Study Report for the Traditional Structures and Local Governance (TSLG)
Project of the Community Empowerment and Social Inclusion Program
(CESI) of the World Bank Institute –
Ahmed Mohamed Hashi – Consultant
Consultants in Development & Environment (CODE)2
E-mail: ffoyan@hotmail.com
June 2005

Summary

The paper describes the basis for the local social structures, their variations and the different entities they entail. Traditional institutions express themselves in the form of traditional kings (Isimo), chiefs (Aqilo), elders (other Guurti) and clergy (ulimo). Societal management was based on invisible, ad hoc, constantly changing and multi-centered structures of these institutions that would operate at different levels of the socio -territorial dimension. The traditional governance, however, have domineering elements that would exclude, from the decision-making process, women, the youth, minorities even with the same socio-clan setting, and other social groups considered inferior.

Traditional laws have been based on a mix up of xeer acts and sharia commandments. The most signific ant judicial cases have been those related to homicide and various degrees of injury. The homicide compensation (based on dia-payment) applied under the traditional maslaha framework has not always been fair and has not been effective in preventing future cycles of retributions between the concerned parties. There was a cultural dichotomy in the customary laws affecting women. An insult or a physical offense of women would be highly sensitive cases. On the other hand, the dia-payment for women would be half of that of men. Successive governments have tried to overcome the constraints of the traditional legal system through the adoption of modern judiciary system.

Overall the functions of the traditional social elite’ (e.g. setting of traditional laws, conflict resolution, resources management, etc.) have changed to various degrees and currently cannot be exercised as would be needed as the traditional structures have weakened or acquired non-traditional roles.

Significant and irreversible social transformations and changes have occurred as a result of the introduction of “modern” governance and administrative systems. The traditional leaders and elders have increasingly become drifted towards the urban-based political and administrative structures. The changes have been exasperated by environmental, socioeconomic and demographic changes that lead to increasing commercialization, urbanization and monetization of livelihoods and social relations.

A highly corruptive political and government system has evolved through the successive administrations and governments (colonial and post-colonial). This has transformed the traditional clan (qabiil) culture that allowed to a certain extent social harmony and mutual relations between social groups into an urban practice of clanism (qabyaalad) through which kinship ties and clan sentimentalism has been exploited to achieve economic, social and political capital. The socio-political transformations have trickled down into the traditional structures and clan social bases, leading to politically motivated proliferation of traditional kings and leaders and politically instigated inter-clan disputes. The engagement of the traditional leadership in urban politics made them no more “neutral” to their clan constituencies and weakened and eroded their traditional statuses and legitimacy as superclan authorities.

Clanism has become the key political and governance cornerstone through which successive governments and opposition parties and rebel movements have won over the unorganized masses. The historically and gradually spiraling marriage between clanism and the sociopolitical aspirations of the upper-tier levels of society (including the traditional leaders and elders) has dragged the unorganized clan constituencies into diverse and contrasting political platforms and into civil strives and conflicts.

For the establishment of the “national state” administration, a series of peacemaking meetings and Beel (clans/communities) conferences were held. In all cases, the upper-tier socio-political elite’, including SNM political and military wings, old-time politicians, excivil servants and businessmen (in addition to the traditional leaders and Guurti) motivated and participated in the conferences.

For the de-mobilization of the clan-based militias and establishment of a “national state” administration, a political leader and statesman with talent and experience in clan-political mobilizations was needed. This was the late President Egal. He inspired the grassroots masses and successfully engaged the socio-political elite’ (including the traditional structures) in the process of de-mobilization and building of a functioning administrations. However, that political leadership was double -edged as it also established a very centralized system of governance where Hargeisa practically became the “city state”. A strong central presidency, operating through clan-political manipulations and institutional corruption, has constrained the roles of the other national bodies, i.e. the two Houses of Guurti and Parliament and the judiciary. Practically there are effective checks and balances on the central government. The regions and the districts barely function as structures enhancing responsiveness and accountability at the local level. Overall the government structures have not allowed much progress towards democratization, decentralization, and building consensus and societal harmony that were crucial for overall national reconciliation and “national state” building.

