Academy for Peace and Development
Hargeysa, Somaliland
July 2002

http://www.somali-jna.org/downloads/Jimcaale%20-%20APD%20Governance%20and%20Dcentralisation%20of%20Institution.pdf Principal Researcher:

Cabdirahman Jimcaale

Working Group Members:
Aamina Maxamuud Warsame
Cabdillaahi Ibraahim Habane
Cabdillaahi Sheekh Hassan
Muuse Jaamac Maxamad
Aadan Muuse Jibril
Maxamad Baaruud Cali
Kinsi Xuseen Qoqdhan
Saciid Cabdillaahi Yasir
Cali Xaaji Cabdi Ducaale
Xuseen Xaaji Cabdi Camir
Jibril Cali Salaad
Axmad Cabdillaahi Nadiif
Maxamad Jaamac Colow
Maxamed Cabdi Dhinbil (Deceased)
Axmad Askar (Deceased)
 
Table of Contents

1 Introduction.5
2 Governance in the Modern History of Somaliland 8
Pre-Colonial Somali Society 8
The Colonial Administration and Indirect Rule  8
Resistance to Colonial Rule 9
The Nationalist Struggle for Independence 1940 -1960  10
Independence and Union, 1960-1969. 11
The Military Regime.13
Insurgency and civil war. 16
The SNM.17
The SNM Interim Government.17
The Boorame Peace and Reconciliation Conference, January-May 1993. 20
The Cigaal Administration, May 1993 to February 1997. 22
The Hargeysa Peace and Reconciliation Conference, October 1996-February 1997 24
The Constitution and the Legalization of Political Parties. 26
3 Political Representation in the Post-War Period: ”The Beel System” 29
State Organization in Somaliland 29
The Executive  30
The House of Guurti. 32
The House of Representatives 34
The Shir-Gudoon. 37
Representation in the Beel System: The Nomination Process. 38
Power Sharing and Equity  40
The Beel and Multi -party Systems Compared. 43
4 Decentralization.45
Definition. 46
Legal framework  46
Why decentralization? Public attitudes towards change 48
Existing arrangements  48
Roles and responsibilities.50
De facto centralization of administration 52
Implementing Decentralization  53
Political Parties. 54
5 Revenue Collection and Distribution. 57
The history of taxation. 57
Rebuilding the taxation system 1991-2000 59
Central government and financial administration 60
Local government and financial administration  64
The capacity of the institutions administering taxation.67
Issues in revenue collection 68
Equity  71
6 Conclusions and Recommendations. 74
Representation.74
Decentralization. 74
Revenues 76
Bibliography 78
Annex 1: The 1999 and 2000 Somaliland Budgets Compared. 80
Annex 2: Workshop Participants. 82
 

Introduction

In 1991 the people of the north-west regions of Somalia declared the formation of the independent Republic of Somaliland, whose territory comprises that of the former British Somaliland Protectorate. After a decade of civil war the people of Somaliland set about rebuilding the political, social and economic institutions of government. The process of political rebuilding has been difficult and not without violence. The formation of Somaliland provided an opportunity to break with the corrupt and unrepresentative type of governments that Somalis had endured in the past, and to craft a system that is more participatory and responsive to the needs and aspirations of people. After a decade of independence, the extent to which this has been achieved in Somaliland is hotly debated.

During more than one year of Participatory Action Research (PAR) by WSP and the Academy for Peace and Development (APD), Somalilanders from all walks of life identified governance as a key issue requiring greater in-depth study. The WSP National Project Group Meeting therefore chose ‘governance’1 as an issue for further in-depth research. A Working Group was formed to take this forward, comprising people from different sections of the population in Hargeysa, Somaliland’s political and commercial centre. After lengthy discussions the Working Group, under the title, ‘The Consolidation of Basic Government Institutions at the Central and Local Levels’, divided the research into three themes:
* Political representation
* Decentralization of administration
* Taxation and equity

The main phase of research began in June 2000. It engaged ordinary people in debates on these themes through three participatory workshops in different regions and districts of Somaliland.

Baki town, in Baki district in Awdal region, was chosen as the venue for the workshop on decentralization of government, due to its rural location, the fact that the government had no presence and because the place had seen no development for the last 40 years. The workshop, held in June 2000, examined the legal framework for decentralization, assessed the existing arrangements and the challenges and opportunities of decentralization. The Somaliland Transitional National Charter adopted in 1993 and the 1997 provisional constitution mandated the government to decentralize the system of government. A suitable environment and opportunity for decentralization prevails. There is peace and public tolerance of government. A fear of a return to centralized rule also sustains pressure for the devolution of powers.

However, progress has been slow. The workshop participants identified the main factor hindering decentralization to be a lack of commitment from the government, but peoples’ inexperience, lack of awareness, nomadic culture, clan loyalties, mistrust, illiteracy and lack of organization are also obstacles. Some participants argued that the central government appoints local government officials who are accountable only to the central government. Thus while the apparatus of government is decentralized, powers are not.

The second workshop on political representation was held in Hargeysa, the capital of Somaliland and the seat of central government. Colonization introduced a Western state model of governance that was adopted by Somaliland at independence in 1960. Although some traditional practices continued, like customary law, and elders were incorporated into the system of governance, alternatives to the western model of government were not considered. Reviewing the last forty years, workshop participants argued that there was a mismatch between the western state model of governance and that of a predominantly kinship-based nomadic pastoral society.

A review of the modern history of Somaliland reveals that four decades of independence and nation building by both civilian and military regimes left the Somali people feeling politically and economically marginalised. For most of the independence era, the populace was not consulted in the country’s political, economic and social affairs and a representative government was never established, even in the nine years of civilian multi-party rule.

After reclaiming their sovereignty in 1991, the people of Somaliland adopted a beel (clanbased) system of governance that has proven critical to the process of reconciliation, healing and recovery of Somaliland. In 2001, a new constitution was approved in a public referendum, paving the way for a transition to a multi-party system of government. Workshop participants reviewed the merits and demerits of the beel system of government and the potential opportunities and pitfalls of moving to a multi-party system. The third workshop on taxation and equity was held in Ceerigaabo in January 2001, the regional capital of Sanaag region, where the administration was only established in the late 1990s, and the system of revenue collection was new. Discussions centred on assessing the system of revenue collection and its administration.

Somaliland’s financial institutions have been re-established and are operational at the central and local level. The government system of tax collection is improving and there is a steady growth in the revenue collected by central, local and para-statal government agencies. The prevailing peace and stability and the presence of functional public institutions provide opportunities for greater tax collection. However, the 2000 and 2001 budgets were severely affected by the Gulf States’ ban on imports of Somali livestock in 2000. Tax laws and financial regulations need to be updated. Many types of taxes are not collected, the system of taxation is still not unified, not all customs departments of Somaliland are functional and municipal tax is based almost exclusively on the zeyladaha (local livestock market). More revenue could have been collected if Somaliland overcomes various obstacles hindering proper revenue collection and management. These include a legacy of mistrust of government, tax evasion, a lack of proper accounting and auditing. Taxpayers question the returns to the public in terms of basic social services. The collection, management and expenditure of tax revenue without the presence of local legislature are also questioned.

Table.1. Major Clans of the Somaliland Protectorate

              Somaal

Dir           Isaaq   Harti
Gadabuursi            Warsangeli 
Ciise                 Dhubahante

Governance in the Modern History of Somaliland

The present system of governance in Somaliland has been shaped by a history that includes almost 100 years of European colonisation, nine years of ineffective and chaotic multi-party democracy after independence, twenty-one years of military dictatorship and a decade of armed struggle against that rule. Since 1991, the government in Somaliland has been a hybrid of Western-style constitutional democracy and the traditional Somali beel system.

Pre-Colonial Somali Society

When the British colonized Somaliland in 1884 they found the territory inhabited by a stateless society of nomadic people herding livestock in the semi -arid territory of the Horn of Africa. This nomadic society was organized on the basis of kinship and divided into ‘clan families’ (Lewis, 1961). Each clan family segmented into clans, sub-clans and diya-paying groups (see box 1 – diagram of Somaliland clans’ structure).3 There was no central authority and each family and clan independently managed its social relations with other groups, as well as its subsistence needs.

Among these clans a council of the elders of a clan (shir), was an important means for managing internal and external affairs. Explaining the political organisation of the Somalis, (Lewis, 1961) described the shir as a highly democratic assembly attended by all adult men as need arises in which any attendee had the right to discuss and speak his mind. In addition, xeer (customary law), to which all kinsmen are party, and the Islamic shariica (Islamic law) were used in maintaining social relations and political stability, as well as managing pasture and water resources.

The Colonial Administration and Indirect Rule

British colonial administration brought fundamental changes to this uncentralised and stateless system of governance. The establishment of single centralised colonial authority in the British Somaliland Protectorate disrupted indigenous political structures. Colonial District Commissioners (DCs) were appointed to rule over local clansmen, under the general supervision of the Governor of the Protectorate.

The British practice of ‘indirect rule’ involved incorporating clan elders into the administration as salaried chiefs (pl: Caaqilo).4 They were further incorporated into the system as judges (Qaadiyo) through local courts (Lewis, 1980). It has been the practice of all successive governments since independence to incorporate clan leaders, and therefore clans, into the administration through the appointment of caaqilo (s. caaqil), salaadiin (s. suldaan), Garaado (s. Garaad) and Ugaasyo ( s. Ugaas).

Under the system of indirect rule the Caaqil acted and served as an intermediary, assisting in implementation of administration’s policies. This created a situation in which the traditional practice of decision-making by consensus was replaced with a more formal system of hierarchical authority. For example, if need arose the Caaqil could confiscate or seize livestock with the help of the District Commissioner’s Illaalos (rural police force). As a result the trust between the traditional leader and his clan was damaged.

On the other hand, the British government had little interest in the socio-economic development of the colony. Abdi Samater (1989) noted that the simple objective of the British colonialists was to secure the supply of Somali mutton for the British military garrison in Aden and to keep away other colonial powers. Another incidental objective was for the colony to serve as a refueling station for sea traffic to the Far East. During the 80 years of British rule the Protectorate received little investment in development and infrastructure. In 1937, for example, the budget of the protectorate was only £213,139 (Lewis 1980).

Some developments were vigorously resisted by the local population, such as the establishment of schools and revenue collection. There was a suspicion that education would be used for spreading Christianity (Ahmed Samatar, 1998). This accounted for the limited number of schools at that time. In 1956 there were 450 applicants for the 60 places in the two existing elementry schools in the protectorate capital (Abdi Samater, 1989). The District Commissioner of Burco in 1943 was killed when he introduced taxation. A local teacher at the time, criticised the colonial government’s attitude as “The deaf government whose sole intention was to have no ideas and spend no money.” (Ahmed Samater quoted in Geshekter, 1988).

Resistance to Colonial Rule

For twenty years, between 1900 and 1920, the religious and nationalist leader Sayid Maxamad Cabdulle Xasan, led a struggle against the British, Italian and Ethiopians, to free his countrymen from colonial occupation.

The Sayid was from a religious family and as a young boy he traveled greatly as far as the Sudan, Mecca, the Hijaz and Palestine to learn the Quran and Islamic teachings. Upon returning to the protectorate in 1895, the Sayid sought to promulgate the Salixiya order, a puritanical Islamic sect that was locally perceived to be “politically more vibrant and aggressive than the Qadiriya order.” (Samatar, 1988). The Sayid preached ascetism, and denounced smoking, qaad chewing (practices tolerated by the Qaadiriya) and called on his countrymen to be strict in their observance of Islamic teachings. He was also a gifted poet and his peace-making efforts between clans won him fame and popularity (Lewis, 1980).

In the same year the Sayid returned to the protectorate he confronted the French Catholic mission in Berbera and warned people of the dangers of Christian colonization destroying the Muslim faith. Despite the opposition of the colonial administration and the influential Qadiriya leadership, he succeeded in rallying the support of pastoralists, mainly from among the Dhulbahante clan of his mother and his own Ogaden clan, establishing his stronghold in areas of the countryside where the British administration did not reach. For many years he managed to keep the British confined to the coastal towns while he controlled much of Togdheer, Sanaag, Sool and parts of Saaxil - nearly two-thirds of Somaliland - where the remnants of his forts and wells can still be seen. His fighting force - the Dervishes - were fed from the livestock confiscated or collected from pastoralists. In 1920 the Sayid was finally defeated as a British blockade off the coast cut off his supply of arms. He was then attacked by from the sea, by air and on land at his fortress in Taleex. One ironic consequence of the Sayid’s war against colonial rule, however, was to draw the colonial rulers further into the interior.

