Hargeisa, February 2005
Consultants: Maximo Halty
Abdi Duale
Acknowledgements
The consultants wish to thank the Somaliland authorities, in particular the Minister of RRR, Abdullah Hussein Iman, the Minister of Finance, Hussein Ali Duale, and the Minister of Defense, Ismail Omar Adan, for having taken the time to orient and advise the mission, and then to review the initial drafts of the proposals and provide their comments and suggestions. Their interest and their active support of the process was an encouragement to all those involved.
We wish to thank the NDC and UNDP authorities and staff for their support and active participation, particularly Abdi Abdillahi Riirash, the NDC Chairman and Ahmed Ali Sulub, the NDC Director General, who faced the challenge of reviewing the NDC with a constructive spirit, and at UNDP, Robert Scharf, Eddie Boyle and Sidi Zahabi, who defined the objectives of the consultancy, developed the workplan, provided the necessary briefings and made the mission possible.
Our thanks goes also, of course, to the UNDP staff who supported the mission, both in Nairobi and Hargeisa, particularly Gina Ilie, who provided many valuable insights regarding the psychosocial reintegration support challenges.
And special thanks goes to Hassan Idd, for his invaluable help in providing timely advice and unfailingly sound counsel, in setting up the meetings, and in generally back-stopping the mission throughout. Table of Contents
1. Organizational Review of the NDC. pg 3 2. Opportunities, Challenges and Constraints Analysis. pg 11 3. Recommendations. Pg 13 3.1 NDC Roles and Responsibilities: looking towards the future pg 13 3.2 Revised NDC Structure pg 15 3.3 SSR Policy and Strategic Action Plan pg 19 3.4 Proposed NDC Staffing and Operational Budget pg 21 3.5 On-the-job Training of staff and NDC capacity-building. pg 23 Brief Organizational Review of SOOYAL pg 24 Towards a Strategic Institutional Development Plan pg 29 Annexes Annex 1: Present NDC payroll list Annex 2: Resumes of present NDC staff Annex 3: Outline TORs for proposed staffing structure Annex 4: TORs of the consultancy Annex 5: List of interviews1. Organizational Review of the NDC
The following pages present a brief review of the NDC since its inception in 1993. This review will cover: past and present NDC institutional structure and staffing levels, assets and equipment, and yearly budgets. It will also attempt to study what capacity has been built over time, and what remains. The following chapter will then analyze the relevance and implications of this review regarding the present day situation and the challenges ahead.
1.1 Establishment of the National Demobilization Commission (NDC)
In accordance with a Presidential Decree Law 1, the National Demobilization Commission, hereafter referred to as the NDC, was established in June 1993. As the decade-long liberation war between the SNM and the forces of the former military regime of Siyaad Barre came to an end in early February 1991, the need for an effective DDR program throughout Somaliland became clear. To address this need, the NDC was instituted as a para-statal agency to implement demobilization and reintegration programs in Somaliland. It was also entrusted with the coordination of the DDR programs that were to be carried out by the government in close collaboration with both local and international agencies.
In carrying out these activities, the NDC gave itself the following Vision Statement: “The NDC will establish sustainable and effective DRP programs that will have a positive impact on the livelihood of its target groups and will build long-term funding capabilities through various sources, which will enable it to focus on its country-wide programs.”
Though lacking a detailed census, the initial target group for DDR was estimated to be within 50,000 to 80,000 armed fighters, divided into the following categories:
- Somali National Movement (SNM) Forces (of which a significant number have since self-demobilized themselves and reintegrated into various income-generating activities),
-
Disaffiliated ex-servicemen of the former regime of the SDR, of which some units were still intact in some parts of the country,
- Armed Clan militias and paramilitary units, allied with the various conflicting forces, who were less trained and disciplined than the two first categories,
-
Dependents of the above-mentioned three groups,
1.2 Initial Budget and Staff:
A. Budget:
In Somaliland Shs In US $ Date
38,000,170/= 63,333.61 18/4/1994
B. Staff:
Ali Mohamed Yuusuf, Hassan Mohamed Abdirahman, Abdullahi Nuh Hassan, Mohamed Abdi Ahmed, Mohamed Hashi Osman, Mohamed Farah Warsame, Nimco Abdullahi Sheikh Warsame, Hodan Mohamed Ahmed, Da’ud Mohamed Gelleh, Mohamed Abdi Allamagan, Arab Nur Handulleh, Salah Said Salah, Mohamed Arab Gelleh, Deria Abdullahi, Hussein Haji Adan, Sado Hassan Ali,1.3 Activities carried out by the NDC:
A. 1995 – 1997:
- Demobilization and reintegration of 150 ex-combatants through the establishment of snack bars (Hargeisa Airport and others), fuel stations and other micro-business activities like small shops in down-town Hargeisa;
- SOOYAAL Vocational Training (sewing, brick-making, metal work and masonry),
- NDC/GTZ created work for 500 Ex-combatants for a period of one year in the partial maintenance of the 285 Km long Hargeisa-Lowyaddo road that connects Somaliland with D’jibouti,
B. 2000 – 2003:
NDC, working with and through GTZ, with some UNDP support, reintegrated a total of 814 persons from the national forces: 392 from the army, 251 from the police and 171 from the custodial corps in the following sectors:
Rural reintegration in agriculture and live-stock re-settlement,
Small-micro economy,
Vocational Training in Electricity: 144 from the armed forces.
Employment opportunity in the private sector for 57 persons who were given permanent jobs by the local community,
Activities carried out jointly by NDC/GTZ seem to have been more effective and more sustainable than the activities carried out in the first phase. However, this also seems to be the origin of growing confusion regarding what the respective roles and responsibilities of each actor really was: who was in charge of setting the policy and strategic objectives, who was in charge of implementation, and who was in charge of evaluation and program review. This confusion continues to the present day.
Meanwhile, and regarding the overall objective of DDR of former fighters, the main –and most effective- action was taken by the Somaliland Government in incorporating most, if not all, of the hard-core fighters into the Somaliland security forces (Army, Police, Custodial Corps). This inflated their number to an estimated 17-20.000 members, but was certainly effective in terms of “buying peace”.
The cost to Somaliland has, however, been high: according to the Finance Minister 60% of the total salaries of the public sector are paid to these overstaffed security forces.
