Charter was refined by additional ad hoc decisions but still reflected a state-centric character. To better address the current needs in Africa and internationally, the OAU has transformed itself into African Union (AU), establishing new organs and bodies as well as formulating new objectives in its constitution. “Of crucial importance in the establishment of the organs of the Union is the challenge to move away from the overly state-centric character of the OAU and its con­comitant lack of civil participation. The cooperation of African NGOs, civil societies, labour unions, business organisations are essential in the process of cooperation and implementation of the Abuja Treaty, as was expressed in the Ouagadougou Declaration and provided for in the Sirte Declaration. During the Lusaka Summit several references were made to the African Union being loosely based on the European Union model, in which respect it was said that Africa ‘should not re-invent the wheel’. However, it was agreed to that the African Union should be something new, with the emphasis on being an African experience. Whereas the OAU was in principle a political organisation that also discussed matters of economic and social concern, the African Union should be an organi­sation aimed at economic integration and social development, which should lead to political unity.”2 Several objectives adopted in the constitutive act of the AU 1 OAU Charter 2 au2002.giv.za/docs/background/oau_to_au.htmare important to the Somali situation, these include the resolutions to:
* achieve greater unity and solidarity between the African coun­tries and the peoples of Africa
* defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of its Member States
* promote peace, security, and stability on the continent. 3 The approach of developing a Union aimed at strengthening the conti­nental integration of the African States implies acceptance in principle of defining conflicts inside one Member State as conflicts inside the Union and therefore to be resolved at the level of the Union. 5.2 IGAD The main bodies of IGAD are the Assembly of the Heads of State and Government, the Council of Ministers, the Committee of Ambassadors and the Secretariat. Also 1996, an IGAD Partner’s Forum was estab­lished to increase a closer co-operation between IGAD and the countries and organisations assisting IGAD.4 UN’s humanitarian, emergency and technical assistance to Somalia The following text is taken from the Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia, of 27 June 2002.5 It was not part of the EU Assistance Study plan to visit all UN agencies and programmes. Only UNDP and UNPOS in Nairobi were visited to discuss their visions and activities. As this report on EU Assistance (and also on the map­ping of CSOs in Somalia and Somaliland) additionally aims to explain the relevant institutions and mechanisms of assistance and as all EU Member States as well as the EU itself are supporting UN activities on a multilateral basis. The text below, by Kofi Annan, gives an overview of UN activities in Somalia. “Operational activities in support of peace” The ongoing operational efforts of United Nations agencies and programmes are based on the premise that much useful work can and is being done to promote and build peace in a situation of localized conflict and uncertainty, with a particular focus an regions of relative calm which have functioning regional and local authorities. Areas of ongoing activity include those outlined in the Statement of the Security Council President of 28 March 2002 as well as social and economic revitalization, review and training for judicial systems, promotion of hu­man rights norms and institutions, and capacity-building of governance and administration. Particular attention is given to vulnerable groups of returning refugees, internally displaced persons and host communi­ties. In addition to these ongoing projects, United Nations agencies and their development partners continue to identify crosscutting issues and strategic entry points to promote peace-building The return of refugees and internally displaced persons is a major chal­lenge to Somali communities. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has made substantial progress towards creating conducive conditions for returnees, by means of infor­mation campaigns, dialogue between countries of asylum and local authorities and organized confidence-building visits of refugee represen­tatives to areas of return. UNDP and UNHCR are completing the second phase of their joint Reintegration of Returnees and Displaced Persons Programme in north-western Somalia. This pilot programme aims to develop a multi-agency model for broad-based community reintegration throughout Somalia. The World Food Programme (WFP), in its Food for Work Programme, supports income-generating activities for minority groups, including internally displaced persons, marginalized clans and vulnerable groups throughout the country. These projects also help to rehabilitate com­munity assets such as roads, markets, schools, wells, water catchments and irrigation canals UNDP, in consultation with local authorities, United Nations agencies and non-governmental organization partners, is continuing the imple­mentation of the Somali Civil Protection Programme. Progress has been made in the reconstruction of police and judicial infrastructure and in the training and development of law enforcement and judicial services. Work an the Police Training School at Mandera in the north-west was completed, including a separate dormitory for female recruits, the first group of 30 women starting in June 2002. Mainstreaming of human rights has also been introduced into the curriculum for this intake, fol­lowing a “training of trainers” course initiated by UNDP. 3 au2002.giv.za/docs/background/oau_to_au.htm 4 Austria, Belgium, Canada, France, Greece, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Swe­den, Switzerland, UK, USA, EC, UNDP and World Bank The Demobilization Task Force of the Somalia Aid Coordination Body, under the Somali Civil Protection Programme, continues to review, plan and coordinate international support for demobilization and reintegra­tion work in Somalia, with regular coordination meetings both in Nai­robi and in Somalia. The programme of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in Mogadishu helped to demobilize 450 militia (between the ages of 15 and 35) by providing training for both literate and illiterate demobilized youth in 11 different trades. The International Labour Organization (ILO) rehabilitation pilot project and the Sport for Peace Project (UNESCO) address economic recovery and social reintegration within the framework of a consolidated common approach for the demobilization and reintegration of militia. UNICEF is commencing an expanded child protection programme for Somalia, in close cooperation with UNDP and other United Nations and international agencies, addressing formal and non-formal juvenile justice and law enforcement mechanisms, capacity-building of police of­ficers in relation to child protection, prevention of juvenile delinquency and training of young people, and small arms reduction and demobil­ization in relation to child soldiers. UNDP and the United Nations Office for Project Services continue to build an the foundations of the Somali Mine Action Centre in Hargeisa, through which technical support is provided to local authorities for a mine action strategy, including a mine action information system and the drafting of mine action policies and work plans in accordance with the terms and aims of the Convention an the Prohibition of the Use, Stock­piling, Production and Transfer of Antipersonnel Mines and an Their Destruction. The mine action programme is ready to expand and engage in the south and the north-east as soon as security conditions permit. A preparatory assistance phase for a UNDP small arms control project under the Somali Civil Protection Programme has been completed. The United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) contin­ues to promote gender mainstreaming in United Nations agency pro­grammes and to ensure the strengthened participation of women in all United Nations efforts to implement a development strategy for peace-building in Somalia. UNIFEM seconded a gender and demobilization expert to the German Agency for Technical Assistance programme in north-western Somalia, which has developed a database an former mi­litia and their dependents based on gender. At a grass-roots level in the Lower Shabelle and North-west regions, UNIFEM continues to support inter-clan dialogue among women to promote reconciliation and peace. UNIFEM also supported the participation of women in a policy seminar on mainstreaming gender in IGAD peace-building and humanitarian policies. In “Puntland” UNHCR is supporting the Galkayo Education Centre for Peace and Development, to enhance the role of women in peace-building and to raise awareness