The Nationalist Struggle for Independence 1940 -1960

In the early part of the twentieth century, all efforts of the British administration of the Protectorate aimed the defeat of the Sayid and his Dervishes. It was a period of limited administration and no social development in the protectorate. Following the defeat of the Sayid, peace returned to the protectorate, and with it the British policy of benign neglect: there was little or no development to speak of in the inter-war years. In 1939, when the Second World War broke, Italy briefly occupied the protectorate in an attempt to incorporate it within the Italian East African Empire, but British forces expelled the Italians in 1941 and restored the Protectorate to British military rule. In order to strengthen its claim to the territory, the British began to provide various public services such as law enforcement, education, health, water and roads. However, a Somali nationalist political awakening accompanied these developments.

In the 1940s new nationalist political movements began. Political associations and religious based social clubs were organized, which later developed into political parties that led the struggle for independence. In Somaliland the most notable parties were the Somali National League (SNL) formed in 1957, the National United Front (NUF) established in 1958 and the United Somali People (USP) formed in the last year preceding independence. The Somali Youth League (SYL) also had some influence but was more prominent in the south.

Given the general lack of political education under the British, the new political parties were typically initiated by Somalilanders living abroad5 and they depended for their support base upon local merchants, traders, civil servants and religious leaders. They faced formi dable obstacles in reaching the rural populace and their appeal remained chiefly confined to the Protectorate’s major towns. Their political platforms were remarkably similar, sharing a commitment to nationalism, pan-Somalism and the rejection of clanism.

In 1948 political activism gathered momentum when the British signed an agreement to cede the Hawd reserve area, the main grazing area for trans-border clans, to Ethiopia. The agreement, which was implemented in 1954, intensified the anti-colonial and pan-Somali sentiments, and ultimately contributed to the unification of the British Somaliland Protectorate and the Italian Trust territory in 1960.

Although the political parties were, theoretically, driven by a nationalist cause, the clan system remained the overriding principle of social organization and the main support base of each party. Nevertheless, some parliamentary candidates in the 1960 pre-independence polls were elected in areas of the Protectorate where they had no clan support base, suggesting that nationalism did have a role to play. For example, the politicians Mohamed Bihi “Shuuriye” from the Gabooye clan and Cumar Maxamad Cabdiraxmaan (“Cumar Dheere”) from an Ethiopian branch of the Ogaden clan, were elected respectively in 1960 and 1964 from Hargeysa, an Isaaq-dominated city.

The clan base of the political parties became more apparent as the euphoria of the independence faded. However, the formation of political alliances like the Somali Youth League (SYL)6 made it impossible for narrowly based clan parties to achieve any effective position in national politics. There were no political parties representing the interests of a single clan, but at the same time the transfer of clan loyalties to political parties had become pervasive.

The thirty-three-member legislature of the Somaliland protectorate was elected in February 1960. The Isaaq-dominated Somali National League (SNL) won 21 seats; the United Somali Party (USP), composed mainly of members of non-Isaaq clans, won 12 seats and the National United Front (NUF) 1 seat. This short-lived assembly debated many issues, but its main focus was the unification of the Somali territories in the Horn. Immediate union with the south without pre-conditions was agreed by consensus, and on 1 July 1960 the State of Somaliland united with the Italian Trust Territory to form the Somali Republic Independence and Union, 1960-1969.

After official unification of the two Somali regions a new provisional constitution was adopted with a parliamentary system of government. This government was comprised of a non-executive President elected by the 123 members of parliament and an executive Prime Minister nominated by the President. The Prime Minister appointed his cabinet from the leading parliamentary party, subject to approval by the President and the Parliament. A third organ of the government was the judiciary, with five Supreme Court judges appointed by the President. The Ministry of Interior appointed Regional Governors and District Commissioners in the eight administrative regions and thirty districts of the country. District Councils, however, were democratically elected along party lines. Each council then elected a Chairman who functioned as the mayor of the district capital.

The major challenges confronting the new government were to consolidate unification, through administrative integration and the harmonization of the socio-economic development of the two different regions with their “dual colonial heritage” (Lewis, 1980). This included different British and the Italian systems of education, administration, security services, pay rates and legal systems.

In many respects the south was more advanced in government politics, having exercised self-rule under the Italian Trusteeship for ten years prior to unification. However, there was no agreed power sharing arrangement or pre-planned methodology to facilitate the amalgamation of the two territories. Ahmed Samater (1988) noted that matters were complicated “by the dominance of the politicians from the south in the new government.” This was apparent in the imbalance in the distribution of cabinet and other government posts, including in the security forces. The South had gained the top political offices of the President and the Prime Minister. British Somaliland received just 33 seats in the legislative council, while 90 were awarded to the former Italian Somalia. This meant that when the territories and legislatures were joined in 1960, less than one third of parliamentary seats were held by northern politicians.

Northern disenchantment with the union began shortly after independence, when the people of the northwest saw their former capital Hargeysa reduced to a minor regional headquarters while the new capital, Mogadishu, became the seat of the government and center of national affairs. Northerners, who had perceived Somaliland and Somalia as two equal states before independence, became a minority in the new Somali state. The former Protectorate’s secondary influence in national affairs damaged northern pride and began to breed feelings of resentment. Commenting on the difficulty that the northern parliamentarians faced, one contemporary observer noted: They were aggrieved that they could not influence any decision making process because of unbalanced minority representation in the national assembly. (Qalib, 1995)

The latent political discontent in the north found expression in June 20 1961, when the majority of the people of the north voted against a new unitary constitution. This was soon followed by a failed coup attempt led by group of disgruntled northern British-trained officers in December the same year.

After the first euphoric years of independence, the multi-party political system began to falter and lost momentum. Political parties ceased to be based on an ideology of nation building and there was a mushrooming of clan-based political parties. People were generally inexperienced in the modern system of governance and the society’s deeply rooted nomad way of life, poverty and high illiteracy were, and still are, limiting factors in the emergence of a political consciousness. The clan remained the overriding principle of social organization, hindering the formation of a civil society and broad-based political parties. Only a handful of political parties contested the first elections after independence. By the 1964 election the number had risen to over twenty, and in 1969 over sixty political parties contested the elections. One workshop participant described the situation as one where, “political parties had no political mandate and roughly every clan or large sub-clan had formed its own political party.” Local councils and mayors were elected by the same system and so also reflected the clan-based divisions.

Throughout the 1960s, government became increasingly centralized. The administration and policy decisions were concentrated in the capital city, leading northerners to label the government ‘Cawaro’ (‘one eyed’) and to remark that: ‘Nalka Xamar baa la nooga soo daara’ (“[In the rest of the country] even the electric light has to be switched on from Mogadishu”). Citizens requiring trade licenses, legal services, passports, higher education and civil service recruitment were obliged to travel to Muqdisho – a trip of considerable expense and inconvenience for those who did not live in the south. Northerners whose political connections in Mogadishu were weak had problems getting access to government services – a situation described by one bitter political commentator in the following terms: Ninkaan daba gaabi daadihinayn amase dibitaati daaya lahayn dameerka abgaalba wuu dilli. (‘He who is neither led by a mini-skirted lass, nor protected by a parliamentary boss, will eventually be killed by the donkey of the Abgaal’ [a clan from the Mogadishu area]).

Northern resentment was sharpened by the well-founded belief that felt that only a small proportion of the millions of dollars of international aid that poured into Somalia, was invested in the north. The construction of Berbera port, Tog-wajaale wheat farm, Laasqoray fish factory and the extension of Hargeysa airport, were among the few development projects executed in the north, in contrast to the south where many projects were implemented. Total development expenditure in the north was less that ten percent of that in the south.

Political dissatisfaction was not confined to the north, however. Disillusionment at the misappropriation of state powers, rampant corruption, favouritism and nepotism by the civilian administrations was felt throughout the Republic. In 1969, chaotic elections that resulted in several deaths were followed by the assassination of president, Dr. Cabdirashid Cali Sharmaarke in the remote town of Laascaanood, paving the way for a coup d’etat on 21st October 1969.

The Military Regime

In October 1969 democratic civilian rule was replaced by the Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC), comprising twenty-four officers from the uniformed forces led by General Maxamad Siyaad Barre. Under military rule, power became further concentrated in the office of the President, favouring Mogadishu and its environs. National development planning and political opportunities were concentrated in the capital and certain aras of the south, while the rest of the country was marginalized politically and economically.

Following the military coup, the SRC suspended the constitution, dissolved the elected parliament, disbanded the independent judiciary and banned all political parties. The SRC assumed sole authority for formulating policy objectives for the country, assisted by a handpicked council of 14 civilian Secretaries, who executed the routine affairs of the administration in the different ministries. In terms of clan representation the SRC was unbalanced. Only eight out of 25 members were from the northern clans and the Digle and Mirifle, who inhabit the large agro-pastoral regions of Bay and Bakool, were not represented.

Military officers directly accountable to the SRC replaced the regional and district administrations, followed by the formation of local revolutionary councils selected and chaired by governors and the district commissioners, appointed from the circles of the revolutionary party. The Charter of the revolution proclaimed equality, justice and the universal right to work. After a year in power, the SRC adopted Scientific Socialism as the country’s ideological orientation. This reflected the SRC’s heavy ideological and financial dependence on the Soviet Union.

The Somali people, disillusioned with the corrupt parliamentary rule of the previous nine years, welcomed the ‘bloodless revolution’ and placed their hopes in the change of government. In the initial years, therefore, the military leaders of the revolution had little difficulty eliciting community participation in their development programs. Revolutionary programs and slogans, disseminated through the ‘Hanuuninta’ (political orientation centres) or by radio sought to engineer a new socialist nation free from the bondage of ‘clanism’.

Intensive public campaigns were conducted against corruption, nepotism and clanism. An effigy of the clan was buried and burnt and the collective practice of diya-paying was abolished and replaced by death sentences and life imprisonment. A Public Relations Office was established to prepare the youth and intellectuals to become cadre of the revolution. In the early 1970s several ambitious development programmes were launched: state farms were formed in agricultural areas, a new Somali script was introduced in 1972, followed by a successful national literacy campaign, and a major resettlement operation was launched to assist nomads affected by the 1974/5 Daba-dheer (‘long tailed’) drought. Social services and basic infrastructure were expanded, a national university was established, family law was amended giving women more inheritance rights, and an embryonic industrial sector was started.

Despite these accomplishments, the grandiose socialist policies of the regime in the end only served to impoverish rural producers, who formed the majority of the population and the backbone of country’s economy, and intensify economic and social misery. The government Agricultural Development Corporation (ADC) controlled grain market prices and distribution, allowing the farmer to retain only a portion for domestic consumption. The purchase of grain at prices controlled by the government discouraged food production and the country moved from a situation of food surplus to one of food deficit.