The traditional leaders and Guurti have only been elements in those political and governance processes. They have proliferated concomitantly with the increased socio-political factionalisms. As they have converged into the main towns, they have widened the ruralurban gap and validated top-down governance and administrative system.

Therefore, they could not be means of expression for decentralization and devolution approach to participation and local development. They could not engage themselves on a sustainable basis in a constructive political reconciliation process to secure the Somaliland “national state” building agenda. They have almost failed in their “traditional function” of conflict resolution and could not prevent actual and latent inter-clan conflicts.

The traditional structures have become and more linked both formally and informally to the government structures. Many of the current “traditional” leaders and Guurti were ex-civil servants, ex-police or security officers, ex-militias, ex-traders, and so on. Rather than “traditional positions”, they by now have and strive for “urban socio-political statuses” as members of the Houses of Elders and Parliament, Council of Isimo, House of Aqils, District Councils, and urban political middlemen, mobilizers and opinion makers. Because of their new roles in this political-administrative machinery and limited direct and supportive involvement in their pastoral and rural clan territories, they are now often referred to as the elder with the “plastic hats” (signifying their fakeness and simulation of traditional elders).

The weakness of the traditional structures is also demonstrated by the radical changes in resource management. They could not deal with and restrain the inevitable governance, demographic and economic changes that ha ve entailed socio-economic stratifications and radical changes in land use patterns. The pastoral and rural communities are convinced of the irreversible land change that would impact negatively on the sustainability of their livelihoods and would welcome and support measures to halt and ultimately reverse the trends. However, they are unorganized, socially fragmented and lack “local social structures” that would adopt interventions for better management of the resources.

After all, the traditional structure would not be able to facilitate optimal resource use and devise and implement policies (social, institutional and economic) that would avert the very underlying causes of the negative trends in resource use and management.

In addition to the traditiona l structures by now assimilated into the urban-based sociopolitical elite’, the paper also examines the other non-state actors that affect the lives and self-governing capabilities of the pastoral and rural communities local development. These include the religious institutions (already defined within the traditional structures), the civil society organizations (local non-governmental organizations and community based organizations) and the professionals and their associations The paper concludes that the traditional structures have been absorbed into top-down sociopolitical and administrative systems that are a bottleneck to local governance and development. It also summarizes their weaknesses in coping with breakdown of authority, demographic and economic changes and the consequent social stratifications and irreversible land use changes.

From the other side, through a bottom-up natural process of urbanization, the traditional and cultural practices have emanated from the rural bases to the urban socio-politics where they hardly go along with efforts to adopt democratic management of society. On the whole, it is difficult to draw a line between rural and urban social sectors and the urban-based sociopolitical elite’ (including traditional leaders and Guurti) influence from there the events and changes in the pastoral/rural areas.

In the final analysis recommendations are made to go beyond and effect social changes in those socio-political strata and facilitate and support the pastoral/rural communities to organize themselves and have a voice in the institutions affecting their lives. In other words the modern and traditional institutions (by now deformed) and top-down and bottom-up approaches need to be coupled to promote local governance and development. Emphasis is placed on the prioritization of the stakeholders (local/district government structures, socioeconomic elite’ including traditional structures, religious institutions, business community, CSOs, professional associations, etc.) and especially their “linkages” and how these could be made more cooperative and productive in effecting the necessary social and development changes.

1. Introduction

The study was conducted for the Traditional Structures and Local Governance (TSLG) Project of the Community Empowerment and Social Inclusion Program (CESI) of the World Bank Institute and discusses the implication of the traditional structures and other non-state actors in local governance and development in Somaliland. An attempt is made to describe the basis for the traditional social structures, their origins and perspectives and practices, and to provide a critical analysis of their historical and contemporary transformations, contributions to the political and governance processes, and challenges in their role in democratization and decentralization to promote local governance and development.