of and respect for women’s rights and gender equality. The UNESCO Civic Education and Peace Education Project conducted radio and pre-production workshops with the participation of various partners. This resulted in the dispatching of different radio programmes, which were aired by all partner radio stations in Somalia and the region, including Radio SONECA at The Hague and the BBC. The World Health Organization (WHO), the United Nations Popula­tion Fund (UNFPA), UNICEF and UNHCR have taken initiatives an HIV/AIDS education and prevention, including training by WHO on syndrome management and HIV/AIDS clinical management for health professionals in Hargeisa, Baidoa, Garoowe and Mogadishu. UNFPA worked with health officials in Hargeisa an prevention strategies. UNHCR has also conducted information campaigns for returnees on this issue. Both emigrant remittances and livestock exports have traditionally been major earners of income in Somalia. Both have been seriously eroded recently, posing a threat to economic and social security. Following the closure of Al-Barakaat, a leading money transfer company, after the tragedy of 11 September, and the growing difficulties faced by other companies in their international money transfer operations, UNDP has encouraged discussions among administrative authorities, Somali companies and international banking institutions to foster an enabling environment for those companies to comply with international financial rules and regulations and follow transparent systems and procedures. UNDP and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) have been collaborating since 2001 to introduce livestock and meat production standards, as well as quality control and certification mechanisms, aimed at reopening the livestock and meat trade to the Gulf countries. This initiative still requires concerted attention because the largest market, Saudi Arabia, remains closed by the ban imposed in Sep­tember 2000. The United Arab Emirates and Oman have reopened their markets to both meat and livestock from Somalia, but those two markets account for only 3 per cent of total exports. : In northwestern Somalia, UNDP is supporting a land survey (cadastral) project that seeks to meet the need for land and collateral, and employs a process that is conflict resolving in character. The process is transpar­ent and participatory, based on the resolution of existing, and potential claim disputes. It uses traditional, local-level, consensus-building and mediation techniques to ensure a fair process of land tenure and titling involving demarcation, on maps and on the ground, of the boundaries of private farms. Also in the northwest, Habitat is supporting several mu­nicipalities in water management and municipal planning. In collabora­tion with partners, FAO will continue efforts to assist Somali authorities develop a countrywide water and land information management system. UNDP and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development have supported the northern ports of Berbera and Bosasso in developing and strengthening facilities and local management capacities. Somali authorities are now managing both ports and UNDP continues to support two vocational training centres, responding to private sector opportuni­ties for employment. Since 1996, the International Civil Aviation Organization, with the sup­port of UNDP, has been working to maintain proper air traffic control of the Somali skies as a caretaker authority. Funds for this initiative are normally advanced by UNDP and reimbursed from the over-flight charges paid by the airlines. Owing to the recent international secu­rity situation, the number of flights over Somalia has been drastically reduced. Consequently, the resources available to support this important service are insufficient. It is important to establish a financial mecha­nism to maintain a steady flow of resources to maintain this service, which is essential to Somalia and to the international community. The Somalia Watching Brief Programme implemented by UNDP and supported under the PostConflict Fund of the World Bank collaborates with the Transitional National Government, regional administrations and other development partners to review and prioritise data needs and to collect and compile socio-economic data for informed decision-making, planning and monitoring. In addition, UNDP reached an understanding with other partners for the preparation of a preliminary version of the In­terim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper with the participation of Somali administrations and under their leadership to the extent possible. Both initiatives are very important in monitoring the millennium development goals. The United Nations Country Team for Somalia has initiated a process of internal consultations on three further initiatives which would be national in scope, multi-agency in planning and execution, encompass both humanitarian and developmental elements of a peace-building strategy, and build, where possible, on what is already being done. The initiatives are: (a) A Skills for Somalis programme, which would coordinate and build upon current efforts to provide technical and vocational training skills to Somali youth in close consultation with local authorities, civil society and the private sector. A number of “centres of excellence” would be established throughout the Country, each centre focused an a small number of skills, with trainees selected countrywide. The programme would address a range of pressing needs, including technical education, demobilization, return and reintegration and a growing decentralized market economy (b) A Provision of Basic Services project within the existing Re­integration of Returnees and Displaced Persons Programme, which would try to ensure that the four basic services of wa­ter, sanitation, health and education are available to vulner­able communities of returnees, internally displaced persons, host populations and disadvantaged minority groups. The project will be planned in close consultation with prospec­tive beneficiaries, local authorities, civil society, and United Nations and other agencies. Its implementation methodology would encourage employment opportunities, community management and the empowerment of women; (c) A programme for the exchange of technical expertise for So­mali professionals from a range of technical and administra­tive disciplines which would give an opportunity to exchange experience and knowledge and develop uniform standards of operation. Priority areas could include telecommunications and transport (air, sea and road), social services such as education and health and the management of public utilities. Beneficiaries would include both the public and private sec­tors, as well as civil society. These collective efforts of United Nations agencies to develop and implement projects and programmes which can operationalise a devel­opment strategy for peace- building represent a commitment to strengthening coordination and preparing a United Nations Country Team strategy to support overall United Nations peace-building efforts and strengthen Somali partici­pation in them.”6 UNDP Somalia UNDP Somalia was one of the interview partners for this study and its activities are represented here to serve as an example of one agency’s engagement with Somalia and Somaliland. UNDP Somalia is support­ing Somalia and Somaliland at various levels: by taking active part in assistance strategy formulation; running offices and programme hubs in Hargeisa and Baidoa and an office in Mogadishu; funding the SACB secretariat as well as running programmes requested by Somalis. These programmes include peace-building, civil protection, governance and poverty reduction:
* Peace-building and civil protection Under the headings Rule of Law, Small Arms, Demobilisation, Disarma­ment and Reintegration and Mine Action, the UNDP Somalia Somali Civil Protection Programme has been in operation since 1999. Train­ing for judges, attorney-generals, high-ranking custodial corps officers and police officers has been provided, bar associations established, district, appeal and regional courts as well as prisons and police stations rehabilitated, demobilisation processes carried out, reports on human rights abuses produced, a mine action centre and a mine information and management system established and Somali de-miners trained.
* Capacity-building for governance Support was provided to the public sector, civil society and parliamen­tarians through the provision of data and information, the formulation of development and macro-economic plans, policy management and the preparation of a national budget. Parliamentarians were trained and equipped, the drafting of investment codes, banking laws and cadastral surveys initiated and information systems established, Mogadishu mu­nicipal officials were trained, professionals assigned, surveys in the field of electricity, households and the labour market carried out.