Government agencies also had a monopoly on other sectors such as the marketing and export of skins and the importation and distribution of food items. Over time, nationalized enterprises such as SNAI (Societa’ Nazionale Agricola Industriale - The Italian Jawhar Sugar Factory), SEIS (Societa Eletrica Italo-Somaalo - The Italo-Somali Electric Society) , tobacco importers, fuel-oil distributing companies, banks and insurance companies, began to work far below capacity. Nationalization and other economic policies left the country with large deficits and dependent on foreign borrowing and aid. By the 1980s, exports were in serious decline and the economy was characterized by massive corruption and raging hyperinflation. Faced with such troubles, the regime became more repressive. Rather than relying on orientation centres, greater powers were given to internal security forces to pursue its policies. These included the National Security Service (NSS) formed in 1970 from the former intelligence services, the Guulwadayaal (‘Victory Pioneers’) formed in 1973, which provided a community-level system of surveillance. Following Somalia’s defeat in the Somali-Ethiopian Ogaden war in 1978 and in response to internal strife within the army, the state terror agencies increased in number. The Haangash (military intelligence), Koofiyaad Cas (‘Red Berets’ – Presidential Guard), and the investigative organ of the government party (Baadhista xisbiga) were formed to further strengthen the regime’s power base. Repression and the violation of human rights and became the order of the day. A former Police Commander explained the powers of these security organizations: “With the exception of the social organizations, they all had powers of arrest, search and seizure of property, torture and detention with out trial. The social organizations fulfilled the role of intelligence”. (Qalib, 1995)

In a thinly veiled attempt to disguise the dictatorial nature of the military regime, and ostensibly to implement his own brand of socialism, Maxamaad Siyaad Barre founded the Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party (SRSP) in 1976. This involved forming a rubber stamp “Peoples’ Assembly” to legitimise his increasingly dictatorial regime. The purpose was not in fact to enlarge popular participation in public affairs, but strengthen the apparatus of control. Ensuring loyalty to the regime took precedence over development or good governance.

Party and administrative structures were established that linked the grassroots to the office of the President. Every 50 houses in the cities, towns and villages were linked together as a political unit (Tabeela). The next higher level was the Xaafada (‘Quarter’) with an orientation centre for mobilizing the community and spreading propaganda on the successes of the revolution. The regional and district administrations represented the party and were assisted by nominal local councils whose members were also well connected to the SRSP.

Opportunities for corruption proliferated at all levels within both the party and the administration. Despite the government’s declared intent to free the country from ‘clanism’, patronage, favoritism and nepotism were revived and became common practice in government circles. Certain clans were favored and rewarded for backing the regime. Key positions in the administration and the security forces were given to individuals related to the President, many of whom had little or no qualifications for their posts.

Under Barre, the Somali state’s combination of centralization and authoritarianism steadily undermined social and economic development, and incrementally disenfranchised a growing proportion of the population. As one report described, “Somalia’s government under the authoritarian rule of Siyaad Barre systematically shut out community input into the development agenda” (HDR, 1998).

Insurgency and civil war

Somalia’s defeat in the 1977/78 war with Ethiopia over the Ogaden is considered by many analysts as a watershed in Somali history, signalling the end of pan-Somali nationalism and the beginning of the disintegration of the Somali Democratic Republic. From 1978 onwards, the proliferation of clan-based rebel groups kept Somalia in a constant state of political and military turmoil.
* One major consequence of the Ogaden war was a mass influx of mainly ethnic Somali refugees from Ethiopia. The country hosted roughly 1.5 million refugees, representing some 40% of the population of Somalia (Bradbury, 1997). Of the 41 refugee camps throughout Somalia, 12 were located in the Hargeysa-Boraame region (Said S Samatar, 1991). Fear that Isaaq land and rights would be usurped by Ogadeen and the Oromo refugees was one of the causes of the SNM’s challenge to the regime. The refugees caused widespread land degradation, while food aid for the refugees discouraged local farm production. In return for hosting the refugees the regime received a great deal of foreign aid. Much of this was later used to wage war against the armed insurgents and many refugees were recruited by the military to fight, particularly against the SNM in the north.

In April 1978, one month after the ceasefire with Ethiopia, a group of Majeerteen military officers launched an abortive coup, triggering brutal government reprisals in their home regions. These disaffected military officers went on to establish the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) in 1979, which launched attacks against the regime from bases in Ethiopia. The SSDF was followed in 1981 by the formation of the mainly Isaaq Somali National Movement (SNM) in the northwest, and in 1989 by the United Somali Congress (USC, Hawiye) and the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM, Ogadeen).

In response to the SNM uprising, the regime launched both a military and economic war against the Isaaq. The system of Franco valuta, introduced in the 1970s in the north to facilitate trade and commerce, was terminated. In 1983 local qaad farms were burned out and uprooted and northern merchants were refused import-export licenses. As the military situation deteriorated, martial rule and a night-time curfew were imposed in Hargeysa. Civilians suspected of being SNM supporters were subject to arbitrary arrest and detention; torture and summary execution became commonplace. In 1984 the government army massacred civilians in Burco and Hargeysa. In 1988, when the SNM attacked and captured Hargeysa and Burco, the Somali military responded with aerial bombardments of Hargeysa, virtually destroying the towns. People fled to neighbouring countries for refuge. In Ethiopia alone, approximately 360,000 refugees resided in the camps of Awaare, Kaamabokor, Rabbasso, Daroor, Aishaca and Hartasheekha (Said S Samatar, 1991)7.

A gradual intensification of conflict between the disparate rebel forces and the government eventually forced the Barre regime from power on 26th January 1991. As the USC took control of Mogadishu, the SNM took control in the north-west. The SNM The Somali National Movement (SNM), based in Ethiopia, was founded in London in 1981 by a group of former politicians and civil servants. The movement aimed primarily to topple the Siyaad Barre regime and aimed to replace him and his government with a more democratic and decentralized system.

The SNM lacked unifying ideology and was organized essentially as a coalition of sub-clans, each supporting its fighting militia with supplies of food and other resources. This was coupled by contradictions between urban elite from urban centres and the bulk of the fighting forces from nomadic communities whose support the movement desperately needed.

Despite the difficulties and controversy that attended that SNM’s war effort, its decentralised leadership, its democratic transfers of power and its institutionalisation of traditional leadership8 are counted among the SNM’s more valued legacies to post war Somaliland. The SNM’s essentially democratic nature also contributed to the succeed of the Burco peace conference of 1991 and the relatively smooth hand-over of the SNM leadership to a civil administration in May 1993.

The SNM Interim Government

Following their defeat of the Barre forces in January 1991, the first task of the SNM leadership was to seek peace and reconciliation between the northern clans. Between 15 and 27 February 1991, the SNM convened the first of several peace conferences, the ‘Shirka Walaalaynta Beelaha Waqooyi’ (meaning ‘The Brotherhood Conference of the Northern Clans’), which sought to restore trust and confidence between the Isaaq and non-Isaaq clans who had fought on opposing sides during the war. The conference achieved what one observer has described as the SNM’s conciliatory policy of peaceful coexistence between all the clans (Drysdale, 1993).

The Berbera meeting prepared the ground for a larger conference of prominent clan elders and leaders from the north, convened in the city of Burco between 27 April and 18 May 1991. The conference, known as the ‘Grand Conference of Northern Clans’ (Shirweynaha Beelaha Waqooyi), took place in parallel with the meeting of the SNM Central Committee. The purpose of this conference was to continue the process of confidence building among the northern clans and to discuss the destiny of the region. After extensive consultations lasting nearly two months, the clan elders and SNM leaders approved the following resolutions:
* The withdrawal of the former British Somaliland Protectorate from the 1960 union with former Italian Somaliland, and restoration of its sovereignty
* The declaration of the Republic of Somaliland
* The continuation of peace-building in Somaliland.

On May 18, 1991, the SNM Central Committee formally announced the independence of the Republic of Somaliland and the formation of a transitional SNM administration to govern the territory for a two-year period.9 The incumbent SNM chairman, Cabdiraxmaan Axmad Cali ‘Tuur’, an experienced civil servant and diplomat, became President. The decision to withdraw from the union was taken with some reluctance by the SNM leadership (Drysdale 1993) – a reluctance due to their concerns about the state of the devastated country, a fear that international recognition would be difficult to achieve, and the preference of many of the SNM’s senior figures for a federal system of government for Somalia. However, particularly within the Issaq community, the call for independence was deeply popular, and was given urgency by the USC’s unilateral announcement of an interim government for Somalia on 27th January 1991 in Mogadishu.

Cabdiraxmaan Tuur formed his first cabinet at the end of May 1991. This consisted of eighteen Ministers, six of whom were non-Isaaq.10 The new administration faced the daunting task of rebuilding a war-torn country from scratch, with no financial and material resource base to draw on and limited international assistance.

The demobilization and reintegration of militia proved to be a particularly complex and problematic issue. After the defeat of Barre’s forces in 1991, many members of the SNM and clan militias voluntarily demobilized and returned to civilian life. But this spontaneous demobilization was offset by the mushrooming of irregular militias whose members included both war veterans and new recruits seeking to earn a living from banditry and extortion. Many of them occupied checkpoints along the main trade routes between towns, disrupting the flow of people and commercial goods. Some units controlled public facilities, such as ports and airports within their clan territories, collecting revenues and perpetuating insecurity. In 1993 the government of Somaliland estimated the armed clan militiamen to be demobilized and reintegrated at 50,000 (Niyathi, 1995).

Within a year the new administration faced a serious security problem. Unable to control the clan-based militias, the Tuur administration failed to restore law and order or to extend the administration’s authority beyond Hargeysa. The crisis was compounded by a power struggle with the political elite, who manipulated clan loyalties. In the absence of a common foe, cohesion between the Isaaq clans broke down, and competition over public resources became a new source of contention (Farah, 1997).

Wartime rivalries between the civilian and military wings of the SNM resurfaced. One group of SNM military commanders in particular, popularly known as the Calan Cas (Red Flag) faction, felt underrepresented in Tuur’s administration and began to coalesce as an opposition force. The collapse of SNM solidarity in the aftermath of the movement’s victory made it impossible to convene a meeting of the SNM Central Committee during the two-year tenure of the interim administration”.

The central committee was legally bound to meet every six months, though after the take over in 1991 the SNM found difficult to achieve this. In 1992, for example it failed to get a quorum at the May meeting because of difficulties of logistics and partly because of the problems connected with some SNM supporting clans at war in Berbera and reluctance of many members (Gilkes, 1993).

In January 1992 fighting broke out in Burco between two Isaaq clan militias, controlling the east and west halves of the town respectively. The fighting was triggered by the administration’s attempt to organize a national military force and to disarm clan militias. Since Tuur’s administration was locally perceived to be partisan, one part of the Burco community welcomed the force while the other 11 opposed it. The fighting, which lasted one week, displaced virtually the entire population of the town and resulted in hundreds of casualties from both sides. Elders from different regions, including prominent Isaaq elders cooperating with the government, mediated between the parties to restore peace and stability. Women in Hargeysa and Burco made public demonstrations for peace.

The government’s campaign to disarm militias and constitute a national force, however, continued. In March 1992, shortly after the battle in Burco, a government-supported militia force moved to Berbera, triggering a new standoff between pro-government and opposition forces. As in Burco, the population of Berbera was divided in its reaction to the government initiative. Efforts to negotiate a peaceful settlement to t he crisis failed, and fighting broke out in March, causing a mass exodus from the town. The fighting continued sporadically for over six months, until opposition forces managed to expel the pro-government militia from Berbera in October 1992. A special peace committee, known as the Kulanka (‘meeting’) comprising of thirty individuals equally selected from members of the cabinet and the opposition was organized to mediate the conflict. The Kulanka concluded that Berbera port should be placed under government control, but local leaders argued in response that all public facilities in the country should therefore be similarly treated.

The Gadabuursi clan elders, concerned about the potential spread of the war throughout Somaliland and utilizing their neutral status as non-Isaaqs, offered to mediate. Their Guurti 12 brokered an agreement by proposing a formula agreeable to all the parties. This stipulated that all public facilities in Somaliland, including airports, seaports, roads and fuel storage depots should be managed as state property.

The initial Gadabuursi initiative formed the basis for the constitution of a broader Somaliland Guurti. Having resolved the Berbera conflict, they proposed a further conference in the town of Sheekh to complete the peace process. That conference, which took place in October 1992, was attended by the Guurti from all the clans of Somaliland, who jointly brokered an agreement between Berbera’s warring clans. Although, the Kulanka had declared an immediate cease-fire, the Sheekh conference consolidated peace, underpinned by the following resolutions:
* Fixed assets taken during the war must be returned to owners on both sides.
* Militias should be withdrawn from the battlefield.
* All roads must be cleared from armed militias and be opened for traffic, especially the road between Burco and Berbera.
* Prisoners of war must be exchanged.

In addition, a further peace and reconciliation conference was proposed to consolidate the peace and discuss the future of the nation. Boorame was chosen as the location for the conference, because of its enduring stability and because the Gadabuursi clan had played a neutral and central role in reconciling the conflict over Berbera.