Section 2 looks into the basis for the traditional social structures and the social-clan levels at which groups of people recognize themselves as part of allied or closely related social units. It also analyzes how the social groups are part of wider socio-territorial dimensions and integrated into the market economies of villages, towns and urban centers.

Section 3 describes the traditional structures that oversee the norms and regulations of the predominantly pastoral and agro-pastoral society and that express themselves in the form of traditional leadership, elders (Guurti) and clergy (ulimo), their origin, powers, functions and interrelationships, the decision-making process, the culture of dominance, inclusion/exclusion and accountability, and the traditional and customary laws.

Section 4 discusses the social transformations and changes in the traditional structures following the introduction of “modern” administration structures during the colonial and post-independence periods.

Section 5 describes the thorny pathway to building a “national state” administration, the role of the traditional structures in the political and governance process, and the progress towards democratization, decentralization and national reconciliation. Section 6 summarizes the views about the roles of the traditional structures and Guurti in these agendas, while Section 7 analyses their capacity in resource management.

Sections 8 and 9 draw attention to the other non-state actors that affect the lives of the rural communities and to the position of women in local governance and development.

Section 10 summarizes the challenges in the implication of traditional structures and other non-state actors in the socio-political, administrative and governance system, and provides recommendations on the social sectors and their linkages that should be focused on to effect the necessary social and development changes.

2. The basis for social structures

2.1.The clan system

The most obvious social structure of the Somali people is the clan system. In Somaliland, the population is more or less divided into three major kin-groups: The Isaq clan–family occupying mainly the central areas including the three towns of Burao, Berbera and Hargeisa; The Harti clans (Dhulbahante and Warsangeli) of the Darod clan-family occupying the eastern areas; and the Dir (Gadabuursi and Isse) occupying the west. The clan-families and clans are divided into innumerable divisions, sub-clans, and sub-sub-clans. Numerous smaller clans of different lineage are dispersed within those clan-families.

A lot has been written about the traditional clan structures. However, comprehensible thoughts have not evolved on the social bonds and in particular on the level at which groups of people or social segments recognize themselves as part of the same “social community” or at which social units are most cohesive.

People at any lineage segment claim to belong to a clan-family/clan. However this does not reflect an effective social delimitation or a purposeful organized social pattern. Going down this broad structure, previous works concluded and defined the dia-paying group (dia is compensation for various forms of injuries and homicide) as the basic socio -organizational unit.

However, a dia-paying group does not correspond to any specific point or level of the lineage ladder. It is a contractually bound broad alliance of a number of lower segment units (especially jilib, jilibo, pl.) who, although for the most part blood-related, do not necessarily follow the same line to the common primary lineage. It may even include other social groups who are not related to the broader group in terms of kinship, but who only develop with them the dia-paying social contract. Furthermore, the dia-paying group is not static and groups can join or leave the contract.

A smaller and more closely related social unit than the dia-paying group is the Jifi sub-unit, which comprises those households most directly associated and collectively affected in the dia-payment process. The broader dia-paying group, for example, does not equally share a homicide payment. The Jifi unit will receive one-third of the dia if the offense was against them, the remainder shared by the rest of the broader dia-paying group to which they are incorporated.

2.2.The socio-territorial dimension

The above social structures do not imply that the people (e.g. social segments or groups) live closely together on a permanent base or exclusively occupy a given territory. The clan social structures are also part of wider socio-territorial dimensions that as well determine the scope of the inter- and intra-social movements and relations.

In the predominantly pastoral areas, the lowest production unit comprises the jees, which is a single nomadic household/encampment (reer) standing alone in a given grazing point. A number of nomadic camps often come close together in a micro-spatial pastoral area. Such a “settlement” or “neighborhood” is called the beel and may comprise households of the same lineage, dia-paying group or segmentary units and may even include groups of other lineages. The beel is often linked to a village or cluster of villages.

In normal (non-drought) periods, the pastoralists’ movements are limited and irregular with quasi-concentric circles that overlap the grazing areas around a cluster of nearby villages. However, although that pattern may imaginatively be viewed as a “community of a locality” linked to village(s), it is only a “temporary neighborhood or settlement”, since with the second movement, the camps are most likely to disperse following different migration routes.