* Poverty reduction Economic and social recovery is assisted by the development of a reintegration action plan, by reintegration projects, data-gathering and preparation of the national Human Development Report. Further as­sistance undertaken is improvement of the ports of Bosasso and Berbera, water management and Rift Valley fever projects and support for the control of air traffic. UNDP sent a livestock ban negotiation mission to Yemen and negotiated with Saudi Arabia, achieving a temporary lifting of the livestock ban. To bring the livestock ban to an end, UNDP could support vaccination of animals and quarantine. One reason for most UN funding going to Somaliland and Puntland could be given as the “peace dividend” approach, as well as more secure work­ing conditions in these regions. Somalia (South) receives only a small portion of available financial resources or other kinds of support.Annual BudgetAssistanceProgrammes and ProjectsPartnersUS$ 15-20 m planned Main programmesCivil protection (rule of law, human rights, small arms control, de-mining, demobilisation) Local authorities, INGOs (e.g. Diakonia, Life and Peace Institute), local NGOs and academiesGovernance (public sector, civil society, parliamentarians)Local authorities, NGOsPoverty reduction (database, watching brief, simple PRSP, coherence) UNDP and World BankSpecial programmeAir traffic control, capacitybuildingICAO 50 5.3.1 Observations and recommendations made by UNDP and UNPOS In order to strengthen the development of internal structures in Somalia and Somaliland, UNDP welcomes the active participation of local minis­tries in the decision-making on assistance. UNDP often feels it is criticised as favouring Somaliland. This decision to give Somaliland special at­tention is made due to the conducive environment and existing structures in Somaliland and not for any political reason. UNDP also welcomes the strategy on development assistance for Somalia and Somaliland formulated by the EU. To strengthen its implementation, to foster coherence and to avoid overlaps, a closer co-operation between UNDP and the EU is recommended as well as a more decentralised ap­proach by the EU in order to support local consensus-building and the development of local authorities in Somalia. Local NGOs should become executing agencies, as in the UNDP procedures. UNDP and the EU agreed on some common programmes, yet UNDP invites Denmark, Finland, Ger­many, Italy, Sweden and the UK to come on board again. On the international and regional level, the UN supports IGAD (techni­cal assistance, exchange, joint IGAD Partner’s Forum on Somalia, consultations at highest level) and recommends that IGAD be strength­ened by the international community. The international community and especially the EU are invited by the UN to increase their assistance to Somalia and Somaliland. The promises countries make should really be kept. The UN recommends that the EU and the international community participate more actively in the peace process and in conflict resolu­tion. Somalia should be assisted massively. The neighbouring countries, especially Djibouti and Ethiopia, should be asked to really support the peace process. The arms embargo should be implemented. The interna­tional community, as well as the EU in particular, should stop financing countries which trade arms. 5.4 G8 The Group of Eight leading industrialised democracies (Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russian Federation and USA) is an in­formal organisation meeting annually to discuss world economic issues. The President of the EC takes part in all meetings, summits and in the preparatory process. In the year 1999, after having been prepared by the World Bank and IMF, the G8 agreed on the HIPC initiative, a strategy to relieve highly indebted poor countries. This year, G8 decided to support NEPAD, New Partnership for Africa’s Development, and adopted an action plan to promote African initiatives to implement the rule of law, separation of powers and human rights. 5.5 OECD 30 countries7 are members of the Organisation of Economic Coopera­tion and Development (OECD), an intergovernmental organisation and a “unique forum to discuss, develop and refine economic and social policies. They compare experiences, seek answers to common problems and work to co-ordinate domestic and international policies to help members and non-members deal with an increasingly globalised world. Their exchanges may lead to agreements to act in a formal way – for example by establishing legally binding agreements to crack down on bribery, or codes for free flow of capital and services. The OECD is also known for ‘soft law’ – non-binding instruments on difficult issues such as its Guidelines for multinational enterprises. Beyond agreements, the discussions at the OECD make for better-informed work within member countries’ own governments across the broad spectrum of public policy and help clarify the impact of national policies on the international com­munity. The OECD is a group of like-minded countries. Essentially, mem­bership is limited only by a country’s commitment to a market economy and a pluralistic democracy. It is rich, in that its 30 members produce two thirds of the world’s goods and services, but it is by no means exclusive… The organisation is one of the world’s largest and reliable sources of com­parable statistical, economic and social data”.8 The OECD is governed by a Council with decision-making power made up of one representative of each member country and one from the EC. In some 200 committees, representatives of the member countries meet to advance ideas and review progress in more tightly defined areas of policy such as development policy.9 The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) encourages and harmonises OECD aid to develop­ing countries. “It monitors aid budgets, how they are spent and whether they conform to the agreed priority of economic growth that embraces the full population and is sustainable in terms of the environment and population growth.”10 7 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, European Community, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxemburg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,8 oecd.org/oecd/pages/document/print_template/0,3371,EN-document-0-nodirectorat-no-13-26640-0-,00.html 9 oecd.org/oecd/pages/document/print_template/0,3371,EN-document-0-nodirectorat-no-13-26640-0-,00.html 10 oecd.org/oecd/pages/document/print_template/0,3371,EN-document-0-nodirectorat-no-13-26640-0-,00.html Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, UK, US In the 1970s the donor countries and UN Member States declared that, in principle, they envisaged spending 0.7% of their GDP on develop­ment assistance annually. This goal could never become fully reached by all states. As mentioned above, decisions on national budgets and their distribution must pass through the national parliaments. Where parlia­mentarians assume that the citizens and tax-payers will not agree with the increase of certain expenditures, internationally agreed but not legally binding decisions will not get implemented. Also within the OECD, gov­ernments discuss their budgetary decisions as well as other instruments being introduced to development assistance. Decisions taken by the DAC are essential for the projected budgets and the character of the develop­ment assistance. The following table and chart show the net official development as­sistance (ODA) from the DAC member countries. ODA comes from national public budgets and does not include grants from private sources or from churches. The absolute amount is counted in million US $, the relative amount as a percentage of the gross national income (GNI). Table 3 gives information about the amount of ODA received by African countries. Although the overall amount of ODA granted has increased since 1996, Somalia and Somaliland belong to the group of least sup­ported countries (2000: US $ 104 m). In relation to the number of their population (estimated at 9.39 million), Somalia and Somaliland received a per capita transfer of US $ 14.91. For comparison the receipts of coun­tries with a similar population are given: Benin: US $ 39.12, Burkina Faso: US $ 30.55, Malawi: US $ 41.24, Mali: US $ 34.02, Niger: US $ 20.10. 5.6 European Union 5.6.1 Principles and main bodies of the EU The European Union is the integration of 15 European states (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Finland, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, Spain, the United Kingdom), originally founded to support internal European free trade and economic integration and to prevent internal violent conflicts by increas­ing complex inter-relationships between the member states. Since then, the principal objectives of the EU include:
* establishing European citizenship (fundamental rights, freedom of movement, civil and political rights)
* ensuring freedom, security and justice (co-operation in the field of justice and home affairs)
* promoting economic and social progress (single market, Euro - the common currency, job creation, regional development, environmental protection)