1.4 NDC Budget: 2002 – 2004:
2002 Budget: 156,994,092/Ssh, US$: 22,427.72 S/No: Subhead Description Budget in Shs In US$ 1. 1.0.0 Administration 108,420,000 15,488.57 2. 1.2.0 Service 31,300,000 4,471.42 3. 1.3.0 Equipment 3,274,092 467.72 4. 1.4.0 Maintenance 4,000,000 571.42 5. 1.5.0 General 10,000,000 1,428.57 Total 156,994,092 22,427.72 2003 Budget; 196,700,848 Ssh, US$: 28,100.12 S/No:Subhead Description Budget in Shs In US$ 1. 1.0.0 Administration 122,100,000 17,442.85 2. 1.2.0 Service 39,694,000 5,670.57 3. 1.3.0 Equipment 3,274,130 467.73 4. 1.4.0 Maintenance 4,000,000 571.42 5. 1.5.0 General 24,032,818 3,433.25 Total 196,700,848 28,100.32 2004 Budget: 336, 702,247 Ssh. US$: 48,100.32 S/No:Subhead Description Budget in Ssh In US$ 1. 1.0.0 Administration 132,012,000 18,858.85 2. 1.2.0 Service 67,000,000 9,571.42 3. 1.3.0 Equipment 75,480,000 10,782.85 4. 1.4.0 Maintenance 7,000,000 1,000.00 5. 1.5.0 General 55,210,247 7,887.17 Total 336,702,247 48,100.321.5 Other contributions
According to verbal accounts, while GTZ implemented D and R program activities, contributions were made towards the operational costs of the NDC. However, no written records are available, and it was stated that all these records were destroyed upon GTZ closing down its’ operations by the GTZ staff.
As of UNDP having assumed the responsibility of implementing agency in late 2004, lump sum contributions to the NDC operational budget have been made, though there is, as yet, no regularity in these contributions and no clarity as to what they should cover and why. However, in this case, a financial report and complete set of receipts have been prepared and are properly filed.
1.6 Present Staffing
According to the latest payroll list (see Annex 1), the NDC presently has a staff of 37 people, of which, according to the resumes presented to the consultants (see Annex 2), only the following have a degree of training compatible with their functions:
Hassan Mohamed Abdirahman, Abdullah Nuh Hassan, Mohamed Farah Warsame, Mustafe Abdi Arte, Ahmed Hassan Aadan, Abdulkhaaliq Mohamed Buni, Mohamed Jamac Barud, Fathiya Yusuf Abdullahi, Axmed Shire Gud-Adde, Anisa Hussein Ali, Mohamed Abdi Allamagan, Mohamed Abdi Ahmed, Abdi Yusuf Abdi, Hassan Ayanle Du’aleh, Mohamed Arab Gelleh,1.7 Turn-over and loss of trained staff
According to verbal accounts, a significant amount of training was given to the NDC staff during the period of GTZ program implementation, both in country and outside the country. However, no written record of these activities seems to exist, or at least none could be found.
What is clear is that there has been a high turnover of staff, and –again according to verbal accounts- the staff that has left has been the most highly trained and qualified. The main reason for this lack of retention capability by the NDC has to do with the salary level of the institution.
1.8 Grades and salaries:
The present staff of the NDC is graded as follows, with their corresponding salaries:
Grade Salary Ssh US$ A 300,000/= 50$ B 250,000/= 40$ C 190,000/= 30$ D 120,000/= 20$Note: The Chairman is given an allowance of 1,000,000 Ssh= 150 US$, while the DG is given 600,000 Ssh= 100 US$.
As the trained staff leave the NDC for better-earning jobs in the local NGOs or the private sector, they may get as much as 500 US$ to 700 US$ a month, or more.
1.9 NDC Office Equipment as of 27/01/2005:
No: Description Model Number Remarks 1. Computer 6282-690 Not functioning 2. Computer ED 105E11/17N Not functioning 3. Computer Viewsonic Not functioning 4. Computer 21569-3E Functioning 5. Deskjet 11225 TH 11 13 Functioning 6. LaserJet Not functioning 7. Photocopy Canon 6030 Not functioning 8. Computer/Lab top 1750 6366 Functioning 9. Typewriter 0946 Not functioning 10. Safe 81364 leeco Not functioning Furniture: Tables: 10, Locally made, Chairs: 10, Locally made, Shelves: 5, Locally made, Cupboards: 4, Locally made, Two sets of Japanese office furniture in the Chairman’s and DG’s offices, Telephone: Not functioning, Vehicles: S/No: Description Model No: Plate No: Remark 1. Mark II 1992 197 Functioning 2. Mini bus 1992 B20 Not functioning 3. Landcruiser II 1992 12926 Not functioning 4. Hilux 1990 510 FunctioningNote: Again, there is no detailed and updated inventory of equipment and supplies.
1.10 Present NDC Structure
The following is the present day organigram of the NDC. It must be noted that no Terms of Reference exist for these positions.
2. Opportunities, Challenges and Constraints Analysis
In analyzing the past and present situation of the NDC and its’ mission, the first fact that must be recognized is that DDR in Somaliland is effectively over.
At the creation of the NDC in 1993, DDR of ex-combatants was logically a main security concern of the Government, and it also received some attention from the international community (including GTZ and UNDP). However, in terms of the actual process of DDR, this mainly took the form of a massive integration of the hard-core militia groups into the security forces.
More than 10 years later, the process of DDR must be considered as being finished (whether complete or incomplete). The concept of ex-combatant is (or should become) meaningless, as the immediate security threat posed by them has since been effectively contained.
There will, of course, continue to be war veterans, and their voice needs to be heard, and their needs addressed, within the logical constraints of social fairness and equity. This should be the focus of the war veterans association, SOOYAL, as is discussed in Chapter 4 of this report.
This being the situation, NDC’s mission needs to be revised, and its’ institutional structure reviewed accordingly. To process this discussion, a one-day workshop was carried out with the NDC authorities and staff, and the resulting recommendations are included in Chapter 3 of this report.
Learning from the past
In reviewing the past activities of the NDC, its’ structure, staff, equipment and budget, a series constraints and limitations, both structural and operational, are apparent, and they must also be addressed if the NDC is to increase its’ effectiveness in the future:
There is an inefficient mix of policy and operational objectives in NDC’s mission statement, that is then expressed in its’ staffing structure. This causes systematic overlapping with any implementing partner (or implementing unit, if the activity is to be carried out by the government itself).