In extremely very long dry seasons and droughts the camps may be compelled to migrate to more distant zones. In other words, different social groups and categories (including primary and long time users of a given grazing area, seasonal users from adjacent territories, occasional or first time users) may meet seasonally with households randomly changing across seasons and rotating between different groups and areas.

The rapidity with which different households and groups converge and disperse has increased as a result of the significant land use and technology changes, by which in the latter case those who can afford use motor transport for the shift of their families and small stock (sheep and goats) from one grazing area to another in the rigorous chase for the grazing sites that receive the first rain showers.

The villages in a pastoral setting then are not self-contained settlements but rather structures linked to a surrounding pastoral environment where nomadic camps (including primary clients or claimants and other seasonal or one time incomers) are spatially and transiently arranged. With the increased commercialization and the more and more reliance and attachments of pastoral groups to villages and towns to obtain food and goods and for other service deliveries, temporary makeshift camps (known locally as camp, caamam, pl.) are established in key grazing sites/water points at some distance from main villages and where pastoral groups concentrate seasonally. These act as temporary or mobile “settlements” with no fixed assets. Once the herders disperse and migrate to other areas, the camps are abandoned and the camp petty traders (linked to village and town networks) follow and catch up with new pastoral settled sites that are remote from villages. The practice can be described as a mobile delivery service mechanism conveying foods and other goods to the pastoralists in the more remote areas. In the past, it was less frequent and the makeshift camp was referred to as the “kabadhe”.

The above social-territorial dimension allows for a loose and flexible resource use system accommodating the “interests” and the “right to use” of different pastoral groupings and, therefore, permits for social groups to spillover and overlap across different levels of resource units. An extended grazing or agro-pastoral territory within which there are a series of beels (and settlements) and a series of micro-spatial grazing areas and eco-zones that complement each other in terms of resource availability across seasons and claimed to by the same social groups of the same kin or even by same different groups is called the deegaan. From this outlook, a deegaan may encompass a series of grazing areas and eco-zones within a district or may spread across two or more districts or even regions. However, the term is also used to define a smaller grazing area or an eco-zone with distinctive physical and productive characteristics.

The socio-territorial dimensions indicate that physical cohesion of members of a social group is hardly achievable and the pastoral population of a given zone comprises spatially and temporally mobile lineage segments/groups, temporary neighborhoods and camps/households. The system allows also for the close integration of the production and livelihood system to the market economies of the trading centers (makeshift camps, villages and towns) and the pastoral groups’ nonstop exposure to and interaction with village and town social categories.

Community, neighborhoods or “rural villages” in the real sense becomes more meaningful in the agro-pastoral areas. The socio-territorial pattern is more harmonized with the same social group(s) residing in a given area permanently or semi-permanently. In this setting, a district is divided into beels (distinct geographical and socio-economic agro-pastoral areas) each comprising a cluster of agro-pastoral settlements/villages. Each settlement referred to as the xubin has a number of more or less sedentary households and forms the lowest organized and inhabited structure.

3. Traditional institutions expressed in the form of traditional leaders and elders (Guurti)

3.1. Traditional leadership

With the above socio-territorial dimensions of social movements, social interactions can only be realized through consistently changing and loosely organized structures and networks.

Within that frame operates traditiona l institutions that regulate and sanction social relations. However, the institutional structure does not express itself through “organizations” in the classical sense but through sets of traditional leaders, elders and clergy (ulimas) who oversee the rule book and norms of society.

In the old times, major clan-families had a prominent leader or king3 that in practical terms run small dominions and majesties. The origin of these is discussed with legendary and fairy tales. Most probably individuals who took dominance and supremacy over their communities due to various factors (bravery, wealth, etc.) founded them and most certainly were started by the Arab sheikhs who traveled to and settled the country (mixing up with the indigenous population) and to whom major clan-families allegedly trace their origin. The spiritual and holy (Kraamo) powers believingly attributed to the traditional king by the subjects demonstrate to some extent the “Arab (and religious)” connections of the source of the quasifeudal structures. The attributes augmented by the authority, responsibilities and obligations exercised by the kings evolved to cultural significance of almost absolute respect and loyalty for the position to become something of a shrine with perpetual succession and holders inheriting it by birth and “naturally” becoming empowered to guide their communities.