* asserting Europe’s role in the world (common foreign and secu­rity policy).13 The EU has not the character of and is not acting as a singular state. Its member states delegate sovereignty to common institutions represent­ing the interest of the Union. All decisions and procedures are derived from the basic treaties ratified by member states.14 Accordingly, the EU is not represented as such at the UN. Individual member states of the EU are members of the UN in their own right. Nor is the EU a member of the G8; it has observer status except in areas where common European policies prevail. The process of integration is ongoing and not yet finalised, although the EU has developed some supranational structures. Nowadays, the EU deals not only with common economic and trade issues, but also with internal political issues to support the creation of equal conditions of competition among member states. It relies on three pillars: increasing economic and monetary union; commitment to harmonising the internal and legal policies of its members; and movement towards developing a common foreign and security policy. There is no European Government as such. There are, however, govern­ing institutions of the Union. The European Parliament shares with the European Council the power to legislate, the budgetary authority and the exercise of democratic oversight over the EC. Members of the parlia­ment are directly elected by European citizens. Political decisions are made by the Council, composed of the Heads of State or Heads of Government of the Member States. The Council exerts, at the highest level, legislative and executive functions as well. The presidency of the Council is assumed every six months by one of the Member States, based on the principle of rotation. The Council of Foreign Ministers is composed of all foreign ministers of the member states, who meet on a monthly basis. Many significant deci­sions regarding not only foreign but also internal EU policy issues are taken by the Council of Foreign Ministers. In the event that they cannot agree, the issue is generally transferred to the European Council (made-up of heads of member states’ governments). The Council of Line Ministers deals with sectoral issues, such as agriculture, environment, health and also development assistance. They meet whenever necessary. In the event that they do not agree, the issue is referred to the Council of Foreign Ministers. The European Commission is composed of a president and 19 commis­sioners delegated by the member states on the proposal of their govern­ments. The commission has the right to prepare decisions of the European Council and Parliament (e.g. it has the right to initiate draft legislation), to safeguard the treaties along with the European Court of Justice, to implement and manage European legislation, the budget and programmes adopted by the Parliament and the Council, as well as to represent the EU internationally, including in the negotiation of international agreements. 13 europa.eu.int/abc-en.htm 14 europa.eu.int/abc-en.htm: de­velopment policy Of the Commission’s 36 Directorates-General, offices and services, five in particular are related to countries of the South:
* Development Directorate General This Directorate contributes to the formulation of the EU’s development policy as well as managing and coordinating relations with the ACP-states and OCTs. There are four Directorates working in the fields of: - General affairs and operational issues - Development Policy and sectoral questions - Horn of Africa, Eastern and Southern Africa, Indian Ocean and the Pacific - Western and central Africa, Caribbean, OCTs
* Trade Directorate General The DG Trade has the task of conducting the Union’s commercial policy in accordance with objectives set out in Article 133 of the Treaty: “to contribute, in the common interest, to the harmonious development of world trade, the progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade and the lowering of customs barriers”. Together with monetary and development policies, trade policy forms a main pillar of the EU’s rela­tions with the rest of the world.15 The DG Trade consists of six Directorates dealing with general affairs, trade defence, free trade agreements (e.g. ACP), coordination with inter­national organisations, sectoral trade questions and sustainable develop­ment and trade.
* External Relations Directorate General This Directorate General coordinates the external relations of the EU with European states which are not members of the EU, with North America, Asia, Latin America, Middle-East and the South-Mediterra­nean, TACIS assistance countries, as well as with international organi­sations. It participates in the activities of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).
* EuropeAid Co-operation Office As part of its effort to reform the management of external aid, the Com­mission formally set up the EuropeAid Co- 15 europa.eu.int/comm./trade/misc/mission_en.htmoperation Office on 1 January 2001. Its mission is to implement the ex­ternal aid instruments of the EC, which are funded from the EU budget and the EDF. The office is responsible for all phases of the project cycle (identification and appraisal of projects and programmes, preparation of financing decisions, implementation and monitoring, evaluation of proj­ects and programmes), which ensures the achievements of the objectives of the programmes established by the Directorates General for External Relations and Development and approved by the Commission.16 The office comprises eight Directorates: - Programmes in Europe, the Caucasus, Central Asia - Programmes in the Southern Mediterranean and Middle-East - Programmes in the African, Caribbean and Pacific countries - Programmes in Asia - Programmes in Latin America - Management of the project cycle of issue-based programmes in the areas of NGO co-financing, democracy and human rights, environment, social development (drugs, gender etc.) and food security. - Two directorates are responsible for providing the resources and tools needed by the office.17
* Humanitarian Aid Office - ECHO This office is mandated to provide emergency assistance and relief to the victims of natural disasters or armed conflicts outside the EU. The EC Delegations in third countries represent the EC. 5.6.3 EU’s development policy The EU itself describes its development policy thus: “The objective of Community development co-operation policy is to foster sustainable development designed to eradicate poverty in developing countries and to integrate them into the world economy. This can only be achieved by pursuing policies that promote the consolidation of democracy, the rule of law, good governance and the respect for human rights. Putting equity in the centre of its policies, the Directorate General for Develop­ment gives priority to defending the interests of the most disadvantaged developing countries and the poorest sections of the population in economically more advanced developing countries”.18 In the following sectors specific development policies are formulated: trade, sustain­able development and the environment, social and human development, water, education and training, forests, gender, regional integration, fishing, rural policy, health, private sector, food security, information society, support for NGOs/civil society, tourism and transport.19 The development policy focuses on economic development (improvement of the economic situation, food security, debt relief, rural development, transport and social services) and integration (regional and world mar­ket) as well as institutional capacity-building. Every activity must have incorporated in it the horizontal aspects of human rights, gender equity, children’s rights, protection of the environment, conflict prevention and crisis management.20 A basic principle in the development policies is the recognition of ownership of the strategies by partner countries. “With that in mind, the most wide-ranking participation of all segments of society should be encouraged and prime importance should be given to political dialogue with the partner countries”.21 Under the objective to decentralise devel­opment co-operation, the EU is following a more participatory approach in involving others in addition to the usual NGOs. Cooperation can now be extended to: local authorities, trader’s organisations, local citizens’ groups, cooperatives, trade unions, women’s and youth organisations, teaching and research institutions, churches, indeed any non-governmen­tal associations likely to contribute to development.22 There are different ways in which the EU is implementing development policy:
* multilateral: The EU signs agreements or conventions with a group of partners, like the ACP countries. Additionally, accord­ing to international agreements, the EU supports international organisations, such as UN agencies.
* unilateral: The EU decides itself to facilitate the access of other countries to the EU internal market in order to support the economic development of these countries. In addition, thematic activities, such 18 europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/development/mission_en.htm 19 europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/s05036.htm 20 europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/r12001.htm 21 europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/r12001.htm 16 europa.eu.int/comm/europeaid/general/mission_en.htm17 europa.eu.int/comm/europeaid/general/struct_en.htm: as food aid, humanitarian aid or the fight against HIV/AIDS, can be supported as emergency aid.
* bilateral: The EU can agree with single countries on develop­ment co-operation.