The Boorame Peace and Reconciliation Conference, January-May 1993

The 1993 Boorame conference has been described as the watershed of peace making and political development in Somaliland (Farah 1993). The Conference successfully concluded the inter-clan fighting and oversaw the transfer of power from the SNM to a new civilian administration. It also set the direction for governance in Somaliland and established a model for future peace processes in the Somali territories. After five months of serious deliberations the main outcomes of the conference were the following:
* A National Charter for Somaliland was adopted, which served as a working constitution for Somaliland from 1993-1997.
* A Peace Charter for the Somaliland clans was adopted, which laid down provisions for peace agreements to be mediated by the Guurti and set out methods and procedures for conflict resolution.
* A president and a vice president were elected.
* A parliament was formed comprising the 150 voting delegates of the conference.

The success of the Boorame conference can be attributed to a number of elements: the meticulous preparations of the organizing committee (see table 5), the fact that it was largely between them and the SNM’s military and political wings. In the 1990s in Somaliland, the Guurti represents clans in regional and national inter-clan peace conferences.

financed by Somaliland communities,13 and it operated according to a flexible time -frame.

The conference included 150 voting delegates of elders from almost all the clans of Somaliland,14 although an estimated 2,000 people actually attended and were hosted by the Boorame community. The conference lasted for five months, allowing for interventions by religious leaders and other facilitators to break any deadlocks, and for separate clan and subclan meetings to take place as needed.

Table 1. Major Reconciliation Conferences in Somaliland, 1991-97

Clans Meeting place... Duration Name of Meeting

1 National Berbera 15-27 Feb 1991 
The Brotherhood Conference of Northern Clans 
2 National Burco 27 April - 18 May 1991

The Grand Conference of Northern clans

3 Dhulbahante & habarjeclo Yagoori Feb 1991
4 Warsangali &habar-yoonis Yube 18 June Yube I
5 Habar-yoonis & Warsangali Yube 6-9 October 1991 Yube II
6 Habar-yoonis, Habar-jeclo & Dhulbahante

Oog 30 October 1991

7 Warsangali & Habar-jeclo Ceel-Qoxle 10 May 1991
8 Gadabuursi & Isaaq Boorame 17-19 Feb 1991 Guul Alla
9 Baha Samaroon & Jibriil Abokar

Boorame 17-19 Oct 1992

10 Reer Nur & Jibriil Abokor Boorame
11 Habar-Awal & Gadabuursi Haargeysa
10 Dhulbahante & Habarjeclo Kulal/Awrboo

gays 1-22 June 1992

11 Habar-jeclo, Warsangali &Gahayle Shinbiraale 16-22 Aug 1992
12 Dhulbahante & Habar-jeclo Xudun 1 Sept 1992
13 Habar-yoonis & Warsangali Jiidali 5-9 Nov 1993
14 Habar-jeclo, Dhulbahante, Warsangali

& Gahayle Garadag 23 Nov - 1 Dec 1993

15 Warsangali & Gahayle Dararweyne 2 Jan - 5 Feb 1993
16 Sanaag region Ceerigaabo 1993
17 Gadabuursi eastern clans &
Sacadmuuse
18 Gadabuursi & Issa Geerisa
19 Gadabuursi & Issa Agabar
20 Habar Yoonis/Ciisa Musa Sheikh 28 Oct – 8 Nov 1992 Tawfiiq
21 Dhulbahante/ Habar Yoonis Dararweyne 2 Jan - 5 Feb 1993 Khaatumo
22 Warsangali/ Habar

Yoonis Jiideli 6-9 Oct 1992

23 Habar Yoonis/Ciisa Musa Hargeysa 4 Oct 1992
24 Warsangali/Habar-jalo 11-18 Aug 1992
25 National Boorame 24 Jan - May 1993 Allaa Mahadleh
26 National Ceerigaabo
27 Ciidagale Xarshin 1995
28 Ciidagale Kaam-Abokor 1995
29 Habar-yoonis & Habarjeclo Gaashaamo 1996
30 Habar-yoonis & Habar-jeclo Baaldhaye 1996
31 Habar-yoonis & Habar-jeclo Duruqsi 1996
32 Habar-yoonis & Habarjeclo Beer 1996
33 Reer-nuur & Jibriil Abokor Gabilay 1996

The Cigaal Administration, May 1993 to February 1997

On the basis of the interim Charter agreed to at Boorame, a two-year transitional government was formed. On May 5 1993, Maxamad Xaaji Ibraahim Cigaal, a prominent Isaaq politician, and Prime Minister of the last civilian Somali government in 1969, was elected as the President. Cabdiraxmaan Aw Cali Faarax, an SNM colonel from the Gadabuursi clan, was elected as his Vice President.

Importantly, the National Charter defined a hybrid system of government. This comprised a bicameral legislature including an elected House of Representatives and a Council of Elders, or Guurti, a Presidential Executive, and an independent judiciary. 15 The new government differed from the previous SNM administration in two main ways:
* It possessed a broader base in terms of political participation and representation. Although the smaller and minority clans were not represented in the conference, non-Isaaq clans were given better representation compared the previous administration.
* The role of traditional clan leaders was institutionalised in one of the central political institutions of the state, as a check on the executive and the elected representatives. The newly formed government took immediate steps to implement the mandate of the National Charter. The government began by forming a “national army” and disarming clan militias in the western regions (Hargeysa and Awdal). Much progress was achieved, and by by 1995 the national army numbered 5,000 (NDC, 1994). The nucleus of an administration was formed and public sector institutions were revived. An environment favourable for repatriation was created and, with the help of UNHCR, a process of voluntary repatriation from Ethiopia commenced in 1994.

Also in 1994 the government introduced a new Somaliland currency with the assistance of some of the country’s big businessmen. The new currency generated mixed reactions. The government asserted that the issue of new currency was consistent with their mandate to enhance Somaliland’s status as an independent state, while the opposition feared that it would empower the President and his clan. Many Somalilanders consider the new currency as one of the principal causes of the war that erupted in Somaliland in November 1994.

Many others, however, argue that the new Somaliland currency was a turning point for the creation of the Somaliland State, uplifted the rebuilding government institutions, and protected the Somaliland economy from the rampant inflation that subsequently affected the Somali shilling.

The administration of President Cigaal was more inclusive than that of his predecessor in terms of clan participation, both in the Executive and in the Parliament. However, not all grievances had been settled at Boorame and some groups were not yet satisfied by the formula for political representation. Politicians of the Habar Yoonis, the clan of the former President Tuur, almost immediately expressed their dissatisfaction with the election of Cigaal as well as the number of seats accorded the clan in the parliament and the allocation of only one ministry in the cabinet to the clan. Furthermore, the inclusion in Cigaal’s cabinet of members of the Calan Cas, who had opposed Tuur, was seen by some Habar Yoonis political leaders as a provocation. Although, the proportional representation of Isaaq clans in the administration was based on a formula agreed at the 1990 SNM congress in Balligubadle, the Habar Yoonis, having lost the Presidency, now contested their allocation. A Somali proverb described their mood: ‘Libaax laba raqood lagama wada kiciyo’ (‘Do not attempt to make a lion surrender two carcasses.’)

In July 1993, the Habar Yoonis held a conference in Burco, known as ‘Libaan I’, to discuss their political position. The conference concluded by declaring the withdrawal of Habar Yoonis cooperation from the government. The following year, members of the Habar Yoonis opposition organized ‘Libaan II’ – at conference at which it was agreed that the Cigaal government was illegitimate. A group of Garxajis political leaders led by Cabdiraxmaan Tuur subsequently declared themselves in favour of a federation between Somaliland and Somalia, and joined the Muqdisho-based “government” of General Maxamed Faarax Caydiid. Not all Garxajis agreed with the decisions of Liibaan II, which many described as being a political gathering rather than a clan conference, and rejected the alliance with Caydiid. These developments set the stage for a serious military confrontation between the government and an increasingly entrenched opposition.

The peace accords reached at Boorame in 1993 and the new National Charter had given the government control of major public infrastructure. This included Hargeysa airport, which fell within territory controlled by Ciidagale militia associated with the opposition leadership. Extensive talks and consultations between the government and the airport militia failed to persuade the militia to peacefully hand over the airport to government control. Although Ciidagale senior elders worked closely with the government to defuse the crisis, they were unable to persuade either the militia or their political backers to desist from a confrontation.

In November 1994, government forces moved to wrest control of Hargeysa airport from the militia, and fighting erupted. The clashes displaced many people from Hargeysa and divided the city into two halves. The conflict rapidly escalated into a war between the government and its associated clan militias on one side, commonly known as Marya-alool,16 and the opposition militia on the other. In 1995 the fighting spread to Burco: again thousands of people were displaced and the city was extensively mined and destroyed. Despite subsequent characterization of the conflict as a war between the government clan coalition and a Garxajis opposition, it essentially involved only the political leadership and military forces on both sides, and failed to engage their clan “constituencies.”

The government’s term ended in the middle of the conflict. In order to avoid a political vacuum, it was extended by the Parliament for another one and half years, from September 1995. Neither the government nor the opposition was able to win a decisive victory and in the end this induced the government to seek a peaceful solution. Without a formal ceasefire agreement between the warring parties, Somaliland’s second civil war was brought to an end by a series of inter-clan conferences,17 which culminated in the second national Shirbeeleed held in Hargeysa between December 1996 and February 1997.18

The Hargeysa Peace and Reconciliation Conference, October 1996-February 1997

The Hargeysa Shir-beeleed signalled the formal conclusion of the 1994-6 war. Like Boorame the conference employed the Beel system of representation to work out a new power-sharing formula – one that addressed the grievances of the opposition, particularly the Habar Yoonis among the Garxajis19. This conference also benefited the minorities. The Habar Yoonis clan gained five more seats in Parliament. Cigaal also gave them four cabinet posts and several assistant ministerial posts. The Madigaan, Akisho, Abba-yoonis, Gurggure, Jibraa’iil, Gahayle, Gabooye and the Carab minority clans who were not represented at Boorame, were given representation in the parliament through the addition of nine new seats.

The differences between the 1993 Boorame conference and the 1997 Hargeysa conference are noteworthy. Unlike Boorame, the Hargeysa meeting was organized and funded by the government. Whereas 150 delegates took part in the Boorame conference, Hargeysa was attended by a total of three hundred and fifteen delegates. These comprised the one hundred fifty parliamentary members who had been named at Boorame, plus one hundred and sixty five new delegates representing all the clans of the Somaliland20.

Instead of bringing about a change of leadership, the Hargeysa conference reinstated the incumbent President and Parliament. In February 1997, the conference re-elected Cigaal as President and named Daahir Rayaale Kaahin as the new Vice President21 for a term of five years. It also appointed the 164 members of House of Representatives and House of Guurti for a further five years and six years respectively.

Finally, the conference replaced the National Charter with a provisional constitution, which had been a bone of contention between the Executive and the House of Representatives during the previous term (see the section on the Constitution below). This provisional document stipulated the validation of the constitution by referendum, the introduction of a multiparty political system, and the holding of elections within the term of office of the new administration. Critics of the Hargeysa conference have described it as an undemocratic exercise dominated by one circle within the political elite. Allegations that the process was heavily manipulated by the incumbent government and its supporters damaged perceptions of the viability of the shir beeleed as a vehicle for democratic political change and highlighted the necessity of exploring alternatives.

Despite these shortcomings, the successful completion of the Hargeysa conference enabled Somaliland’s political, economic and social reconstruction to continue. In the years following the conference, significant progress was made in a number of important ways. Peace and stability were consolidated and government administration was extended to much of Togdheer and Sanaag regions in eastern Somaliland, areas that previous administrations had failed to reach. The prevalence of peace and stability attracted both international assistance and private investment to Somaliland and cooperation between the government and foreign aid agencies improved, albeit modestly. More than 60 or so international agencies operate in Somaliland. Generally in Somalia, Donors adopted ‘peace dividend’ approach, conditioning aid on security and good governance, a policy aimed to invest in the more politically stable areas of the former Somalia. “The restoration of security in Somaliland is reflected in the larger proportions of international aid channeled to the region since 1997 and the reorientation of aid programs from rehabilitation to development” (HDR, 2001). A more efficient administration oversaw an increase in annual revenues from $20 million to $37 million over the period in 1999 to 2001. The government managed to pay off its internal debts and balance its budget, even as it strengthened government ministries and para-statal agencies.