Traditional elders assisted the traditional kings in the day-to-day management of societal affairs. These comprised traditional statesmen4 who assumed eminence because of their wisdom, bravery, oratory, and expertise in traditional xeer (traditional laws and social contracts), and belonged to the different lineage segments that were under the kinship rule of the king.

In that management system, the elders carried out the initial discussions on a pertinent issue. For instance, ad hoc and “voluntary” committee or council of elders (guurtida beesha) would handle the day-to-day management of issues in a locality or neighborhood. These social structures worked on an ad hoc basis as the members would change from time to time given the social fluidity and mobility. They might also select ad hoc committees to take over a particular task such as the management of a water point. Complex cases that could not be resolved at the local social levels and verdicts were referred to higher-level traditional leaders and kings for ultimate judgments, conclusions and validation. Societal management and decision-making was, therefore, based (and still is where it is still functional) on invisible, ad hoc, constantly changing and multi-centered social structures that operated at different levels of the socio-territorial dimensions.

A key component of the traditional leadership (and still significant) was the clergy or religious leaders comprising of ulimo and prominent sheikhs who played a vital role as spiritual leaders and Islamic educators and orientators. They applied sharia law in criminal, civil and social matters and, thus, had a major role in the conflict resolution processes.

The religious institutions were the only structures expressed through “quasi-formal organizations” arranged and ordered, like the kinship family tree, along “faith lines” or dariiqooyin 5 that would trace their schools of religious thought and practice to a genealogy of sheikhs leading to Prophet Mohamed.

Overall the traditional structures and leadership still express themselves in the form of traditional leaders, elders and clergy. Their traditional roles, which have changed to a significant and varying degree over time, are summarized in Box 1.

Box 1: Functions of the traditional structures

The functions of the traditional structures and leadership have among others included:
- Setting of traditional laws and social contracts (xeer)
- Resolution of disputes and conflicts
- Regulation of resource use
- Motivating or supervising traditional charity and social gatherings such as religious ceremonies and prayer-feasts (Alla-Bari)
- Conveying and defending clan/deegaan interests versus other clans, administrations (colonial and post-colonial) and others (e.g. aid implementing agencies)
- Management and application of the Sharia law (in the case of ulimas)

However, as will be illustrated in the following sections, these roles have changed to a significant de gree and cannot be exercised as would be needed as a result of the dramatic social transformations and changes that have resulted from the introduction of modern governance and administrative systems. The ensuing economic and political forces have more and more drifted and absorbed the traditional structures into wider urban-based and topdown socio-political structures. By now, rather than “traditional positions”, they strive for urban socio-political statuses and have their legitimacy as super-clan author ities considerably weakened. They have almost failed in their critical traditional roles such as conflict resolution and resource management.

3.2. Decision-making

In the exercise of many of the functions, decision-making, apart from being based on ad hoc and multi-centered social structures, was always restricted to that social elite’ who retained (at any one point in time and space) absolute dominancy over the social bases.

Previous writings on the traditional decision-making processes emphasized the “traditional under-the-tree meetings” (shirka geedka) that were assumed to be based and decided on consensus. However, the local powers and authority domains (expressed in the form of traditional leadership and Guurti) guided directly or indirectly the pr ocesses and the final conclusions or actions to be taken. The participation could not be more than passive debating and opinion making. If, for instance, a “young man” strongly contradicted the views of the “traditional wise elder or leader”, he would be scolded at and shamed by the others. The decision-making process was not also all-inclusive as it excluded wide sections of the community including women, social groups not belonging to the clan lineage segments and considered to be inferior or castes, and other minorities even the same clan settings.