* co-operation with NGOs: In order to involve civil society in economic and politically relevant decisions, the EU supports NGO activities, mainly by co-funding projects. DAC’s Peer Review of the EU development policy “The OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC), meeting in Paris on 6 June 2002, discussed the Peer Review of the European Com­munity. The DAC Chairman, Mr Jean-Claude Faure, summed up the following DAC findings. The European Community is a large donor with global reach and specific capabilities through its regional partner­ship agreements, linking trade and political aspects with development co-operation. The European Community has substantially improved its development policies and strategies since the last review in 1998, and remains committed to implementing all the elements of its reforms in the upcoming years. The European Commission’s ambitious reforms also aim to improve its capacity to fulfil its primary aim to reduce poverty through the European Community aid programme. Further to the positive steps already taken on policy coherence, the DAC noted the need to improve the coherence of a broad range of Community policies with its development objectives, with clear benefits for the world’s poor. While commending the efforts in development policy and management reform, the DAC encouraged the Commission to promote further its comparative advantage, to increase its visibility in the field, and to focus on measurable results in its regional and country programmes. The European Community has increased its Official Development As­sistance (ODA) for two consecutive years. It rose by 21.1% to USD 5.91 billion in 2001 and by 13.4% in real terms to USD 4.91 billion in 2000. This is part of broader E.U. external relations activities (some Euro 11.7 billion in 2000), which support countries’ efforts to gain accession to the EU, help maintain stability in neighbouring regions, and provide development assistance. The European Commission plays a co-ordinat­ing role with its Member States, encouraging them to raise the average of their ODA from 0.32% to 0.39% of gross national income (GNI) by 2006. The DAC welcomes these efforts to raise ODA. The DAC commended the work done by the European Community to enhance its development policy framework since the 1998 DAC Review by setting out six priority areas to achieve the principal aim of poverty reduction throughout the Community’s global aid programme. The DAC noted some major challenges for the European Community in translating this poverty reduction aim into more effective ODA country allocations. The European Community should also aim to improve the developmental impact of its sectoral allocations, taking account of crosscutting objectives of governance, gender equality, and environment within the context of the primary aim of poverty reduction. There is a need to adjust ODA allocations in line with these priorities, recognising the importance for European Community policy of increased economic growth, through trade and development linkages, including support for the private sector, and social sector development, taking account of country ownership. The European Community’s regional, sectoral and horizontal strategies now more clearly display an overall sense of vision, though still requir­ing attention to implementation issues. Country Strategy Papers (CSP) have become a central mechanism for developing policy coherence and co-ordination with Member States. There has been success with policy coherence through the important “Everything But Arms” initiative that opens market access for the least developed countries. However, there is a need to take account of developing country interests in the European Community’s internal policies, for example the Common Agricultural Policy and the Common Fisheries Policy and other policy areas. The DAC recommended that the European Commission further develop its analytical capacity to develop the CSP as a management tool and to engage more effectively in dialogue about the impact of Community policies. The European Commission has made substantial progress since January 2001 with organisational and management reforms of its development and humanitarian aid system. Of particular note are improvements to accountability at all levels, the introduction of the CSP process, the speedy and efficient delivery of humanitarian aid, the clarification of the links between relief and development, improved evaluation systems, and progress in the decision-making process with Member States and with “deconcentration” of authority to field offices. The DAC welcomed the European Commission’s commitment to implement speedily the DAC Recommendation on aid untying. The DAC also took note of the aim in the Barcelona Declaration of moving beyond the recommendation to benefit all developing countries. In this regard, more work needs to be done for further aid untying and harmonisation of procedures with other donors in line with DAC discussions. Several issues for the reform process remain: sustaining political support, includ­ing more strategic roles for the Council and Parliament; developing organisational capacity to make deconcentration work; and ensuring ap­propriate and sufficient staffing to strengthen implementation. The DAC recommended the European Commission simplify its procedures further and delegate greater authority to field offices.”23 5.6.4 Financing for development The main source of resources is the general budget of the EU which is endowed by the contribution of the member states and which is distrib­uted among different areas of expenditure, among them development assistance. Development oriented funds are benefiting third world countries according to geographic (Mediterranean Basin, Asia and Latin America, southern Africa), thematic and sectoral criteria (all countries). In the case of ACP countries development assistance from the general budget is focusing on food and humanitarian aid as well as cooperation with NGOs.24 Additionally, there are two more financial instruments: the European Investment Bank granting loans (€ 1.7 billion for the five-year period of the ninth EDF); and the European Development Fund (EDF). Chart 4: European Community’s aid at a glance25 Net ODA 1999 2000 Change 1999/ 2000 Current (USD m) 4,937 4,912 -0.5% Constant (1999 USD m) 4,937 5,601 +13,4% In Euro (million) 4,633 5,330 +15% 5.6.5 EU and ACP countries Special provisions are made to least developed, landlocked, island and post-conflict ACP states, such as strengthening of regional co-operation, development of transport and communications infrastructure and the implementation of food strategies. The Cotonou Agreement is governed by a Council of Ministers (mem­bers of the European Council, of the EC and of each ACP country government) to initiate political dialogue, adopt guidelines and ensure smooth operation, by a Committee of Ambassadors (permanent EU rep­resentatives of the EU Member States, two EU representatives of each ACP state) to assist the Council of Ministers and a Joint Parliamentary Assembly (equal numbers of representatives of MEPs and ACP states) to adopt resolutions and submit recommendations to the Council of Minis­ters. Each partner country government appoints one National Authoris­ing Officer in order to represent the government in all activities financed by the EDF and to closely collaborate with the respective EC delegation. 5.6.6 EU and crisis prevention In all its documents the EU states that the prevention and resolution of violent conflicts cannot be achieved by diplomacy or by military interventions alone. Development co-operation plays a vital role in supporting the emergence of stable and sustainable political, economic and social development which is crucial for the management of change without violent conflict. The EC has adopted five basic principles for dealing with violent conflicts: 23 OECD/DAC Peer Review on EU development policy. Mr Koos Richelle, Director-General for Develop­ment Co-operation, led the European Commission delegation at the Peer Review. The examining countries were Canada and Norway. 10/06/2002. oecd.org/oecd/pages/document/print_template/0,3371,EN-document-590-17-no-12-30854-590-,00.html 24 europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/r12000.htm 25 oecd.org/pdf/M00030000/M00030848.pdf
* the principle of ownership: The developing countries them­selves are responsible for peace-keeping, prevention and resolu­tion of violent conflicts. The EU supports these local efforts.
* the principle of prevention: An early-warning system shall be developed to identify possible causes and situations of conflicts.
* the principle of coherence: Causes of conflicts shall be eradi­cated by using a coherent and cross-cutting combination of political instruments.
* the principle of early action: The temporal distance between analysis, early warning and action shall be reduced by fast-track development of scenarios and political options.
* the principle of co-ordination: To improve synergies the interna­tional community shall strengthen the exchange of information and intensify contacts with international finance institutions and regional bodies (e.g. AU, IGAD). Several instruments have been developed and activities carried out, such as the political initiative to adopt an international convention to stop the illegal trade in conventional weapons (1997), to formulate a codex on weapons exports (1998), the institutionalisation of a Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit within the European Council, of the Conflict Prevention Network and of the European Platform for Conflict Preven­tion and Transformation (1997), the development of a handbook for the analysis of conflict root-causes to which typical escalation and resolution patterns can be related, the institutionalisation of a committee on civil conflict management (2000) to consult the external relations policy and of a Crisis Management Unit of the EC. Under the Finnish presidency, an action plan concerning non-military measures to manage crises was adopted together with a Rapid Reaction Mechanism. To identify the kind of measures to be undertaken, the EU has developed (1996) the following approach: In addition to development activities aiming to achieve sustainable peaceful conditions, the EU has a wide range of measures to prevent conflicts, human rights violations or diversion of financial assistance for military purpose. These include trade mechanisms, co-operation agreements, diplomatic contacts and sanctions (e.g. restriction on exports, freezing, reducing, suspending aid) all of which can be used to impose conditionality.26 Decisions must be based on assessments of the individual situation and then measures proposed. In the case of the UN Security Council imposing sanctions against one country, the EU will integrate these resolutions into its own legal system. To foster regional integration as a path to peace, the EU supports organisations such as OAS, AU, SADC, IGAD etc. : 6. European Civil Society and NGOs 6.1 A European Perspective on Civil Society The historical emergence of civil society in Europe is accompanied by a number of conflicts between the leading political forces and the popula­tion in which the citizens gained more and more freedom to decide and act. The development started in the ancient Roman Empire (civitus romanus sum – I am a free citizen of Rome) and is still ongoing. Within the European context civil society can be characterised as follows:
* Civil society needs legally guaranteed freedom and liberty. People must have the chance to choose dependencies by them­selves, according to self-interest and qualification (employee, manager, worker, freelancer, marital status, place of residence, etc.).