There are no clear terms of reference, either for the NDC as a whole, nor for each of the staffing positions.
The NDC is overstaffed, much of its’ staff is unqualified, and all of the staff is underpaid.
Due to the above, the NDC has little or no capacity to retain qualified staff. Therefore, any training that is provided –though a benefit to the individual- frequently results in a loss to the organization, since the trained staff tends to leave for better jobs elsewhere.
There is a lack of proper record keeping: inventory, financial records, and activity reports are scarce and incomplete.
There has been no clear communication strategy by the NDC. Little is known by the public –and even the Government- of the activities that have been carried out, and of its’ successes –and limitations. Proper communication is, however, a critical input to effective D and R, especially at the community level, since reintegration is a two-way street: there must be a will to reintegrate from the demobilized, but also the acceptance of the demobilizee by the community.
There is no clear understanding regarding the relative roles of the NDC and SOOYAL, and their possible areas of cooperation and complementarity, if any.
Challenges and future opportunities
Though the process of DDR, as is argued above, should be considered as being over, it is clear that the consequences of the immediate solution given to this problem by the Somaliland Government (integration of ex-combatants into the security forces) are still present, and are a challenge for the future. The present structure of the public budget is unfair and ultimately unsustainable. A reform of the security sector is necessary, and NDC is well placed to play a critical role in that process.
To do this, it must revise its mission statement to focus on the Demobilization and Reintegration (D and R) of redundant security forces personnel, within an integrated process of Security Sector Reform (SSR), led by the relevant security sector ministries, through the MRRR, under the guidance and coordination of the Ministry of Finance, who can place this SSR firmly within the overall process of restructuring of the Somaliland public budget.
This has been, after all, the real nature of the recent activities with GTZ and UNDP, since the majority of the program beneficiaries came from an initial pilot effort at downsizing the security forces. But, as indicated in the review, there is a lack of clarity about both this objective, and the way the NDC and its’ partners organize themselves to attain it.
In looking towards the future, the constraints and limitations that have marked the activities of the NDC in the past must therefore be addressed and resolved. The recommendations of the following chapter, developed and discussed with both the NDC authorities and staff, and the UNDP program staff, attempt to do so.
Recommendations
3.1 NDC Roles and Responsibilities: looking towards the future
To correctly define the role and responsibilities of the NDC and other parties involved in the present process of D and R of the redundant members of the Security Forces of Somaliland (Army, Police, Custodial Corps), it is first necessary to define the context of this activity and its’ precise nature and objectives.
From DDR to SSR
The demobilization and reintegration of Somaliland security forces personnel is not, as indicated before, a process of DDR, but rather of Security Sector Reform (SSR), which itself should be a part of a structural reform process of the Somaliland Government. Inasmuch as the salaries of the Security Forces represent some 60% of the overall public salaries, only a marked reduction of these Forces will allow the Government to significantly reinforce its’ very limited social investment spending –on health, education and related services.
The D and R (and Small Arms) component of the ROLS program, working in coordination with the previous GTZ program, have assisted the Security Sector authorities in setting up a registration procedure –which includes information that can support the screening process for identification of the candidates for demobilization-, together with the development and approval of the overall criteria for demobilization from the security forces. Additionally, a recent consultancy supported the Ministry of Defense in undertaking an assessment of the Defense forces, with a view towards developing a detailed plan for downsizing and up-grading these forces.
The National Demobilization Commission should, by virtue of its’ mandate, be the main policy-making body regarding the specific process of demobilization of the security sector personnel, but it needs to adapt its’ present structure to do so effectively. As part of this critical role as decision-making body regarding the demobilization (and effective reintegration) process, the NDC could be the institutional support structure for an Inter-Ministerial Working Group charged with developing the Government’s SSR Policy and Strategy, of which the D and R of the redundant personnel will be the critical initial component.
It is with this general objective in mind that the role and responsibilities of the NDC needs to be redefined and clarified.
The separation of the policy-making role from the implementing role
As indicated earlier, the initial institutional design of the NDC included a mixture of policy-making functions with implementing functions that, as experience in many countries –and many areas- shows, is unworkable. A fundamental principle of both good management and good governance is that the legislative (rule-making) and executive functions need to be separated and given their autonomy from each other (though a clear dispute-resolution mechanism needs to put in place). The nature of the legislative, (or rule-making, or policy-making) body is such that it necessarily functions by committee. And a basic principle of management is that management by committee is a recipe for inefficiency, or worse.
Therefore a clear separation of these two functions is needed for the D and R process. The NDC needs to redesign its’ structure to address its’ basic policy-making role (making sure that all relevant actors are brought together in a timely and informed manner), while clearly defining its’ relationship to execution units, normally program management units (PMUs), in such a way that the PMUs work strictly within the defined policy framework, while the policy-making body refrains from managing programs “by committee”.
In short, the role and responsibilities of the NDC is to address the Who?, What?, Where?, When? of the D and R of downsized security forces personnel, while the role and responsibilities of the PMU(s) implementing specific programs for this overall goal should be to address the How?.
The following is the recommended institutional structure for this task.
Revised NDC Structure
Proposed overall institutional structure
Proposed NDC Policy Unit Structure
Proposed Outline Terms of Reference
Regarding NDC responsibilities:
Develop and approve the national D and R policy and strategy (normally through the formal signing of a D and R Policy Paper);
In particular, define the D and R objective and main beneficiaries, its’ target groups and benefits, and its’ main implementation modalities;
Define the overall criteria for D and R implementation: selection of beneficiaries, approval of benefits, priorities in processing and similar;
Define (and redefine whenever necessary) the institutional, political and tactical issues pertaining to the process of D and R;
Approve specific D and R programs to implement the above policy according to the defined criteria;
Define and oversee the set-up of the required PMU (one or more, according to approved program design);
Validate the procedures proposed for the PMU to carry out its’ activities;
Validate the candidates for program beneficiary;
Approve the PMU action plans and validate the related activity reports;
Assure the overall coherence of the D and R info and sensitization campaign, to avoid misperceptions and false expectations;
Assure that all relevant governmental and non-governmental actors participate in a coordinated and effective manner, when they are called upon to do so;
Assure the permanent monitoring and evaluation of the D and R program(s), and feedback into policy/strategy/criteria redefinition as required.