In the case of women, as mothers and wives they were esteemed as indispensable social components of household livelihoods and management, for their relative importance in terms of family/household protraction and continual existence (e.g. female -headed vs. male -headed household) and for their family social support networks and interrelations. At the same time, inaccurate religious practices sculpted into deeply rooted conservative tradition and cultural practices marginalized women from the intra-community decision-making structures and traditional leadership.

It has to be observed that the traditional and cultural governance had domineering and dictatorial elements and tendency whereby the male social elite’ (traditional leaders, elders and clergy) dominated over their clan social constituencies.

Nevertheless, the local influential power was by no means homogenous or harmonious but subdivided into contesting or allying factions and alliances on the basis of mere kinship or other interests (intermarriage rapport, neighborhood, etc.) even within the same lineage segments.

In the case of the kinship, the local power relations and influences was not only expressed in the form of the traditional king and leadership but also through the size (male population) of any segment compared to other segments of the same lineage. The segment that counted the greatest number of genealogical ancestors or generations of forefathers to the common ancestry assumed the status of laandheere (laan meaning the shoot and laandheere the longest shoot of the family tree) and had more often than not the largest size compared to the other related segments. The male population size was significant as this was the basis for the most important binding and quantitifiable social factor, i.e. the dia- and jifi- payments. The laandheere entailed some form of dominancy, as this would give that segment an advantageous position in terms of dia-payment and enforcement of rights or claims over the other segments. If the segment to which the traditional king belonged and the laandheere segment did not coincide, the local power relations were based on the cumulative and comprising capacities of these two local forces and this would subdue the bargaining clout of the smaller segments.

The issue of inclusion/exclusion was, therefore, not only a matter for women, castes or other minority groups, but also affected in a different way (and although with much less impacts) the smaller segments (compared to the larger segments) of the same lineage. This clan sizebased cultural dimension could be classified as the “hegemony of the majorities” where even wise, informed and talented elders from smaller segments could not have the same weighing and influence in the decision-making process compared to less gifted counterparts of the larger segments of the same lineage.

3.3. Traditional and customary laws

Traditional laws were based on a mix up of xeer acts and directives and sharia commandments. The former comprised rules and judgments set over times memorial by cultural common sense and the obligations and rights dictated by the compulsion of the highly uncertain environment that entailed codes and behaviors for all to safeguard for the functioning of the livelihood systems and for the common continual survival. The elders present at any one point in space and time handled small cases. However, for major cases, some form of ad hoc traditional judges would be summoned where the accuser and the accused would present their cases. The xeer experts of their kin as traditional lawyers might also flank them.

It was very common that a case between two individuals or households might transform into a major legal confrontation between the two segments or social groups of the accuser and the accused. In such cases, each group would select their traditional lawyers on the basis of the type of relationship (good or bad) that they had with the other groups. There were those traditional lawyers who because of their natural and social construct and experience expertised in the law and legal process for the foes and adversaries (gar cadaawo) and those in .the lega processes of compromise and reconciliation (gar islaah or maslaho) and the confronting groups would use them accordingly. In other words, the legal system while in the most of cases strived to be just and evenhanded, at times it could be unfair with victims losing their rights if the traditional lawyers of the opponents were too talented, experienced, oratorical and vocal and decided to overstake the rights of the others.

A lying behind and imperceptible local powers and hegemonies would ease and create a conducive environment for such cases of legal biases.

That would not happen when sharia law was applied. The plaintiff would chose whether sharia or traditional and customary law (xeer beegti) would be applied in judging the case, this generally also needing the concord of the accused. The sharia is based on strict written codes and laws while the xeer beegti followed informal, unwritten cultural codes, norms and bylaws whose lawful practicality was tested and consented to over time.

The most significant cases were those related to homicide and various degrees of injury. The judgments for these were based on extrapolations from the sharia supplemented with xeer elements. For example, in the case of homicide, the offender would be executed (death penalty) or dia would be paid to the family of the victim. The offended family would choose either of the options. If dia-payment (following the sharia) was agreed on, the family of the offender might in addition also be judged to offer a girl of a marriage age to the family of the victim. This xeer element added onto the sharia judgment was intended as a further incentive for the offended family to forgive and forget and to ensure that peacefulness and coexistence was rooted and persisted between the two families.