* There is a need for a certain financial independence. Financial means help people to self-govern their lives and to make inde­pendent decisions.
* Financial means do not only entail freedom, but also obliga­tions such as taxes. But it is important that such obligation be defined by law, not arbitrarily.
* Obligations are mutual: the citizens paying taxes demand services (in return) from the state, such as the guarantee and acceptance of their rights, security and reliability.
* Citizens help each other; take risks and accept responsibility, both for themselves as well as for the common wealth. It is important that this personal/individual contribution is not made because of legal obligations, but voluntarily in accordance with the valid rules and laws guaranteed by the state, which were formulated with the participation of the citizens.
* Citizens respect themselves and others. Of course, tensions do exist between the different interests of different actors. It is important though, that these tensions are managed peacefully, using non-violent and legal instruments. Individual courage and also civil disobedience are part of civilized behaviour.
* Freedom and liberty are important, but each individual’s right to freedom and liberty has to be limited to such an extent that that of other individuals is not being infringed upon. Liberty and freedom are also areas of tension. Their definition and ac­ceptance thereof is enhanced by the presence of a basic ethical and moral code within the society.
* There is a freedom to form political groups, even such ones opposed to the state. The precondition is to respect the existing legal, ethical and moral rules and institutions. It makes sense and is useful in helping to better the existing circumstances and to build up the common wealth if citizens take the initiative and organise themselves in groups. This kind of initiative influences all areas of life, within and without the political sphere. The state must respect this freedom.
* In a civil society, in a society consisting of individual citizens, the state does not have overall authority. It represents the citizens and their interests. These interests can be conflicting so that the state should play the role of a mediator. After having heard all sides concerned without exemption the state has the right to pronounce the final verdict, but not arbitrarily.
* A society of citizens, a civil society, is always in the process of defining the interrelationship between the state and the societal actors. It is not the one-sided freedom of the single individual which is important, but the distribution of rights and obligations as equally as possible among the citizens which will give them the greatest possible freedom to act and to take on risks and responsibilities. Without far-reaching citizenship there is no long-term sustainable strata of political and economic subjects. And without a state there are no reliable rules and thus there is no control over their being complied with. This description of what Europeans mean when talking about civil society shows that first of all it is a society of free and responsibly acting citizens having the right and the obligation to peacefully articulate and negotiate interests and also to organise themselves in political bodies. The citizens express political interests during elections, through opinion surveys, mainly conducted by the media, demonstrations or move­ments (for instance anti-nuclear power movements, peace movements, women’s liberation movements). Peacefully conducted campaigns strongly influence political decision-making and can even make dictators disappear (for instance in the Philippines where the population made the former president Marcos leave the country by means of quiet sit-ins and demonstrations). Political interests are also expressed by becoming a member of the many non-governmen­tal organisations (political parties, churches, the media, trade unions, self-help initiatives, common interest initiatives, economic, social, environmental, political, professional unions etc. with local, regional, national or international/global targets and scope). First of all, these organisations articulate interests and represent specific groups in the so­ciety in the political negotiation process or they support specific groups with a social bias, such as the disabled. In the field of development assistance different NGOs act with differ­ent targets and target groups. Some mainly represent the rights of the developing countries in the political arena by negotiating, addressing and lobbying for fair trade conditions, respect for human rights and peace within the international and external relations, anti-discrimination and anti-racism issues and so on. Others support vulnerable groups by sending experts to developing countries, such as medical doctors. Others support civil society organisations in developing countries by providing financial resources and advice or by taking an active part in concrete activities, such as the construction of hospital and schools. 6.2 NGOs and engagement with the international community Within the international political organisations, such as the UN and the EU, CSOs can play different roles:
* taking part in conferences, negotiations and various meetings as observers or consultants. These, mainly international, NGOs are formally recognised as consultative actors by the UN or the EU. Additionally, NGOs can be part of the national delegation of member countries to international negotiations after having been selected and appointed by the member states.
* international and local NGOs and CSOs can become partners in the implementation of development assistance. Civil society groups can apply for public funding to carry out or to support projects and other activities in the developing countries. The EC and the UN usually do not implement programmes or proj­ects by themselves.
* In relation to the Cotonou Agreement an ACP Civil Society Forum was established to provide a platform for civil society actors from the ACP countries to develop common positions relevant to ACP-EU co-operation, to enhance the participation of CSOs in the co-operation framework and to facilitate the dia­logue between all relevant stakeholders as well as to regularly access, update and share information. 28 As mentioned above, the EU is following a more participatory approach by involving other organisations in addition to the traditional NGOs, namely: local authorities, trader’s organisations, local citizens’ groups, cooperatives, trade unions, women’s and youth organisations, teaching and research institutions, churches and any non-governmental associa­tions likely to contribute to development.29 7. Selected actors – visions, remarks and activities 7.1 Selected non-EU countries’ observations and views on Somalia The overall strategies of Egypt, Kenya, Norway, Switzerland and the USA are in principle similar to that of the EU Member States: peace and stability in the region while accepting territorial integrity. Kenya also stated that security is one of the prime objectives. The US, especially af­ter 11 September, pays special attention to the fight against terrorism and the monitoring of potential terrorist activities directed towards the US. All of the countries support the reconciliation process. The Somali people should be helped in solving the conflict, therefore Somali initia­tives are welcomed. Egypt declared itself strictly opposed to any secession and accepts the Somali constitution of 1960 as decisive. Nearly all Somali people have been badly affected by the Siad Barre regime, which is one reason why they should come together, reconstruct the country and rebuild their nation. Warlords and militias should be disarmed and sanctioned. Egypt supports the TNG Parliament and President. A stronger dialogue with all Somalia’s leaders should be carried out. Education, health and recon­struction are defined as the most important sectors to be assisted. Kenya mentioned it as a priority for Somalia to build central 28 Saferworld/CPN 2002 29 europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/r12004.htm: government structures so as to develop institutional negotiation partners for Somaliland and Puntland. In principle, the Somali people have to decide by themselves. The “peace dividend” approach is in general ap­proved of; the so-called “islands of peace” should be assisted. Norway supports the Arta peace process and expressed its concern about the continuing flow of weaponry to Somalia. It was also concerned about the worsening humanitarian situation, particularly in Gedo, saying that long-term interventions are required to build sustainable solutions. The international community should contribute towards improving the economic, humanitarian, political and security situation. Switzerland is assisting in the formulation of a new constitution. The “peace dividend” approach is, in general, favoured in such a way that so-called “islands of peace” should be more strongly supported. Again, Switzerland agreed that the resolution of the Somali conflict must be built from inside the country, although this is not expected to happen soon. The US stated clearly that they would not recognise Somaliland as a sovereign state. The issue of recognition of Somaliland is closely connected with