Regarding NDC Inter-Ministerial Steering Committee composition:
The Minister of RRR is the line ministry for the NDC, and therefore the Chairman of the Steering Committee. The other participating ministries are, and should be: Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Planning. Other key Ministries, as also NGOs and civil society organizations, should be called upon to participate when necessary.
Donors/international agencies should not be part of the Committee, but may have an advisory status.
The specific role of the Steering Committee is the approval and subsequent amendments of the national SSR policy and its’ implementation strategy.
Quorum issues must be addressed, as in any Commission, and also the schedule of its’ (regular) meetings. It is usual for such a Committee to have twice yearly regular meetings (and extraordinary meetings as necessary).
The NDC Secretariat, composed of the Chairman, DG and Secretary, will provide support to the Steering Committee in its’ tasks. The Secretariat will distribute the necessary information and technical proposals to its’ members, prepare its’ meetings, and disseminate –and file- its’ resolutions.
Regarding the Joint Technical Committee:
This committee is made up of the DGs of the ministries that participate in the Steering Committee, excepting the MRRR, since the Chairman of the NDC reports directly to the Minister of RRR. The main role of this Committee is to evaluate, debate and develop SSR policy and strategy proposals for Steering Committee approval.
The Chairman of the NDC is the Chair of this Committee, and the NDC permanent staff, through the NDC DG, will provide the necessary technical inputs for the Joint Committee to carry out its’ work. The NDC Technical Support Unit, through its’ chief technical advisor will have the responsibility of providing these technical inputs for the committee members to carry out their functions.
The Joint Committee should have regular meetings every three months, and extraordinary meetings as needed. Quorum requirements should be established as for the Steering Committee.
Regarding the functioning of the permanent NDC units:
The NDC shall have three units: 1) an administration and finance unit to support the day-to-day functioning of the NDC, 2) a technical support unit, in charge of analyzing PMU action plans and reports, carrying out M&E activities either directly or by sub-contract, and preparing the related evaluation reports and proposals for policy/strategy adjustments to the Joint Technical Committee; and 3) an information, communication and community counseling unit, in charge of defining and implementing the NDC information and communication strategy, and of assuring effective communication and counseling at the community level with the relevant community leaders/groups of the communities where the demobilized reintegrate, to assure a smooth reintegration process.
It is also recommended to create the function of D and R facilitators within the NDC, to incorporate relevant mid-level commanders into communication/coordination tasks for D and R, where they can apply their ascendancy over the members of the different forces to assure a smooth process. The positions of SSR Liaison Officers are proposed for this purpose (at least one for each Force).
Specific outline terms of reference for each particular staff position are included in Annex 3 of this report.
SSR Policy and Strategic Action Plan
Due to the confusion between which activities were DDR and which corresponded to SSR within the NDC/GTZ/UNDP collaboration, the program interventions have so far been done piece-meal, in a start-and-stop manner, while the different actors –including the donors that supported this process- reviewed their objectives and action plans.
It is presently evident that what is missing, and urgently needed, is an integrated SSR national policy and strategic plan, to set out the overall objectives of the process –namely a restructure of government investment and spending-, to clarify the different roles and responsibilities of the actors that should participate –both public and private, national and international-, and to define both the goals and the required timeframes for a full completion of the reform process, within which D and R shall be a critical part, but by no means the only aspect.
The size and scope of the overall downsizing, the criteria for defining the target groups, the timeframe for their demobilization, and the success indicators for their reintegration, must be defined and approved. But also needed is the definition of how the process will be controlled from a budgetary point of view: the payroll cross-checking mechanisms, and the consequent reprogramming of budgetary savings to other areas of public services, particularly social services.
At the same time, this reprogramming will have to first consider certain critical needs for the upgrading of the reformed security forces (less but better), which should also be part of the SSR strategic plan.
A critical aspect of the strategic plan for SSR must be the analysis of sustainability of the effort to carry it out. It must be noted that, if the D and R process is carried out efficiently (program and NDC overhead is kept to international programming standards, assuring that most of the money spent goes directly for reintegration support), the cost of the process for each individual could be covered by approximately two and a half years’ salary. This means that, if the Somaliland government was able to advance these payments 2 to a target group of demobilizees each year, it would then be able to strike most of their salaries from the payroll. The challenge then becomes more a challenge of finding the adequate financing mechanisms than a question of deciding on new spending. Though it is clear that, given the situation of present Government finances, it is to be hoped that donor support can be obtained for this critical restructuring process, the necessary sustainability of the process can, and should, be assured by the Government, one way or another.
One last, but important, issue of sustainability of the process is the need to assure adequate psychosocial reintegration support to the demobilizees. Given the extremely high rate of prevalence of serious mental disorders -approximately 40% of the probable target population, according to existing registrations, and based on the pre-screening criteria developed by the UNDP program team-, effective psychosocial reintegration support will be key to a successful D and R process.
Though the pilot test is still currently underway, it is already apparent that: a) a certain percentage of those requiring support will be “cured” with short-term interventions within the timeframe of the program; b) another group will require certain follow-up support, but they will themselves be able to face the costs of doing so, thanks to the income-generating reintegration projects they will have set up, and c) a third group will require permanent support, from both their families and the public health services.
In the case of this last group, though the family should receive the respective reintegration support in order to help set up an additional source of income-generation to offset the loss of the demobilizees’ salary, the extra cost of the permanent assistance to this person will require that the government continue to pay the salary. However, it is proposed that this be done under the form of a mental health assistance voucher, given out every month to the demobilizee and redeemable only at the public mental health service offices. An independent auditing process 3 should be established to control potential misuse of the system.
This system will assure continuous support to the demobilizee without the risk of the money being used for other purposes, and at the same time avoiding the natural “seepage” of resources if the money is put into the public budget and has to go through the various levels of public bureaucracy. In this manner, the money will go directly to the mental health services, the beneficiary can control that the services are effectively rendered, and finally, by assuring that the public mental health services develop a steady group of paying “customers”, they will be better able to improve their capacity to address other groups of the population who are also in dire need of these services.