The re-imposition of a ban on Somali livestock by Saudi Arabia slashed Somaliland’s export earnings and government revenues. Household incomes also suffered, particularly in pastoral areas. The lion’s share of government revenue continued to be absorbed by security needs. According to government figures, in 1999 almost 83% of the national budget was dedicated to the security forces and general administration. Only 10% remained for social spending, while 7% was allocated for ‘economic’ purposes (WSP/SCPD, 2000). The proportion of security spending increased again in 2001, against a significantly smaller absolute budget.

Somaliland continued to face political challenges to its authority from the Puntland administration, which laid claim to parts of eastern Sanaag and Sool regions, and the newly established administration in Muqdisho, which enjoyed a limited degree of international recognition as a Transitional National Government claiming jurisdiction over both Somalia and Somaliland. Against this backdrop, Somaliland entered the most difficult and delicate stage of its political transition.

The Constitution and the Legalization of Political Parties

On May 31st 2001, Somaliland’s provisional constitution was approved through a general referendum, superseding the National Charter agreed to at Boorame in 1993, and signaling the transition from the beel system to a multiparty system of government. The preparation of the constitution had been long delayed by a disagreement over the respective responsibilities of the legislature and the executive. The 1993 National Charter had given legislature the responsibility for formulating the new constitution, while the executive was given powers of execution. In January 1994, the House of Representatives nominated 10 members from the House and appointed a secretary to draft the Somaliland Constitution. A consultative body of 25 members representing all regions of the country and various groups of society advised this committee. This body consisted of five categories: traditional elders, politicians, judges/lawyers, cultural experts and religious leaders. However, later that year the President also contracted a Sudanese lawyer to draft a new constitution, triggering a direct confrontation with the legislature. Predictably, the main difference between the drafts lay in the balance of powers between the legislature and the executive: the parliament’s draft gave more powers to the former, and the president’s draft favoured the latter.

By 1996, the dispute had created such a serious split within the House of Representatives that the legislature almost collapsed. According to one analyst: “Government loyalists unconstitutionally chose a new speaker of the House of Representatives; the opposition lost the game and the house speaker associated with the opposition lost his post”. The constitutional process became deadlocked.

In 1997 the Hargeysa conference briefly overcame the stalemate by combining the two drafts and producing a new provisional constitution. However, Cigaal was not satisfied with the hybrid draft, complaining that “the constitution has been skewed”(‘Distoorkii laaxin baa galay’) according to one workshop participant. The process remained at an impasse until the year 2000 when a 45-person joint committee from the executive and the legislature together reviewed amendments of the provisional constitution proposed by the executive. The Parliament approved the final version after it received additional powers over finance and approval of public appointments.

A national referendum on the constitution was initially scheduled to take place in March 2001, when provisional constitution was due to expire. Anticipating delays in the preparation of the referendum, however, led the legislature extended the viability of the provisional constitution for a further six months, beginning 17th March 2001. The referendum took place two months later on 31st May 2001. Official figures indicated that 1.18 million people voted and that the constitution was approved by 96.65% of the vote. Approval of the constitution paved the way for local government elections, leading to general parliamentary and presidential elections. Initially, these were scheduled to take place before the expiry of the government’s term on 23 February 2002. However, by August 2001, several important pieces of legislation necessary for the establishment of a multiparty system and for the conduct of fair elections had still not been prepared. These included laws pertaining to the formation of an Electoral Commission, confirmation of regional and district administrative units, demarcation of electoral constituencies, voter registration and citizenship laws.

On 6th August 2000, the parliament passed Law No. 14 (Xeerka Nidaamka Axsaabta), which legalized the formation of “political organizations22. A total of 7 organizations registered themselves under the new law before the pre -election deadline of 23 February 2002 (see the section below on political parties).

An Electoral Law was subsequently approved on 14 November 2001, establishing the legal basis for appointment of an Electoral Commission, which took place on 18 December. The following day, just one day before the scheduled date of municipal elections (20 December 2001), the Commission convened for the first time and announced the postponement of the electoral process. These difficult circumstances persuaded the Guurti to extend the incumbent President’s mandate by a further 12 months (until February 2003) in order to allow elections to take place. At the same time, the Guurti recommended prolongation of the registration period for political organizations in order that as yet unregistered parties be permitted to contest the elections.

On 5 May 2002, President Cigaal died while on a private visit to South Africa. In accordance with the Constitution, Vice President, Daahir Rayaale Kahiin was immediately named as his successor for the remainder of the Presidential term. Cigaal’s demise unexpectedly created national mood of unity and reconciliation and persuaded many of his former political rivals to rejoin the political process. Two political organizations took advantage of the newly extended deadline for registration: ASAD, which had refused to register itself with the government, alleging that free and fair elections were not possible under Cigaal’s leadership; and KULMIYE, which was formed after Cigaal’s death. In other respects, planning for the electoral process remained unchanged.

Laws concerning citizenship, regional and district administrations and councils and demarcation of district electoral constituencies were approved between March and June 2002. As of July 2002, laws on voter registration and the demarcation of electoral constituencies (for Parliamentary elections) remained incomplete. Other major hurdles to be overcome included mobilizing the financial resources, organizational capacity and technical expertise to manage successful voter registration and electoral exercises. Political and regional differences, clan perceptions of power sharing, and a low level of voter education, also threatened to complicate the conduct of elections.

In July 2002, with less than seven months remaining the government’s term of office, specific challenges to the integrity of the electoral process included the following.
* The members of the Electoral Commission and other electoral officials lack experience and training in the management of elections. Likewise, the public and the members of political parties are largely unaware of the laws and procedures governing the electoral process. Yet Somaliland lacks the resources and expertise required for training of electoral officials or large scale voter education programmes.
* Electoral census and voter registration pose particularly thorny challenges, especially in the absence of a clear legal definition of citizenship and a chronic lack of resources;
* The National Alliance Democratic Party (UDUB) includes the current President as well as numerous Ministers, members of Parliament, and government officials and has developed a proprietary attitude towards political leadership, without having been given an electoral mandate. This has created the public perception that UDUB already perceives itself as a ruling party and seeks to use the advantages of “incumbency” to remain in power. This suggests unfortunate parallels with de facto one-party states elsewhere in the region;
* Together, the Constitution and Electoral Law appear to contain a number of inherent contradictions pertaining to the conduct of free and fair elections: the threeparty limit arguably contradicts the Constitution’s guaranteed freedom of political association; the electoral law’s stipulation that political parties must obtain 20% of the vote in all regions of the country is intended to prevent parties from forming on the basis of clan. But the threshold appears so unrealistically high as to be virtually impossible (except in a de facto one party state), and may in any case contain a number of loophole that render the measure meaningless.
* Disputes over electoral constituencies (regions and districts) persist in many areas, and have been an ongoing point of contention between the executive and legislative branches.

In sum Somaliland’s political transition faces numerous political, legal, social, technical and financial challenges. Even if these can be overcome in the short-term, a long-term effort will be required to transform one successful election into a stable democratic political system.

Structure of the Somaliland State

Executive (Cabinet)
House of Elders (Aqalka Guurtida)
House of Representatives (Aqalka Wakiilada)
Legislative
Justice Commitee
Courts Judiciary
Vice President
President

”The Beel System”

Since the adoption of the National Charter in 1993 Somaliland has practiced a hybrid system of governance that combines a Somali beel (clan-based) system of political representation with modern western-style institutions of government. The main characteristic of the beel is to ensure that all clans are represented, with the primary purpose of maintaining peace and security. The workshop on Political Representation held at Hargeysa in November 2000 examined this system of governance. This section reviews the various arguments for and against the different models of government, examining the extent to which they adequately meet people’s rights and needs for political representation.

During the workshop, the history of governance in Somalia and Somaliland was discussed in depth. Two schools of thought emerged from the debate. One school advocated the continuation of the hybrid system of governance until Somaliland matures and becomes more experienced in modern forms of government. The second school argued for a transition away from the beel system to a modern form of government. The experimentation in a hybrid system of governance, it argued, had served its purpose in the immediate postwar era, but was inadequate for dealing with the future challenges of nation building and development. Undue emphasis on clan participation, it was argued, hampers the efforts of the administration.

The current government has decided to pursue the ideas of the second school and has begun the transition to multiparty system of political representation characterized by regular competitive elections. A new constitution which lays the foundations of the new system was finalized and approved in a nation-wide referendum on 31st of May 2001. The Parliament passed legislation allowing the formation of political parties in August 2001, and elections are scheduled to take place by February 2003.

State Organization in Somaliland The SNM constitution institutionalised the role of clan leaders within the movement and ensured them a role in any future government. The interim National Charter of Boorame represented a further development of this model, defining a hybrid form of government in which a clan-based system of representation was integrated with western-style political institutions within three branches of government - the legislature, the executive and the judiciary. The state is led by an executive President elected for a five year term, who nominates a cabinet that is subject to the approval of the Parliament. The judiciary is constitutionally independent of the executive. The legislature consists of a bicameral Parliament including an Upper House of Elders (Golaha Guurtida) and a House of Representatives (Golaha Wakiilada).

Under the beel system, clan representation was explicit in the composition of the parliament (both the Upper and Lower Houses) and in the Executive, but not in the judiciary. This section will examine the features of this system and the adjustments implied by a shift to multiparty democracy.

The Executive

In theory, the representation of Somaliland’s various clans in both Houses of Parliament should have reduced the pressure for a representative Executive, permitting the nomination of a lean, professional (or technocratic) cabinet. This expectation was captured in President Cigaal’s first public speech in May 1993, when he said: “We need to set up a very small cabinet, but efficient. I promise to form a cabinet which is not more than twelve ministers”.

Since then, the cabinet has grown to more than twice that optimistic figure. Between 1993 and 2001 the number of ministers increased from 15 to 26. When Ministers, Vice Ministers and Ministers of State are all taken into account, the total number of ministerial-level appointments in the government totals 42.

The driving force behind this inflationary pattern of appointments is that the President is under pressure to consider the clan balance of his cabinet, and that cabinet posts were therefore created to satisfy clan demands. Satisfying these demands for representation, and thus maintaining peace and stability during a delicate political transition has been given precedence – out of necessity, some would argue - over the competence and efficiency of the executive. This argument was later used by the President himself as a justification for the number and character of his cabinet appointments: There is not a single minister I have appointed who was not recommended to me by a clan or sub-clan head. I am not selective about the cabinet, what matters is the solution […] They may not be the best but they are the solution. [Waa xale xul maaha].

Some workshop participants supported this view, arguing that clan is not the only criteria for cabinet selection: qualifications, professionalism and experience are considered to the extent that circumstances allow. As one political observer argued, “The president usually considers the beel arrangement, but many people of high calibre are nevertheless included in his cabinet”.

Critics, argue that such appointments are unnecessary, suggesting that the President exploits cabinet appointments for narrow political ends rather than to serve the public good. Naming ministers from a given clan can be a device to win support for the government’s policies within that constituency, or to appease, divide and undermine opponents from that same clan. They provide opportunities for the distribution of government largesse through jobs, contracts and projects. Valid though these criticisms may be, they seem to suggest that clanbased patronage is necessarily more pernicious than distributive patronage systems based on regional or party affiliations in other countries – a proposition that merits further investigation.

The sharp divergence of opinion on this issue tends to obscure the fact that proponents and critics of clan-based representation in the Executive may both be justified. There is no doubt that the multiplication of political appointments within the Executive offers ample opportunity for the manipulation of clan loyalties and the distribution of political patronage. On the other hand, public opinion in Somaliland remains highly attuned to the issue of clan representation within the cabinet, and the Chief Executive ignores such perceptions at his own peril.

One of the more undesirable effects of the proliferation of Ministries has been the significant proportion of public expenditure directed towards an overstaffed and underqualified government bureaucracy. General administration absorbs roughly 7% of the annual budget, in addition to the 83% required for the security forces. This leaves less than 10% for social spending and development.