other African states where secessionist movements are weakening the nation’s unity and should not be supported. The livestock ban is not viewed as a political act but as the result of dis­eases that must be treated. The biggest single donor country to Somalia and Somaliland is the US, providing emergency aid to Somalia, which could be used in a very flexible way. USAID proposes to focus on a regional education programme in cooperation with other donors. Some interview partners at USAID did not hold a clear opinion about not recognising Somaliland as a sovereign state in the future. It was also stated that the Somalis themselves must find solutions to their problems. Because there is no fully legitimised and qualified government in the southern part of Somalia that could function successfully, USAID can­not identify who should be its local partner for development assistance. Assistance in the field of education is seen as a priority for development actors. To support nation-building, the diaspora should return to Somalia and Somaliland. USAID also emphasised their ongoing support to civil society in Soma­lia and Somaliland. USAID has been supporting the capacity building of civil society groups in Somalia and Somaliland over the past ten years through a number of programs, particularly through the CARE Somalia Partnership Program (SPP) which was implemented throughout Somalia and Somaliland from 1993 -1999, and more recently through the CARE Civil Society Expansion Program, and through support the War Torn Societies programme 7.2 Selected non-EU countries’ observations and view with regard to the activities and role of the EU Egypt would welcome stronger support of Somalia’s unity by the EU. Kenya welcomes the positive role of the EU and its high level of involvement, which should be sustained. The EU should take the leading role in Somalia’s assistance. The peace process and also Kenya’s role within it must be supported on a long-term basis. The EC has already granted € 500,000 to hold the forthcoming peace conference. Because the costs of hosting this conference will increase, the EC has been requested to increase the budget. In addition, the EC is welcome to take an active part in the technical preparations for the conference both with regards to the content and by supporting the process by seconding con­sultants and experts. In the post-conference process the EC should take an active part in the co-ordination. Norway recommends that a more common approach be developed by the EU and UN to support common activities in order to avoid any pos­sible development of parallel structures. Switzerland would like the EC to strengthen support to the peace pro­cess as such and not to focus only on the TNG. The coherence of the EC, its member states and other countries is seen as adequate. The US is co-operating with the EC through the SACB and is keeping in touch with the EC by political talks and informal contacts. Better donor coordination, in general, is seen as necessary. 7.3 Selected non-EU countries’ observations and view with regard to non-EU countries and IGAD Egypt, together with the Arab League, fully supports the peace confer­ence as well as the leading role of Kenya. Both have appointed Special Envoys for Somalia. Egypt is also a member of the Contact Group based in New York and Nairobi. Egypt and the Arabian countries support the Somali people. The initiation of a nation-building process in Somalia is seen as most important for the whole Horn of Africa while, conversely, fragmentation will weaken all neighbouring countries. It was felt that Ethiopia should consider its position towards the TNG. Preparing for the peace conference, Ethiopia and Djibouti are drawing closer to one another and the IGAD initiative can then stand a greater chance of success. The Arab League has established a fund for reconstruction and rehabilitation of Somalia (US$ 450 m). It will be delivered only once Somalia has become united and stabilised; whatever type of government it may be. Egypt expects the stabilisation of south­ern Somalia as an outcome of the Eldoret conference. At the request of Somalia, Egypt started a political initiative to lift the livestock ban by sending a mission to Saudi Arabia. Unfortunately, after a short break in 1999/2000 the ban was imposed again because of disease. Egypt recom­mends getting the Livestock Diseases Office in Paris involved in order to do official medical examinations. The livestock ban is not seen as a political act because Saudi Arabia supports Somalia in general. Kenya, as well as the Arab League, Egypt and Sudan, has appointed a Special Envoy for Somalia and welcomes the support for the peace process by the Arab states, the OAU and the US. Ethiopia, as well as Somalia, is seen as a victim of the Cold War, but it is urged to accept the advantages of a united Somalia for the whole region. All leaders of Somalia (political, factional, religious) and the TNG, as well as civil society and international community, should be invited to the peace con­ference in Kenya to elect a new government for Somalia. It is necessary to integrate everybody in the peace process, including the warlords. Norway also emphasises the need for regional stabilisation and supports the IGAD peace initiative and efforts of the frontline states. It expresses its concern about the economic problems due to the livestock ban and due to the shutdown of money-transfer businesses. Norway supports the UN pilot peace-building programme for Somalia, the Trust Fund for Peace Building in Somalia, the Contact Group in New York and Nairobi and UN Security Council’s activities in general. Switzerland recommends the involvement of Ethiopia in the peace nego­tiations and invites Ethiopia and Djibouti to come to a common agree­ment on the future of Somalia. IGAD is supported but assessed as weak. The international community should strengthen the implementation of its concept of the “peace dividend” and “building blocks”. Peaceful ar­eas should be assisted, conflict areas not. Switzerland is concerned about the UN focusing on recognition of the TNG. The US also supports IGAD and recommends a better integration of the frontline states. Any kind of external conditionality is seen as problem­atic because of the lack of monitoring. According to USAID, the US government is willing to strengthen its assistance to regional organisa­tions. USAID supports the Eldoret peace conference financially, as well as the IGAD peace initiatives for Somalia and recommends a neutral role as mediator for IGAD. All IGAD Member States should develop a joint peace initiative. Even if there may possibly be no important out­come, the peace conference will provide a forum for the Somali people to discuss their problems in neutral surroundings. 7.4 ICRC – visions, remarks and activities The overall strategy of ICRC is responding to emergency aid needs. ICRC recommends strengthening the implementation of the peace divi­dend approach by rewarding peaceful communities, but raised the need to first look for qualified leaders to take responsibility. The lack of state structures makes it difficult to identify who is representing whom and who has any mandate. The business sector crosses borders and factions but acts in a grey zone with very limited power. Local communities, in general, are highly motivated in implementing development activities and therefore should get autonomy and support. Development assistance should support all sectors: access to education, water, health, agriculture etc. ICRC and the EU are working in close contact developing a common approach. In order to strengthen the regional peace initiative, ICRC would wel­come the better integration of Arabian countries in the international community. ICRC also highlighted the need to negotiate with Ethiopia and Djibouti empathetically. Table 6: Forms of assistance and budgets of ICRC31 8. Summary of the discussion at the conference on donor assistance, policy coherence and civil society in Somalia and Somaliland 32 Held, 21 January 2003, at the Mayfair Hotel, Nairobi. The production of the two Novib Somalia studies, on and the mapping of civil society, have a key objective of furthering the mutual understanding between Somali civil society and the international community. The donor assistance study provides an overview of the decision-making structures of the international community as a whole and then provides specific informa­tion at the local level as to donor strategy, coherence and policy towards Somalia and Somaliland. The report then sets out a series of recom­mendations to both the donor community and Somali civil society. The report focuses on the EC and EU member states as the largest donors to Somalia and Somaliland. Following the production of a draft report of the donor assistance study, Novib Somalia organised a one-day round-table discussion of the report in Nairobi with representatives of the donor community, INGOs and Somali civil society. The purpose of this event was to present the report and to present the perspectives of the INGO and Somali CSO communi­ties. In addition it provided an opportunity for the donor community to comment on the findings and analysis of the report and to address the recommendations in the study. The event also provided an initial forum for dialogue between the international community and Somali civil society to address the challenges of working together for development in Somalia and Somaliland. The event was well attended by the donor community, with representa­tives from more than 15 donor organisations, including EU embassies, UN agencies and the EC Somalia Unit. Opening the conference, Mr. Roger de Backer, an advisor at the EC Delegation, noted the importance of building the relationship between civil society and the international community, specifically in the context of the new aid and trade agree­ment between the EU and ACP countries, the Cotonou Agreement, which makes a particular provision for civil society. He also highlighted recent examples of successful civil society initiatives such as the domes­tic observer programme of the recent elections held 31 The table is based on data provided by ICRC in the interview. 