To prepare the proposed SSR Policy and Strategic Plan, an Inter-Ministerial Working Group should be set up, as suggested above, within the NDC: the NDC Steering Committee should session with its three key members to conform this Working Group: the Minister of RRR, the Minister of Finance and the Minister of Defense. The Working Group will call upon other government ministries and/or other local and international actors, as needed.
It is recommended that both UNDP and other international agencies strongly support this process, and help the Somaliland Government focus on it in its’ integrity.
3.4 Proposed NDC Staffing and Operational Budget
Government Direct Contributions and Program Complement.. Staff Position (those directly related to program support/monitoring).... Monthly salary (in US$) Total salaries Per position Government contribution Program Complement Secretariat Chairman 750 750 400 350 Director General 600 600 300 300 *Secretary 150 150 100 50 Admin/Finance Unit *A/F Officer 200 200 100 100 *Secretary 100 100 50 50 Technical Support Unit Chief Tech Advisor 350 350 200 150 Evaluation and Reporting Officer 200 200 100 100 Monitors (3) 150 450 300 150 Ministry Liaison (3) 50 150 - 150 Information and Community Relations Unit Communications Officer 200 200 100 100 Regional Officers (4) 100 400 200 200 Support Staff Drivers (2) 100 200 200 Totals 3750 2050 1700 Total yearly contributions: Government: 12 x 2.050= US$ 24.600 Program: 12 x 1.700 = US$ 20.400Note 1: The above salary scale is based on salary ranges compatible with private and international program salaries, for part-time dedication. Given the policy-making nature of this NDC team’s role in respect to the program, the individual TORs should clearly state the part-time nature of the tasks involved (except for those positions noted with *). As activities (and funding) increase, it may be necessary (and possible) to revert all, or most, of the staff to full-time status.
Note 2: The direct running costs linked to program implementation will be covered by the program (transportation, basic services and office supplies). The Government should make provisions to cover the remaining running costs.
Note 3: Though these are probably the highest salary ranges that can be covered for this year by the combined contributions of the government and the present program, it would be reasonable for the NDC to attain a salary scale compatible with that of the Somali Mine Action Center (SMAC) in the near future 4, based of course, on the development (and subsequent funding) of an SSR Strategic Plan for Somaliland.
The main challenge in assuring this salary scale has to do with the need to restructure the existing government budget for 2005. As noted in Chapter 1 of this report, the present staff of the NDC totals 37 people. Many of these are, as also noted, not qualified for the tasks indicated in the new NDC structure and should be let go. However, this cannot, and should not, be done without assuring these people some sort of income-generation, especially as many of them are key opinion leaders for the program target group.
It is therefore recommended that they be included in the first phase of demobilization and reintegration support for this year, with the condition that they renounce their respective posts with the NDC (and all other Government posts, as should be the basic condition for participation in the D and R program).
This will allow for the existing budget to be restructured as per the above recommended levels of pay, which should assure both the capacity to hire the right candidates for critical posts that cannot be covered with the existing staff, and to retain this team throughout the present programming cycle, so that their on-the-job training is not lost to future stages of the SSR process.
In the case this restructuring in not possible, or cannot be carried out quickly, then it is strongly recommended that the Somaliland Government consider adding the additional resources to cover the proposed NDC staffing budget for 2005.
3.5 On-the-job Training of staff and NDC capacity-building
Once the new NDC structure is approved, and the budgeting arrangements are concluded, a reprofiling exercise should take place: all present staff should reapply for the new staffing positions, but competing openly with external candidates. Their past experience with NDC should, of course, be an important consideration in the hiring process for the new positions, but in this manner, it will be possible to select the best possible candidates for each new position among both the present staff and outside candidates.
Based on the staffing needs of the D and R PMU, certain NDC staff members could be seconded to the PMU –for example, the IT officer. Once seconded, these persons shall carry out their duties under the PMU manager, until their secondment terminates.
With the new staff in place, it will be necessary to develop an on-the-job training plan for them, focusing on those areas that require specific skills that the selected candidates lack, or where they need to up-grade them. It is recommended that this be done by incorporating short-term consultants/advisors to the NDC, who will work alongside the corresponding staff member in carrying out the required tasks together, thereby passing on the necessary skills in a hands-on manner.
Finally, UNDP and other donors to these activities should develop a sustainable exit strategy, through the requisite capacity building of the NDC in order to be able to sustain the PMU functions with purely local staff, as needed.
Brief Organizational Review of SOOYAL
Name: WAR VETERANS ASSOCIATION, established in 1992 through parliamentary legislation.
Headquarters and Offices: Hargeisa, head office. Branch offices are at the regional level: Togdheer, Sanag, Hargeisa.Awdal, Saxil and Sool.
Legal Status: a public humanitarian agency for war veterans & victims of war.
Structure of SOOYAAL- Membership Assembly, Board of Directors, Chairman and Vice Chairman, Director General, Director of administration and finance, Programs Officer, Handicap Department, Registration Department, Secretaries.
Mission statement: The war veterans association is a constitutional public organization established for the purpose of implementing demobilization and re-integration projects for veterans, disabled, war widows, orphans and related target groups.
SOOYAL initially participated in the Government-executed DDR process in an advisory and facilitation role, since, as indicated before, the main activities were the absorption of a large number of former fighters into the public security forces.
Once this process was finished, SOOYAL attempted to focus on orienting its members towards other reintegration initiatives and programs, notably those of the NDC. And it attempted to provide a detailed overview of its’ target groups through a systematic registration process, though this took some time before becoming a reality.
Registration of war veterans
This first systematic registration process of war veterans and dependants was done only in 1999-2000. It was funded by the Somaliland government.
NO Region Unemployment Widows Disabled Total 1 Awdal 2312 1169 979 4.460 2 Sanaag 1385 2316 1100 4.801 3- Sool 1376 629 455 2.460 4- Hargeysa. Saaxil, Togdheer, and Sanaag 3805 8474 2602 14.727 * Total 8,878 12,434 5,136 26,448But based on its’ initial partial registration, and later on this more systematic exercise, SOOYAL participated in the NDC-coordinated DDR efforts, including the later projects with GTZ implementation, as has been noted in Chapter 1.
However, in terms of direct participation in reintegration support services, SOOYAL’s main activities have been carried out through the establishment of a Vocational Training Center (VTC).