The multiplication of ministries is only part of the problem. Even at lower levels with the administration, sensitivities about clan representation contribute to overstaffing, underemployment and inefficiency. Appointments of Directors General, heads of autonomous state enterprises, and the commanders of the security forces are made with no lesser reference to clan representation than cabinet ministers. Selection of even junior personnel often depends on the weight and leverage of the candidate’s clan. At this level, however, workshop participants were almost unanimous in their assessment that the Beel system of politics is an obstacle to the recruitment of competent personnel in government departments and the development of an effective administration.

Interestingly, workshop participants generally assigned the blame for the corruption of the appointments system with lineage chiefs and clan elders, rather than with government officials. As one participant put it: “Imagine a Suldaan or a chief always taking his people to a boss for employment, regardless of their ability and professional status. This impedes nation building.” Another participant, himself a political leader noted: “It is common that a public employee who has been expelled for maladministration gets reinstated because of the pressure from his clan”. The Minister of Interior concurred, describing in his intervention a community that had rejected a qualified nominee for the post of Mayor because he was from a minority clan in that particular district. His conclusion: “Clanism only suffocates competence.”

A final criticism was that the beel system had implicitly justified discrimination against women within the Executive. Women’s subordinate public status within the clan meant that they were less likely to be nominated for posts at any level. Only one woman has served at cabinet level since 1991 and there have been no female Directors General or Directors. The vast majority of women in government administration hold clerical or secretarial responsibilities, although many women in the private sector and non-governmental organizations occupy more senior positions.

One positive development cited by workshop participants has been the activation of the Civil Service Commission since early 2000. The Commission is responsible for the screening and grading of government personnel through competitive examinations. Between 2000 and 2002, 6,000 government employees sat for those exams, nearly nearly 80% of whom passed were graded as shown in table 2 below.

Table 2: Personnel evaluation exams and Salary scales

Total No. Sat for Exams No. Succeeded No. released Total
6000 4632 1368 6000
Divisions
A. 891 B. 2037 C. 806 D. 898 4632
Salary scales/steps
A B C D -A1-A9 B6-B10 C7-C11 D11-D15 -

The House of Guurti

The Guurti is the highest organ of the state, defined in the transitional National Charter as an independent council consisting of 82 elders nominated by their respective clans for a six-year term (the current term began in February 1997). The Guurti could also include honorary members such as former presidents and vice presidents. The responsibilities of the Guurti were framed by the experience of civil strife under the first SNM-led administration, and thus defined in the transitional Charter as follows:
* Protect the values of Somaliland customary law and the Islamic faith
* Protect national security by maintaining peace and managing conflicts With the introduction of the Somaliland Constitution (Article 61), these duties were superseded by new powers and the responsibilities of the Guurti, defined as follows:
1. The initiation of legislation relating to religion, traditions (culture) and security.
2. With the exception of financial legislation, the review of legi slation approved by the House of Representatives, it may refer back, with written reasons of its views, any such legislation to the House of Representatives only once within 30 (thirty) days beginning from the date when the relevant legislation was forwarded to the office of the Speaker of the House of Elders.
3. Advice on the shortcomings of the administration of the Government and the presentation of such advice to the House of Representatives.
4. Assistance to the Government in matters relating to religion, security, defence, traditions (culture), economy and society, whilst consulting the traditional heads of the communities.
5. The summoning of the members of the Government and putting questions to them about the fulfilment of their duties.
6. The House of Elders shall also have the power to put to the House of Representatives proposals for projects so that the House of Representatives can debate and reach resolutions thereof.

Workshop participants acknowledged the Guurti’s central role in peace building in the early years of Somaliland’s development. The chief secretary of the Guurti asserted that they had “filled the government vacuum in the early 1990s” when the interim SNM government failed to provide law and order. The role of the Guurti was then institutionalized at Boorame conference as clan representatives in the parliament and the National Charter gave them a constitutional role as legislators.

However, the Guurti’s role in latter years became a topic of some controversy, particularly with respect to the 1994-6 war and its aftermath. Critics contended that the Guurti had abandoned its neutrality and sided with the government, postponing a peaceful settlement.

By way of reply, members of the Guurti argued that they had indeed worked actively for peace throughout the conflict, citing the Xarshin peace initiative of June 1995, which brought together leaders of the Hargeysa community. The positive outcome of this conference encouraged the return of many displaced people to Hargeysa. While it is certainly true that members of the Guurti participated in the peace process as individuals, the Guurti as an institution did not provide the expected leadership: the Xarshin conference and subsequent peace meetings in Burco were organized by local elders and ordinary citizens, not by the Guurti. These local initiatives laid the foundation for peace, which the government would later build on at the Hargeysa shir-beeleed. of 1996-7.

While criticized for their role during the 1994-1996 war, members of the Guurti were credited by workshop participants with having successfully reconciled numerous smaller clan conflicts resulting from land disputes, thefts and killings in all regions of Somaliland. Specific examples include the long-running dispute at Tog-wajaale over Qadowga farmland, and also at Burco, where members of the Guurti spent periods of two months and six months in 1997 and 1998 respectively solving a series of problems, including some 47 cases of looting, deaths, injuries and land disputes. The resolution of these disputes in 1997 gave impetus to the formation of the first municipal government in Burco town since the war.

A more general criticism of the Guurti by participants in the research process concerned its conservatism and limited initiative. In the seven years since it was established the Guurti has initiated only one piece of legislation (its own internal regulations notwithstanding). This concerned the maintenance of peace and preservation of culture, and by mid-2001 had still not become law.

Numerous workshop participants argued that the Guurti demonstrates insufficient independence from the executive. Possible measures were proposed to enhance the Guurti’s independence. These included legislative training, harmonization of modern parliamentary procedures and traditional Xeer, and improved remuneration. Some participants further proposed that the Guurti’s independence would be strengthened were membership of the Guurti to be a position for life, but the Constitution currently specifies that the Guurti’s term of office shall be six years.

The most controversial issue concerned the process for nominating members of the Guurti. Participants in the study offered three recommendations on this point:
1. The continuation of the system of nomination, on condition that Somaliland clans be equitably represented in the House. This form of representation, they argued, is broad-based and inclusive, even of minorities. Exponents of this view proposed, however, that the mandate and power of the House of the Guurti should be more clearly defined, avoiding overlaps between the functions of the Guurti and the House of Representatives.
2. Members of the Guurti should be elected, since this would make them accountable to their constituents rather than to the Executive.
3. The Guurti should be dissolved and its legislative functions transferred to the parliament. Proponents of this opinion held that the Guurti is no longer needed in Somaliland, since peace and stability have been attained and the institutions of government established.

The House of Representatives

The House of Representative comprises 85 members, appointed through clan nomination for a period of a five-years, ending May 2002. The general functions of the lower House are to:
* Represent the interests of their clan constituencies.
* Propose, debate and enact the legislative and fiscal laws.
* Confirm the appointment by the executive of certain categories of public servants.

Article 53 of the Constitution states that the specific powers and responsibilities of the House Representatives are as follows:
1. All appointments of Ministers, Deputy Ministers or Heads of the organs of the state shall be subject to confirmation by the House of Representatives in accordance with the Constitution.
2. The House of Representatives shall also have power to debate, comment on, refer back with reasons or approve the programme of the Government.
3. The House of Representatives shall ratify international agreements (treaties) such as political, economic and security agreements or those agreements which impose new financial burdens which have not been covered in the Budget, or which will involve the promulgation or amendment of legislation.
4. The House of Representatives shall submit to the Council of Government (the Cabinet) advice and recommendations about the direction of the general political situation.
5. The Council of Government (the Cabinet) shall seek the approval of both Houses (the House of Representatives and the House of Elders) for the imposition of a state of emergency in either the whole of the country or parts of it.
6. The House of Representatives shall have the power to summon the Government or its organs or agencies in order to question them about the fulfilment of their responsibilities.
7. The Committees of the House of Representatives shall have the power to question Ministers, Heads of the state organs or agencies or other senior national officers, whose duties are relevant to them, about the fulfillment of their duties.

From May 1997 to March 2002, the House of Representatives convened 16 sessions and passed only 22 pieces of legislation. 23 Members of the House initiated none of these pieces of legislation; the Executive had prepared them all. Some important legislation relating to electoral procedures and the formation of regional and district administrations has been seriously delayed. Routine activities of the house included approval of budgets, issuing resolutions, official inquiries, and approval of government higher officials and meeting delegations. The House’s main achievement during this time was the completion and approval of the constitution, thus paving the way for the transition from the Beel-based system of governance to a multi-party system.

The House’s shortcomings are the product of a number of factors. These include the lack of experience and qualifications of its members, and the vulnerability of members to external pressures. Members of the House of Representative are required to have completed at least a secondary school education. Most claim to satisfy this criterion (see table below), but due to the collapse of academic institutions during the war there is a possibility that some academic qualifications may not be genuine.

Table 2: Qualifications of Members of the House of Representatives,
1997-2001 Secondary education Equivalent Graduates Post graduates
Number 26 34 13 9

* Source: Chief Secretary of the House, April 2000

Only a few members who have any previous parliamentary experience, and few of those have experience of democratic governance.24 The majority of members of the House have gained considerable experience during the transitional period, as over 50% of them have been in the House since 1993, but whether this has or not appreciably improved the House’s performance is open to question.

It is difficult to measure the degree to which external pressures – from the Executive, clan constituencies etc. – may have undermined the conduct of Members of the House. In the public’s perception, however, parliamentarians are so easily swayed that they have earned the nickname Dhaameel,25 implying that they are little more than puppets of more powerful interests. Table 3: Distribution of the seats in the House of Representatives by sub-clan

Clans & Sub clans Year No. of Seats..Year No. of Seats... No. Re-
Elected....No. of New Members... Total
Habar Tol-jeclo 1993 11 1997 11 9 2 11
Gadabuursi  11 11   8  3 11
Dhulbahante 10 10   1  9 10
Habar Yonis 4 7 0 7 7
Arab       7 7 1 6 7
Issa       5 5 5 0 5
Cidagale   5 5 3 2 5
Warsangali 5 5 5 0 5
Cimraan    3 3 2 1 3
Ayuub      3 3 2 1 3
Tol-jecle  3 3 2 1 3
Habar awal 8 8 5 3 8
Minorities 0 4 0 4 4
Total      75 82 43 39 82

Source: Chief Secretary of the House of Representatives, 2000.

Table 4: Distribution of the seats in the House of Representatives by Region

Region Year No. of Seats.. Year No. of Seats... No. Re-elected.. No.
New Members... Total
Awdal 1993 16 1997 16 13 3 16
North-west 23 23 14 9 23
Saaxil     5 7 1 6 7
Togdheer   17 20 8 12 20
Sool       6 6 1 5 6
Sanaag     8 10 4 6 10
Total      75 82 41 41 82

In view of these constraints, workshop participants thought it important to build the institutional capacity of the Parliament. The Deputy Speaker of the House of Representatives acknowledged the House’s responsibility in holding up important pieces of legislation, notably the electoral laws, which have been with Parliament for over a year, and the legislation on the formation of regional and district administrations, which has been held up over concerns about constituency boundaries and populations. In his words “for this we [the House of Representatives] have to be blamed”.26

The Shir-Gudoon

The system of representation is a key element in the development of political institutions. Somaliland’s relatively successful utilization of the beel system and its planned transition to a multiparty electoral system thus merits close examination. Since 1993, nomination to the Somaliland Parliament (the Guurti and the Wakiilo) has been based on clan consensus. The Parliamentary representatives were nominated at two Shirbeeleedyo in 1993 and 1997. At these conferences, the Shir -gudoon (‘chairing committee’) was assigned responsibility for administering the nomination of representatives. The selection of the members of the shirgudoon was thus the first step in establishing the integrity of the selection process.

The selection of the Shir-gudoon members has traditionally been an integral part of the preparatory arrangements for a Shir-beeleed. The Shir-gudoon for 1993 Boorame conference was selected by elders at the Sheekh peace conference, several months previously. In 1997, however, the Shir -gudoon at the Hargeysa conference was a combination of members of the existing parliament and important individuals selected by the governme nt.