32 For a full report of the discussions see the workshop report available from Novib Somalia : in Somaliland. Dorothe Appels, Novib Project Manager, welcomed and thanked the participants for their attendance and expressed the hope that, through discussion and agreement, the participants would find ways to support the courage and commitment of Somali civil society. A presentation on the contents of the report was given by Murtaza Jaffer, the Novib Somalia Programme Coordinator. He introduced the Novib Somalia project and outlined the key findings of the report. He noted that the purpose of the report was to explain the structure and operations of the international community to Somali civil society, analyse its coherence and make recommendations as to how the relationship with civil society could be improved. In response to the query frequently raised by the donor community – who are civil society? – he noted that civil society felt similarly about the donors; who are they? How can we access them? How can we build a partnership? Jaffer highlighted some of the key issues raised in the report, he noted the difficulties donors encountered in considering working with Somali civil society; lack of knowledge and information, lack of understanding of the social context, the risks of operating in an country with no legal framework and the problems of direct funding in that situation. Conversely, he observed the need for donors and the international community to play a more visible role in leveraging for change in Somalia, in raising the profile of Somalia and Somaliland internationally and developing coherent and co­ordinated development strategies with the participation of local commu­nities and their representatives in civil society. He also raised questions of diaspora participation and the possibilities of coordinated funding mechanisms through the Somali Aid Coordination Body (SACB). He finished by inviting the international community to attend the conference of Somali civil society, scheduled for the end of February. He noted that the complementary study to the donor report, the mapping report, setting out the status of Somali civil society, would be presented for discussion at this conference. The expected outcome of the conference is a ‘vision paper’ for civil society, laying out the future direction, agenda and pri­orities, based on the findings of the donor and mapping studies. Gary Jones, Chair of the NGO Consortium, then presented the perspec­tive of INGOs. He raised the issue that whilst many civil society groups may not meet international expectations of accountability this did not preclude their conducting valuable work amongst communities, he cited the example of informal women’s groups and successful advocacy cam­paigns around issues such as FGM and charcoal burning. He highlighted the need for flexibility from donors in light of the ever-changing situa­tion in Somalia and called for an accessible donor’s forum of this kind to meet regularly to allow better access for Somali organisations. Lack of social capital, was cited by M A Jama of SOCDA in his presen­tation on the Somali civil society perspective, as a key constraint for the development of Somali civil society. He highlighted positive examples of organisation by civil society and stated that Somali civil society wanted to engage in constructive dialogue with donors and requested donors to open their doors. In discussion of the findings of the report the problem of lack of legal structures was highlighted by donors as an impediment to direct funding of civil society necessitating the use of intermediaries such as interna­tional NGOs. Whilst donors recognise the importance of local know-how they are held back by lack of information and lack of legal account­ability. There were calls for greater flexibility from donors in this regard, specifically to explore local means of restitution and guarantee and also noting that in other countries such as Kenya, where a legal system is in place, it is very rarely used in the context of relations between local and international organisations. Somali civil society representatives called for greater partnership, incor­porating elements of capacity-building and institutional strengthening in all interactions between international and local organisations. Two questions were presented for further discussion, firstly, how Soma­lia and Somaliland can move up the political agenda for donor countries and secondly possibilities for partnership with civil society. Regarding the first question, it was noted that whilst at Nairobi level there may be willingness to address the problems of Somalia and So­maliland, the capacity of donors to engage with Somalis was constrained by the low priority that Somalia and Somaliland were accorded interna­tionally. The lack of written and integrated strategies, identified in the report, was a reflection of this. Representatives from the Swedish and British embassies noted that for their countries this had started to shift, starting with their appointments and their mandate to develop strategies. It was hoped that this would lead the way amongst the international community. The need to highlight the positive achievements and success stories of Somalia and Somaliland internationally, and the potential role of the diaspora in this, was noted. In discussion on the possibilities for partnership, many positive examples of Somali civil society working relationships were shared and it was emphasised that the majority of civil society organisations were trustworthy and accountable. There was discussion as to whether this was sufficient for direct recognition from donors. The question of whether civil society in Somalia and Somaliland needed more money or more skills was discussed and it was suggested that the international community could provide support to civil society in other ways than fi­nancial, including support for lobbying and advocacy campaigns such as around the issue of the livestock ban. It was also noted that international funding must follow local priorities and not be imposed from above. The development of a Code of Conduct for civil society was noted as a posi­tive step in self-regulation. Possibilities for direct funding were explored including the idea of a small initiative fund. It was noted that prior experience showed that if a local organisation has the strong backing of the community and there is a strong sense of ownership from the local constituency that these function as effective accountability mechanisms and that such considerations could become criteria for direct funding. The difficulty for individual donors of administering small grants to civil society was raised, particularly given the complications of accountabil­ity criteria and the need for flexibility. One suggestion to address these issues was the possibility of a ‘basket’ fund contributed to by donors and administered by representatives of the donor community, INGOs and civil society. Another suggestion focused on the large remittance flows to Somalia and Somaliland, which are far in excess of aid donations, and the pos­sibilities of harnessing these resources and the skills of the diaspora, in development initiatives. The discussions concluded with a question and answer session between Mila Font of the EC and Dorothe Appels of Novib, they addressed issues raised in the report such as accountability, possibilities for regional link­ages and implementing modalities in insecure areas. The conclusions of the workshop were that the analysis of the report was valid and posed pertinent challenges to both the donor community and civil society. Participants welcomed the opportunity to engage in dialogue with counterparts and expressed the hope that there would be more forums of this nature. Key recommendations focused on; the need for flexibility on both sides particularly with regard to accountability and funding criteria; the need for greater understanding and knowledge; and the possibility to open channels of funding through a small initiatives or ‘basket’ fund that would enable organisations to establish a track record whilst releasing funds directly to civil society organisations. It was envisaged that the Civil Society Conference, to be held in Hargeisa in February, would open a further channel for dialogue and the presentation of the mapping report would address the lack of knowledge amongst the donor community on Somali civil society.