SOOYAAL’s Vocational Training Center (VTC)
SOOYAAL-VTC was established in 1993 with the objectives of providing vocational skills training for a large number of war veterans and victims of war in order to improve chances for employment opportunities.
In the beginning, VTC skills training was formal purely center-based vocational training with training courses of 60% practical and 40% theory. In 1997, SOOYAAL re-designed the training approach and content with a view to introduce the new concept of training for self-employment. This type of training is focused on practical skills training with minimum theoretical input (practical skills 80 % and basic skills and knowledge 20%)
VTC governance
VTC is governed independently from the mother organization –SOOYAAL- by a selected Board of Directors (BoD) consisting of five members. This BoD includes members from business community and central government. However, past experience indicates that SOOYAL representation on the Board not only is capable of overriding the other Board members but also the VTC management.
VTC Mission and Objective
VTC addresses the urgent need for its target groups (primarily war veterans and the victims of war such as orphans, war widow, returnees, etc.) through the provision market-oriented basic skills training for self-employment in multi-facetted training approach in order to create more employment opportunities and hence improving source of income.
The overall objective of the VTC programmes is to contribute country wide effort aimed at rehabilitation and development of the country. Training is the main, short- and long-term objective. Optimizing the employment potential of trainees is also a first priority.
Past results of VTC Hargeisa
YEAR Carpentry Metal work Sewing Masonry EBT TOTAL 97-99 75 41 47 73 119 371 2000-2002 63 50 61 72 145 391 2002-2003 Adult literacy 150 Total 912 1-Agriculture project of Gabiley 2001-2002 100 war veterans 2-Adult literacy school of Bura 2001 2002 200 War veterans 3-Adult Literacy School of Hargeysa 2001-2002 200 War veterans 4-VTC Burao, sewing training 2002 -2004 50 war widowsDonor funding
. Project Title Duration Budget (in US$) Funded by Enterprise Based Vocational Training (EBVT) project III December 2003 to July 2004 32.000 CARE International Skills-training project for Self-employment August 2002 to November 2003 76.000 SOOYAL-VTC EBVT Project II December 2002 to July 2003 43.450 CARE EBVT Project I April 2002 to August 2003 36.000 CARE Skills training for self-employment II May 2000 to April 2002 317.000 Caritas Switzerland/Swiss Group SOOYAL target group’s Adult Education October 2000 to June 2001 47.960 UNDP/SCPP/WFP Skills training for self-employment I November 1997 to October 1999 266.000 Caritas Switzerland/Swiss Group Female Adult Literacy/numeracy program February 1998 to November 1998 9.000 Caritas Spain/Swiss group Vocational skills training August 1995 to February 1997 257.903 Caritas Switzerland /Swiss Group Vocational skills training and income generation, Phase I and II Phase 1:July-December 1993 Phase 2: January-May 1994 64.000 CARE 4.1 VTC and SOOYAL plans for the futureSince the beginning, the VTC reintegration programmes were emergency-oriented in concept. They were meant to contribute (in their small way) to the sustenance of peace in Somaliland through employment creation for the unemployed war veterans. VTC now aspires to steer the VTC into becoming a national training institution, offering standardized yet market-demand-led training, commensurate with national development needs, by:
Up-grading the quality of the training programs, both formal and non-formal training for self-employment.
Offering a two years course of popular engineering trades to youngsters who graduate from primary education. The reason is that the numbers of primary leavers are steadily increasing while the corresponding capacities of secondary schools in the country are very limited. For instance, about 74,000 pupils were enrolled in the scholastic year of 2000-2001 as referred from the statistics chart issued by the Ministry of Education.
Increasing the number of VTC-supported trades from 4 to 6 trades.
Sustainability
VTC has long been thinking to establish a long-term process for reducing dependency on external donor assistance. The last center-based project ended in December 2003 - a cost sharing approach was adopted whereby 80% of the costs were met by Caritas Switzerland /Swiss Group and 20% were supposed to be raised locally by the VTC ( mainly from the central government). But, the result was a failure, and VTC has collected only a half of the expected amount.
Nevertheless, VTC plans to sustain its present and future training programme through the income primarily from trainee products sold, the sale of other marketable products and services, mainly through its’ production wing, the commercialization of VTC premises, and Government contributions.
4.2 Re-activating and Re-thinking SOOYAL and the VTC
The present SOOYAL authorities and the VTC management had, as of December 2004, defined the following steps to re-think their institutional set-up and their’ development strategy:
- Define a three years strategic plan.
- Design and implement an institutional development project for both SOOYAL and VTC
- Design and implement a staff capacity building program
- Clarify roles and responsibilities of program stakeholders
- Strengthen its close collaboration with international organizations, UN agencies and government as well as other institutions, which pursue similar objectives.
- Resumption of VTC training activities
- Development of systematic, comprehensive, and non-formal basic education (literacy program), initially for four classes of SOOYAAL-targeted population
- Promote income-generation strategies to assure sustainability of both institutions.
Towards a Strategic Institutional Development Plan
After completing the above brief review, and after having interviewed the concerned Government authorities –notably the Minister of RRR- regarding the expectations of the Government in respect to SOOYAL, a half-day workshop was carried out with the SOOYAL authorities and technical staff, with the objective of identifying the main constraints and challenges the organization was facing, together with the possible opportunities for institutional development, and a short-term plan for how to do so. The following is the summary of the conclusions of this discussion.
Present situation
DDR is finished (rightly or wrongly): 12 years after the war, there are only war veterans not ex-combatants.
What the Government, NDC, GTZ, UNDP and EU have been, and are doing presently, is Security Sector Reform (SSR). These are government employees who are being retired to restructure the budget.
Some of these people (maybe most) will be war veterans, but they are being retired as government employees, therefore should not, as a group, qualify for additional support outside their standard D and R benefits.
SOOYAL needs to focus on its’ main and essential role
The Government recognizes the importance of the war veterans having ‘a voice of their own”. It believes SOOOYAL needs to play this critical political role.
SOOYAL is therefore, above all, an advocacy group for the war veterans, and needs to focus on doing this right.
The initial definition of SOOYAL’s mission holds today and for the future, as long as it is understood that their focus are the war veterans as such, and not their past status as ex-combatants, a categorization that Somaliland needs to stop using.