Table 5: Chairing Committee of the Boorame and Hargeysa Conferences Chairing Committee of the Boorame Conference... Chairing Committee of the Hargeysa Conference

Title Clan Title Clan
Chairman Isaaq/H/Awal Chairman Isaaq/H/Awal
Member Isaaq/Ayuub Vice Chairman Isaaq/Ayuub
Member Issaq/H/Awal Member Issaq/H/Awal
Member Gadabursi/H/Cafan Member Isaaq/Garxajis
Member Harti/Warsangali Member Isaaq/Tol-jecle
Member Isaaq/H/Jeclo Member Isaaq/Cimraan
Member Isaaq/Garxajis Member Gadabursi/M/hiil
Member Harti/Dhulbahante Member Harti/Dhulbahante
Member Harti/Warsangali
Member Isaaq/Garxajis
Member Isaaq/Arab
Member Isse
Member Isaaq/H/Jeclo

In contrast the Hargeysa conference was organized and funded by the government and as such was seen as a one-sided political exercise that undermined fair competition. Some participants questioned the neutrality of the Shir-gudoon and criticized it for being partisan towards the government. Government involvement in the 1997 conference meant that members of the Parliament were not all nominated by the will of the clans. For-example, the Shir-gudoon of 1993 and 1997 both received conflicting lists of nominees submitted by different Caaqilo, Suldaano and Garaaddo of the same clan. Participants asserted that the Hargeysa Shir Gudoon chose those members who were pro government. The neutrality and credibility of the Shir -Gudoon was, therefore, questioned by participants. One remarked, “They underwent an oath but failed to fulfill it”. Such concerns affected the credibility of the conference and its outcome.

In one particularly controversial case, the Shir-Gudoon at the 1997 conference rejected a list of parliamentary candidates submitted by prominent Garaado of Sool region and accepted instead lists from less prominent traditional leaders. Those Garaado whose lists were rejected felt humiliated and withdrew their support from Somaliland. The Shir-Gudoon, on the other hand, attributed the problem to the proliferation of traditional authorities. One workshop participant complained that “an illiterate individual from my clan was chosen instead of me with better experience and qualification”.

The neutrality of the Shir Gudoon was also questioned for its role in the nomination of the president in 1997. At the conference, the organizing committee sided with the incumbent president. As there were 25 members of the Shir Gudoon and they all participated in the vote, this represented a large proportion of the voting delegates. Workshop participants argued that they should not have participated in the voting, but should have remained independent. “Those who administered and organized the shir-beeleed were also taking part in the voting”, said a participant. Participants in th study agreed that this kind of government intervention damaged the credibility of the Shir-Gudoon and can lead to tension and in-fighting within the clan.

Representation in the Beel System: The Nomination Process

In 1993 the 150 delegates attending the Boorame conference were automatically, and equally, divided into the two houses of the parliament, thus determining the system of representation for the next three years. This formula, and the lack of criteria for nomination of representatives, reflected the urgency of the need for a government at short notice. A few clans later changed representatives whom they were unhappy with. At the time there was little interest in joining the Parliament. Many people did not expect the government to last long and few people thought that there would be any benefits associated with being a Member of Parliament. As a result, there was no competition for seats and the competence of members of the House were not an issue.

At the 1997 conference in Hargeysa, lessons had been learnt from the preceding conference, and criterion for nomination to Parliament were established:27

1. The House of Representatives
* A member of the House of Representatives must be a Somalilander.
* Anyone with a secondary education is eligible to become a member. (see table on qualifications of the current representatives)

2. The House of Elders (Guurti)
* Good command of the customary law.
* Good knowledge of Islam.

Theoretically, these criteria should have been respected when clans nominated their representatives to the two Houses in 1997. The system, however, has proven susceptible to manipulation, with influential figures in both the clan and the government attempting to bend the nomination process to their own purposes. Knowledge and professional experience are often disregarded in favour of clan or sub-clan affiliation, a practice that discourages fair competition, fails to reward individual merit, without necessary solving problems of equity between clans, regions, urban and rural populations and gender.

One contributing factor is that the system of nomination from within clans lacks transparency. Clans do not necessarily consult all their members on the nomination of their members of parliament. Instead, urban-based clan leaders and self-styled ad hoc committees tend to dominate the nomination process. Powerful associates of clan leaders - Af-miinshaaro (self-appointed ‘political brokers’ or ‘spin doctors’) - often influence the selection procedure.

Parliamentary representatives may therefore owe their position not to clan consensus but rather to a small, “elite” group, thus becoming dependent on such ‘King-makers’. The concept of laandheeranimo can also play an important role in the nomination process. For, example, the issue of laandheere (the largest or longest lineage) and laangaab (the smaller or shortest lineage) is considered crucial in terms of power sharing. Individuals from the laandheer lineage tend to enjoy an advantage in the nomination process over people from laangaab, regardless of who is more qualified.

In general, workshop participants agreed that the beel-based system of nomination often excludes suitable candidates and offers excessive scope for manipulation by special interests. This they blamed to a large extent on the politicisation of traditional leadership, which began under the British colonial administration and continued under subsequent Somali governments. This process of politicisation involved the creation of titled leaders, such as Caaqilo and Suldaano, and their incorporation into the administration as tools of the government.

Workshop participants argued that the creation of new traditional leaders has been practised since the British Colonial Administration and accelerated during the Barre period and under the current Somaliland administration (see table 6, below). The trend has been most visible since 1997, when the government was seeking support for an extension of its term. Some participants alleged that inducements such as appointments of new salaried Caaqilo and Suldaano were offered by the government to its supporters, and new districts created in order to win the support of local groups. One participant commented that: “These steps were taken to influence the outcome [of the 1996-7 Hargeysa Conference] and to appease particular clans”. Participants described other irregularities, such as the expulsion of some conference delegates and their replacement by other members of the same clan who were thought to be loyal to the government. The Executive’s perceived influence in the nomination process was described by participants as having contributed to diminished public trust in the parliament and a depreciation in the quality of representation. Workshop participants recommended that, in future, the competence and qualifications of the prospective members of Parliament should be given due consideration during their nomination, regardless of which system of representation (beel-system or multi-party electoral system) is in place.

Table 6: Salaried traditional leaders in Somaliland

S.No Period Number of chiefs formed
Salaried Nonsalaried Total % Increase
1 1880s-1960 British colonial Administration 145 145 - 145
2 1960-1969 Civilian Period                  60  205 - 205 41
3 1969-1990 Military regime                  130 335 - 335 38.8
4 1991- Since restoration of independence    87  422 - 180* 602 44

* Although they are presently unsalaried, these Caaqilo are officially registered.

Power Sharing and Equity

The unequal distribution of national resources, a key grievance against the previous regime has not been resolved by the beel system. Public concerns have emerged in Somaliland over apparent disparities in the distribution of national wealth between clans, regions, urban and rural areas and gender, which contribute to uneven human development. Paucity of demographic data compounds the problem, undermining confidence in the current formula for representation. Instead, the beel system is widely perceived as serving the interests of a narrow, urban-based male political “elite” whose priorities are broadly unrepresentative of those of the nation.

The current distribution of seats in the legislature was arbitrarily decided by traditional leaders at successive Somaliland peace conferences, in order to achieve a consensus among the different clans. Consequently every beel is actually represented in the current Parliament (see table 3) – an important concession to peacebuilding. But few beel, if any, are satisfied with their allocation. “Powerful clans want more seats and less powerful or powerless clans are deprived and unable to obtain their political rights” one participant noted. The most critical power sharing issue since 1991 has been within the Isaaq. The prevailing power sharing formula was agreed at the Balligubadle SNM congress in 1990; it was retained during the nomination of Isaaq representatives to the Boorame conference, and also to the two chambers of parliament established at Boorame. However, disputes over the validity of this power-sharing arrangement lay at heart of the civil war in the mid-1990s, and were only practically resolved at the 1997 Hargeysa conference, where the Habar Yoonis clans were given some additional seats. Whereas the smaller Isaaq sub-clans feel that each of the subclans of Sheekh Isxaaq is derived from his eight sons and therefore should receive an equal share of parliamentary seats, the numerically larger Isaaq sub-clans tend to feel that they are under-represented within this system, while smaller clans are over-represented.

This particular problem is in part related to the problematic concepts of laandheere and laangaab. Laandheere clans claim the right to greater representation than laangaab, but these labels are highly subjective. The terminology of laandheere and laangaab is of no use in determining the size of clans proportional to one another, and gives rise to endless disputes. Problems of representation are not limited to the Isaaq clans. Disputes also exist between the Isaaq and the non-Isaaq, and between the non-Isaaq themselves. Representation issues come into play when, for example, the Gadabuursi assess their share of representation vis-àvis the Dhulbahante, or the Warsangali vis-a-vis the Ciise. Such calculations also take place between sub-clans e.g. within the Dhulbahante or within the Gadabuursi.

Many non-Isaaqs lack confidence in the current system and in the notion of an independent Somaliland. As one participant put it: “The law of zero-sum describes well this calculus: what is perceived as success by many Isaaqs in a separate Somaliland is considered as a loss by many non-Isaaqs”. He further argued that just as the majority of Somalilanders (Isaaqs) fear the lesser status they had been or will become in a united Somalia, so do the non-Isaaqs fear the domination of Isaaqs in a separate Somaliland. Therefore what is required is the foundation of a state based on a philosophy other than clan system.” This commentator believes that clanism is an antithesis of a modern state, not a substitute. Under the current beel system, the non-Isaaqs generally feel they are not adequately represented. In the 1960 first Somaliland legislative council, seats were assigned to different clans were as follows: 64% Isaaq and 34% non-Isaaq. In party terms this translated into 20 seats for the SNL, 12 seats for the USP, and 1 seat for the NUF.

According to Touval (1963) clan and party allocations were generally consistent. Under the 1993 Boorame Charter, representation followed similar lines. Nearly all clans objected to this. Minor adjustments were eventually were made, but has failed to resolve much of underlying dissatisfaction. Minorities and occupational groups typically feel that they are poorly served by the beel system. One paricipant observed that all clans had increased their share of parliamentary seats by five since the 1960s, but that the Gabooye share had not increased. He also noted that there is no minister, director, mayor or governor from the Gabooye and that the number of civil servants from the Gabooye is correspondingly few. On the other hand, the beel system guarantees the Gabooye, and other minority groups, at least a minimum representation in parliament – something a multiparty electoral system might eliminate. Even within clans, the beel system can give rise to inequities in representation, since it makes no allowance for a clan’s actual territorial distribution, the distinctions between urban and rural population, or for gender.

Because the beel system lacks a geographic dimension, parliamentary representatives of a given clan may be drawn disproportionately from a single administrative region rather than reflecting the clan’s territorial distribution. For example, most Habar Yoonis parliamentarians come from sub-clans inhabiting Togdheer region, and only a few from other regions. Likewise, rural people - the pastoralists and agro-pastoralists or Reer Miyi – are virtually unrepresented in parliament despite the fact that they constitute the largest proportion of the population. Not a single member of the current parliament has been nominated from a rural area smaller than a district headquarters. Urban people, the Reer Magaal, therefore, dominate the political scene. It is these educated people, prominent traders and urban religious scholars who fight over access to power and resources concentrated at the center, the capital city. Some participants in the research process argued that this is of little relevance since there is no longer much difference between the Reer Miyi and urban people. Sedentarisation of pastoralists is increasing and, as one politician noted, the “introduction of urban habits like Qaad, cigarettes and exotic foods and material into the rural areas is becoming commonplace”. Other participants took issue with this assertion: as one participant reminded the workshop “Urban people in the cities and major towns talk politics, but basic needs like water are the main concern for people on the periphery”.

The most seriously underrepresented group in the political domain is women, who probably constitute the majority of the population and represent an increasingly important economic force, but are totally excluded from participation in the central institutions of government.28 As such they are arguably denied their political rights. No clan appears to be ready to nominate a woman as its representative in government, especially the legislature. As one participant noted, “The clan system does not provide women a political status”. One complicating issue raised by workshop participants is that it is unclear, in this patrilineal society with a system of government based on clan power sharing, whether a woman would represent the clan of her husband or that of her father. It was generally agreed that women would have a better opportunity and access to political decision making in a multi-party system with free and fair elections.

Despite the near-universal dissatisfaction with the beel system, workshop participants could not agree on a formula for representation that might replace it. Some suggested that the only solution was free and fair elections based on one person, one vote system. Some suggested, as an interim measure, basing the number of parliamentary seats on those that existed in the 1960s, which assigned by district, rather than by clan and sub-clan.

The Beel and Multi-party Systems Compared

After almost a decade of government based on the beel system, the adoption of a constitution and move towards a multi-party model of governance is provoking vigorous public debate.

Participants in the workshop process were divided in their opinions about future prospects for the political system in Somaliland.

Some of the participants argue that the Beel system is indispensable because it is rooted in Somali culture, traditions and history. Supporters of the beel system have highlighted the many obstacles to the move to a party-based system: clan is a pervasive force in the political, economic and social life in Somaliland. There is little awareness of constitutional democracy, functional literacy is very low, and civil society institutions are undeveloped. By contrast, proponents of the beel system regard that it provides peace and stability and allows bottom up participation in governance at a grass roots level. Through the beel system, law and order were restored to Somaliland and government institutions revived to a stage where a new constitution could be developed. “It is an entirely new experience, locally cultivated,” according to one participant.

Supporters of the beel system do not perceive the reestablishment of a discredited westernstyle political system as a viable solution. They perceive the election of public officials as a radical and unwelcome change from the nomination process of the beel system, and many were skeptical about whether elections would actually happen. “We may not see elections in our lifetime, for today we are not even ready for elections in terms of preparation and resources”, commented one participant. He added that Somalis are “crisis-oriented, last minute doers”, who are not good at strategic long-term planning.

Advocates of this point of view typically favor the retention of the beel system, albeit with some modification. As one member of the Guurti suggested, “Let us scratch off the thorns of the Beel system,” in order that it cope more effectively with the demands of a modern state.

In contrast, many participants rejected the continuation of the beel system of governance through another shir-beeleed. This position, which constituted the main platform of the political association, Asad, failed to win support among other political organizations and has been consistently opposed by the Somaliland government. A one-year extension of president Cigaal's term was granted by the Guurti in February 2002 precisely to prevent a power vacuum and the convening of another Shir-beeleed. The one-year extension is intended to allow the incumbent President to prepare the ground for Somaliland’s first elections and complete the transition to a multi-party democracy.

Critics of the beel system argue that a transition to multi-party democracy is inevitable because the beel system itself has stagnated. Under the beel system, they contend, power and decision-making are concentrated among higher government officials. The effectiveness and the professionalism of the government institutions are undermined. Narrow clan allegiances trump the evolution of a national identity and national interests. In the long term, they contend, the beel system encourages anarchy and authoritarianism. One participant declared that, “this system must soon be abandoned otherwise accomplishments achieved thus far will be destroyed by the system itself.”

Such thinking is endorsed by the Somaliland government, which has already set in motion the introduction of a multi-party system of government in line with the new constitution.

But workshop participants generally agreed the change should be gradual. As one participant put it, a “hasty change towards blind application of the western model would be a step backwards.” Most agreed that it will be important to retain, as far as possible, the positive features introduced under the beel system that will be relevant to the new political set-up: these include the merit-based screening of government personnel through examinations and the absence of clan agenda from the House of Representatives. According to the Deputy Speaker of the House: “There is no member in the House of representatives that I have known during my term of office who has talked for his clan in the parliamentary discussions”.

One point on which advocates of both systems agreed is Somaliland’s need for political and administrative decentralization. Whether government is to be based on party or clan allegiance, whether representatives are nominated or elected, decentralization is an imperative. How this might be achieved, in practical and political terms, is the subject of the remainder of this paper.

Decentralization

The decentralization workshop, held in Baki in June 2000, examined the legal framework for the decentralization of government, the existing arrangements and the challenges and opportunities of decentralization.

Consensus on the need for decentralization in Somaliland is unchallenged. The experience of Somalia’s highly centralized and authoritarian regime under Siyaad Barre has persuaded Somalis everywhere of the advantages of more diffuse political authority and control. Nowhere was the detriment of centralized rule felt more strongly than northwest Somalia, where isolation and neglect by the distant capital gradually gave way to unresponsive military administration and, ultimately, brutal and massive abuse of human rights. Somalilanders shed much blood during the SNM war with Siyaad Barre for greater self-determination, autonomy and, in the end, independence.29 One commentator has written: “The future political constitution of Somaliland – and in particular decentralization – has been central to the war” (Bradbury, 1997).

Keenly aware of this tragic legacy, the authors of the 1993 National Charter and the 1997 Constitution mandated the Somaliland leadership to decentralize the system of government. A suitable environment and opportunity for decentralization prevails. There is peace and public tolerance of government. A fear of a return to centralized rule also sustains pressure for the devolution of powers. Many Somalilanders, particularly those beyond Hargeysa, deem decentralization to be an inescapable condition for their participation in Somaliland’s political arrangements.

Perplexingly, there has been remarkably little progress. Indeed, many perceive in Somaliland’s current arrangements, a reproduction of Siyaad Barre’s rigid, pyramidical hierarchy. The central government appoints local government officials and, in the absence of elected council, the regional and the district local authority are accountable only to the central government. A narrow layer of public officials therefore governs according to the dictates of the central government and there is widespread corruption.

The decentralization workshop tackled these apparent contradictions. Workshop participants identified the main obstacles to decentralization to be people’s inexperience of decentralized government, the divisive clan factor and a lack of civic organization. The central government was also blamed for a lack of commitment and limited effort in decentralization. The workshop also presented recommendations on how to move the process forward.

Definition

The term “Decentralization” means different things to different people. One academic explanation of decentralization describes it in the following the terms: “Control rights should be assigned to people who have the requisite information and incentives, and who at same time will bear responsibility for the (political and economic) consequences of their decisions”.30

For participants in the research process, decentralization held various meanings:
* Peoples’ participation, representation and desire to establish an accountable, transparent and democratic system of government.
* People choosing those who decide for the people.
* Putting powers and responsibility in the hands of the people, to determine the decisions affecting their lives in matters of socio-economic, development, security, justice, equity and the prioritisation of needs.
* A local administration that is accountable.
* The ability of people to appoint or remove public officials

Legal framework

Many Somalilanders believe that decentralization is essential in order to prevent the revival of kind of authoritarian rule experienced in the past. The importance accorded to decentralization and good governance in post-war Somaliland is reflected in the 1993 Transitional National Charter and the new Constitution. The formation of community, regional and district government structures was inscribed in the National Charter because of the suffering people felt under two decades of centralized dictatorial government rule. Onetime Somali watcher John Drysdale has written: “The intention of the authors of the charter was clearly inspired by their wish to maximize the process of political devolution given that the majority of Somalilanders had suffered grievously over the past two decades from ma nifold abuses of power arising out of a highly centralized state system of government in Mogadishu”. (Drysdale, 1995)

The development of autonomous structures at regional and district levels was intended to be an antidote to centralization. Article 21 of the National Charter promoted the principle of decentralization through the creation of regional and district councils, although the structures were not clearly defined. However, in November 1993, a few months after the Boorame conference, the Ministry of Interior issued a decree establishing the regional and district administration structures. This ministerial order, based on Articles 21 and 17 (3) (F) of the National Charter, defined clearly the structures of the regional and district councils and their duties and responsibilities. Articles 14 and 19 of this Ministerial decree give a statement of intent to this effect: “If a region/district could not agree in nominating a governor/mayor and deputy governor/mayor in 45 days time after a notice to do so, the central government will take the decision to nominate officers for the region/district, at request to parliament for approval by the ministry”.

Responsibility was passed to the parliament to facilitate the process of decentralization, but debate in parliament became polarized on the form and nature of decentralization. In May 1995 the Parliament amended Article 21 of the Charter. Although the principles of the article were reaffirmed, the executive was given the mandate to nominate local officials until such time that local people were able to do so.

The much-delayed constitution of Somaliland was completed and passed by parliament in August 2000. In this document, Articles 109, 110, 111 and 112 define the regional and district administrations as part of the government and give them the power to establish their own legislative councils and necessary bylaws. Article 111.1 empowers the elected chairman of the district to propose the village committee, after consultations with prominent local figures, and the district legislative council then has the prerogative to approve or reject the proposed arrangements.

Articles 111.5 and 111.6 stipulate that a regional governor will be appointed by, and come under the jurisdiction of, the Ministry of Interior. It also states that the governor represents the central government in the region and its districts, without attributing any powers to the post of governor. Although, constitutionally, the elected local council has the power of local decision-making, the fact that the governor is appointed by central government raises apparent ambiguities about the respective roles of local and central government. Overall, the distribution of power and responsibilities between different levels of government remains unclear, creating considerable confusion about the practice of decentralization. As Drysdale has noted: For many Somalilanders it is unclear what the devolution of administrative authority to the local people would require. (Drysdale, 1995).

The criteria for what constitutes a district and region, the eligibility for membership of the legislatures and the voting system are not defined in the constitution. Prior to 1991 there were five regions and twenty districts in Somaliland. One new region and over twenty new districts have been created by executive decree since then..There are no reliable maps that define administrative boundaries or indicate the natural resources of regions and districts. The Law on Regional and District Administrations should have clarified some of these issues. However, when the executive submitted a draft of this law to Parliament in 2000, it was rejected and sent back to the government in early 2001 to be re-written. Lack of technical expertise, a census and voter registration contributed to the delay. The issue is also very sensitive in terms of the perceived balance of power between clans. On 17 June 2002 the bill was finally signed into law, but its application may yet prove problematic.

Why decentralization? Public attitudes towards change

Somaliland’s impetus towards decentralization is more than a matter of legal imperatives. Historical experience and local political culture have combined to generate widespread public interest in decentralized governance arrangements. This public interest, however, is encumbered by differing levels of awareness and perceptions of what decentralization might mean in practice and how to realize it in the context of Somaliland.

Many participants in the research process believe that a degree of “decentralization” has already been achieved through the beel system, which distributed power among different clans, such that one clan cannot subjugate another. This diffusion of authority makes it extremely difficult for the government officials, or even traditional leaders, to exercise power through coercion. At the same time, many social and legal transactions take place beyond the remit of government authority, including matters of blood compensation and marriage, which are administered by traditional authorities in the rural and pastoral areas. Nevertheless, most Somalilanders would appear to agree that the process of decentralization is incomplete. A common theme among Somalilanders is that Somaliland should not reproduce the kind of centralized political arra ngements that contributed to the disintegration of the Somali state.

Recalling the status of the former capital, Muqdisho, there is general agreement that Hargeysa should not become the exclusive centereof power, remote from the rural areas and peripheral communities. In spite of this widespread concern, Hargeysa has rapidly emerged as the de facto hub of Somaliland’s political and economic dynamics - a situation that is already creating some resentment in other regions, notably in the east. Another widely acknowledged feature of Somaliland’s decentralization has been the degree of initiative many communities have shown in pursuing their own reconstruction and development. Given the government’s lack of capacity in this regard, many workshop participants agreed that the government should play a supporting, rather than leading role, in social and economic development. Some went so far as to suggest that excessive government involvement in these sectors would hinder, not help, the process of recovery.

There is widespread recognition, however, that despite its advantages, political decentralization must have its limits. One consideration is the extent to which Somaliland’s resource-scarce localities can afford to support their own administrative structures. Another, more pervasive concern, is the degree to which decentralization may favour some clans over others, rewarding the laandheere (majority) while marginalizing the “laangaab (the minority)”.

One workshop participant warned:

“Decentralization will not succeed until the political rights of laangaab are respected by the majority.” Despite these concerns, participants in the research process were unanimous that the decentralization process must go forward.

Existing arrangements

During the period of ‘transitional’ government between 1991 and 2002, the revival of local administrations, has moved at a slow pace. There are two main reasons for this. First, priority was given to establishing the central institutions first. Second, the local leaders have tended to aw