Towards a strategic plan for SOOYAL and its’ institutional restructuring
VTC must be “spinned-off”: it must be set up as an independent NGO, or even private company, that would maintain a relationship with SOOYAL through representation in each other’s Board of Directors, but it should support itself through the sale of its’ services.
VTC should pay a rent to SOOYAL for the infrastructure/equipment it gets, and could also pay an “association fee” to SOOYAL. But all services should be charged –to SOOYAL or others.
If, and when, certain war veterans should need support to access these training services, and the payment of the fees is –totally or partially- beyond their means, SOOYAL can assist in finding a specific source of funding to subsidize these services specifically –not the whole of VTC and SOOYAL altogether…
SOOYAL should focus on the immediate issue of national recognition of the war veterans and their role in the war. This could include: i) issuance of certificates of recognition, medals and other; ii) celebration of the war effort (yearly celebration ceremony), iii) special access to public services (mainly health) for card-carrying war veterans, etc.
A Museum could be set up, with a permanent exhibition of photographs, writings and other mementos from the war, to help start developing a modern-day history of Somaliland and its’ struggles. The set up of the museum could be funded by private subscription, with additional public support. Entrance fees may be payable.
The museum collection (eventually including a library) could be the basis for a web site to disseminate not only the museum and its’ materials, but also more generally the work of SOOYAL.
The rental of the remaining building space that SOOYAL has should also be address, to provide a further source of income for the association. These halls could be rented for all sorts of public and private events. Again, this should be done by tender for sub-contracting and not in a case-by-case management-by-committee manner.
Finally, an Information, Referral and Counseling Service (IRCS) needs to be set up by SOOYAL to provide permanent support to its’ members. This service can be modeled on the similar service that the SSR program will probably develop for its’ own work. Therefore, NDC and UNDP could eventually provide the system software, the basic initial information and the staff training to run the service, once it has been developed for their program.
Finally, SOOYAL needs to bring all this together into one Strategic Development Plan for the next 3/5 years, in order to organize its’ own independent income, and convince other potential partners (mainly the Government, but also local and international NGOS, and donors) to jointly participate in its’ future activities.
A planning seminar is tentatively scheduled for March 2005. It is recommended that UNDP, and other interested parties, provide technical assistance to SOOYAL to carry out this activity in the best possible manner.
1. Secretariat
Chairman
The NDC Chairman is responsible for the overall functioning of the NDC Secretariat and its’ units.
As head of the NDC Secretariat, the NDC Chairman provides advice and support to the Minister of RRR in his/her role as Chairman of the NDC Steering Committee.
The Chairman of the NDC reports directly to the Minister of RRR, and is therefore the Chairman of the Joint Technical Committee.
Director General
The Director General is responsible for overseeing the technical staff of the NDC, and for assuring that both the Steering Committee and the Joint Technical Committee are provided, through the NDC Chairman, with the necessary technical inputs to carry out their functions in a timely and effective manner. In this respect, the DG is responsible for assuring the timely presentation of the periodic monitoring and evaluation reports prepared by the Technical Support Unit.
The DG is also responsible for overseeing the implementation of the Information and Communication strategies and plans –through the Info and Communications Unit-, and for assuring that the necessary liaison functions both with the community and with the security forces are properly carried out –through the Liaison Officers.
The DG has the overall responsibility for assuring that the NDC administration and financial support functions are properly carried out, through the supervision of the Admin/Finance Unit staff.
The DG will also have the responsibility of tracking the approval and registration process of the candidates for D and R. At the identification stage, this will be done through the counterpart units in the Ministries of Finance (Payroll/Budget Office) and Ministries of Defense, Interior and Justice (demobilization registries at the Human Resources departments, or their equivalent). The respective Liaison Officers will facilitate this process as needed. Final decisions regarding approval of beneficiaries will be ratified by the Steering Committee, and communicated to the PMU. Finally, the PMU managers report to the DG. (In the case of an implementing agency, formal reporting should probably be to the NDC Chairman, but on technical matters, it should probably go through the DG ).
Secretary
The Secretary will provide operational support to the Chairman and DG in carrying out their functions, particularly in relation to the smooth functioning of the Committees.
In this respect he/she will assume the tasks of primary operational support for those meetings (invitations, venue preparation, agenda preparation and distribution, minutes preparation and distribution, and technical report distribution and other operational tasks related to these meetings).
2. Administration and Finance Unit
Admin/Finance Officer
The Admin/Finance Officer is in charge of carrying out and recording all administrative and financial procedures related to the work of the NDC and its’ committees.
In particular, the A/F officer will: i) produce and maintain and up-to-date inventory of all NDC equipment and assets, ii) carry out and register all the NDC financial transactions, -including salary payments, service payments, purchases, etc- and produce regular reports as needed, iii) assure that all NDC activities are recorded and that the activity reports are properly filed.
Secretary
The A/F Secretary will provide operational support to the A/F officer and the other NDC Units, as needed.
In particular, the Secretary will: i) handle in-coming and out-going communications, ii) carry out registration and filing tasks as indicated by the A/F Officer, and iii) assist in report preparation, distribution and filing, as necessary.
3. Technical Support Unit
Chief Technical Advisor
The Chief Technical Advisor is the supervisor of the technical support unit. As such, he/she will: i) prepare monitoring and evaluation (M&E) plans and procedures for adequate program supervision, ii) assure that the M&E activities take place according to both the technical requirements and the schedule of the approved M&E plan, iii) supervise the preparation of the M&E reports prepared by the Monitors and the Reporting Officer, and iv) provide the Secretariat with all the additional technical inputs that they may require to properly carry out their functions, liaising as necessary with the PMU manager and technical staff.
The CTA will supervise the work of the Unit’s staff, in order to carry out these functions.
IT Officer
The IT Officer will be in charge of developing, updating and maintaining the IT systems of the NDC, in particular the internal office network, and the NDC database(s).
The most critical database, the D and R registration and tracking database, will be a key operational tool of the D and R PMU, therefore it is recommended, as stated before, that the IT Officer be seconded to the PMU, and that he carry out his/her tasks under the PMU manager, but including attending to the development and maintenance needs of the internal NDC systems.
Evaluation Reporting Officer
Working under the supervision of the CA, and in permanent coordination with the Monitors, the ER officer will review progress on the monitoring process, assuring its’ timeliness and technical thoroughness. Based on the monitoring inputs, and following the guidelines established in the M&E plans, the ER officer will prepare the periodic evaluation reports and submit them to the CTA for review.
Monitors
The Unit’s Monitors will be in charge of carrying out the direct program monitoring activities, as indicated in the M&E plans, and following the established procedures. They will report to the CTA, and provide the ER officer with the necessary inputs for his/her work.
Information, Communication and Community Counseling Unit
Communications Officer
The NDC Communications Officer will be responsible for assisting the NDC authorities in developing an effective overall communications strategy, and for overseeing its’ implementation, either directly, by subcontracting, or through the PMU (s).
The Communications Officer will also supervise and facilitate the work of the Regional Officers, in order to assure that they carry out their information, communication and community counseling functions in the best possible manner. Regional Officers
The NDC Regional Officers will maintain the critical link between the Government and NDC authorities and the leaders and general population of the communities who will receive the demobilized people, ensure a two-way communication that will provide the necessary inputs to guide both policy-making and the development of the strategic plans for D and R. It will also provide the NDC monitors with the necessary information regarding critical aspects of community impact of the NDC programs, both positive and negative. Finally, the Regional Officers should be capable of providing effective counseling to the communities regarding possible support services to assist in solving some of the challenges posed by the reintegration process. For this last function, the Officers should be able to count on the support of the proposed Information, Referral and Counseling Service of the D and R PMU.
Finally, the Regional Officers must be able to call upon the support of the Liaison Officers as facilitators of the reintegration process.
Liaison Officers
The Liaison Officers will be mid-level commanders of the various security forces participating in the SSR process, detailed to the NDC on a part-time basis, to facilitate the reintegration process of the demobilized, by using their knowledge and influence to advise and counsel both the demobilized, and the NDC and PMU staff, regarding how best to address the specific challenges that each individual process may present.
The Liaison Officers will report to the DG, but will work with all the NDC and PMU technical staff as needed, particularly with the staff of the Info and Communications Unit.
Annex 4: INSTITUTIONAL RESTRUCTURING OF THE NDC
Terms of Reference
THE BACKGROUND
The Somaliland (NW Somalia) National Demobilization Commission (NDC) is a para-statal institution responsible for the Somaliland demobilization and reintegration process, founded in June 1993. The NDC is tasked to plan and implement the Government’s aim of demobilizing excess numbers of security forces and ultimately reports to the Ministry of Reintegration, Resettlement and Reconstruction (MRRR). However, these are currently not operational due to a lack of funds.
The NDC is currently structured around three departments; admin & finance, gender and project planning. A separate war-veterans association, SOOYAL, was formed following the liberation struggle, and also has registered a number of former combatants.
OBJECTIVES & OUTPUTS:
The objective of the mission is to carry out a thorough review and provide recommendations towards the shape, structure and composition of the NDC as relates to delivering on its goals and mandate in DDR in Somaliland. The results of the exercise are expected to form the basis of a partnership agreement between UNDP and NDC in the next stage of the DDR operation (2005). Consultants will also provide technical assistance to the war veterans association SOOYAL (5 working days). In carrying out its task, the Team will consult the following actors over the course of its work:
Government counterparts NDC and SOOYAL senior management Key donor counterparts UNDP Programme staff NGOs and civil society organizationsOrganizational Review
The Consultant(s) will undertake a complete review of NDC institutional structure, analyze its relevance to the present day situation, review its operations, assets, equipment and other needs and various staff functions. In parallel, the mission will examine existing development partner capacities and comparative advantages on DDR. The team will build on an earlier restructuring exercise carried out with SOOYAL.
Programmatic Review
The Consultant(s) will also review past and current programmes and project activities and review any annual plans, existing work plans and institutional capacity or constraints in achieving these goals.
Deliverables
The exercise should derive proposals for the structure, staffing levels, and composition of the NDC, and potential approaches for support by development partners including UNDP. Recommendations should be made in view of, and take into account, the available capacity existing in Government ministries, and the UNDP programme, as well as the future programming in this area. The exercise should also draw strongly on best practice on national DDR institutions operating in cooperation with other DDR country programmes.
The mission will develop and submit to UNDP and NDC the following:
A short analysis of the NDC;
A business plan with clear recommendations on the proposed structure, composition and size of NDC vis a vis its intended and appropriate role to NDC and UNDP for consideration; and Specific staffing profiles (outline ToRs) and levels should also be proposed. Additionally, consultants will provide SOOYAL with advisory inputs, and help in strategy development, to further the goals of the association.
3. TIMEFRAME AND COMPOSITION
The NDC has requested UNDP assistance in the preparation of the above exercise with a view towards increasing the capacity and effectiveness of NDC and furthering the UNDP-NDC partnership. UNDP will therefore provide a team composed of one local and one international consultant with the requisite experience in DDR, and the Somali context.
The team will work independently of the contracting agency and local counterparts in undertaking its work. It will however review existing materials, to be provided by NDC and UNDP, and consult closely with both organizations during the exercise, as well as other relevant actors in Somaliland.
Annex 5: List of Interviews
Abdullah Hussein Iman, Minister of RRR Hussein Ali Duale, Minister of Finance Ismail Omar Adan, Minister of Defense Abdi Abdillahi Riirash, NDC Chairman Ahmed Ali Sulub, NDC Director general Mohamed Abdi Ali, Vice Minister of Finance Ahmed Daud, DG, Ministry of Finance Mahamed Ahmed Haashi, Chairman SOOYAL Hassan Abdi Mohamed, Vice Chairman SOOYAL Abdi Hussein Ada, DG SOOYAL Abdi Hussein Jamu, SOOYAL advisor Hassan Olad Adan, Director VTC Ahmed M. Mohamoud , EU Liaison Officer Ghanim Alnajar, Expert, Commission on Human Rights Jack van Holst Pellekaan, World BankNOTES
1. The original appears to have been lost. No copy could be found…
2. As per discussion on this issue with the Finance Minister, it is clear that this is not possible under the present conditions. This does not invalidate, however, the argument, but simply puts the focus on the financial constraints , not the economic rationality for the process and its’ sustainability.
3. For example, a periodic revision by an international health organization like WHO.
4. Salaries for the local staff at the SMAC range from 600 US$ to 1.000 US$ for technical staff, with 100 US$ being the lowest salary, for the cleaning personnel.