Such use of girls (when against their wishes) as “objects for peace-making” was one case in point of how women rights were violated. This again calls into the “a bit and a lot” figurine of women and the dichotomy of the cultural morals. Inter-marriage was a key strategy for resolution of bloody conflicts, for communal and reciprocal use of natural resources and for building mutual trust and political alliances between social groups.

Furthermore, some of the most serious social offenses were those carried against women. An insult or a slap of a lady by a man would be a highly sensitive case and the offender would be fined to pay a heavy traditional toll (xaal) to the family of the offended. Rape of women was another serious crime almost compared to homicide and perpetrators considered mentally sick and shamed by every body (even by their family members and kin).

It should be recalled, however, that the homicide compensation system and applied under the traditional maslah (reconciliation and compromise) framework of dia-payment:
- Was not effective to prevent future revenges of the offended family against the offenders; It might happen that cases settled decades back might resurface and old scores settled with new cycle of retributions between the two social groups.
- Did not single out the individual who committed the crime or affected those who instigated, planned or contributed to the violence; If dia was to be paid, practically the entire community of the offender would be punished.
- Placed a much lower value on the lives of women and children compared to that of men mainly because of the patriarchal nature of the society; the dia for a man would be 100 camels (plus any xeer rectifications) while that for women would be half that. This was against all constitutions drafted by the successive administrations and does not comply with the gender equality of the United Nations Charter.
- Did not in actual fact support the offended family (i.e. wife and children), as the Jifi segment to which the family is socially attached would share one-third of the compensation and the rest by the wider dia-paying group to which the Jifi is incorporated.

Attempts were made by the successive governments to overcome the above constraints of the traditional legal system through the adoption of “apparently” democratic constitutions and application of civil laws where culprits would be brought to justic e. The most difficult challenge was the attempt by the military regime lead by Major General Mohamed Siyad Barre (re section 4.3) to treat men and women as equals in which the regime for the first time met fierce resistance especially from the religious circles.

In any case, the successive government authority systems with civil laws and courts reduced to a significant extent those limitations. But as government structures and judiciary and security institutions (including those at the present in the post-conflict Somaliland) happened to be weak and loose, they were constrained to succumb to the traditional way while at the same time still struggling to ensure that the laws of the country were observed. For instance, it might happen that the authority system brings the criminal into justice or fails to do so but in both cases had to facilitate (or directly or indirectly pay) the dia-payment to the offended family to maintain the peace.

A typical example was provided by the Egal administration of Somaliland (re section 5.3) when Egal’s chief security Officer was shot dead by one of the security soldiers in broad daylight inside the presidency (presidential office and residence) in Hargeisa and gently walked away through the main gate. To sustain its power base, the administration was restricted by the clan-politics of the day and could not bring the criminal into justice although he was at reach. Instead, the administration resorted to the traditional system and paid a puffed up dia to members of the family of the deceased who had then no other choice.

4. Social transformations and changes in the traditional structure and their enlisting into the “modern” governance and administration systems and into the civil conflict

4.1. The British colonial administration

Initial and significant social transformations occurred with the arrival of the British colonial administration that introduced new values, codes and enforcement structures. To exert it influence over the largely pastoral/rural population, it established new traditional chiefs (Aqils) and local guards (Ilaalo) to support them in maintaining order in pastoral/rural areas. The changes were exasperated by environmental, socio-economic and demographic changes that lead to increasing commercialization and monetization of livelihoods and urbanization and villagization. These changes were more profound in the western zone compared to the eastern zone as the two zones had different historical and socio-political backgrounds (e.g. exposure to outside influe nces of religious institutions, slave trade, Darwiish anti-colonial resistance movement, and different colonial administration statuses).

A significant difference was that the struggle against the British colonial rule starting from early 19th century by the Darwish resistance movement of Sayid Mohamed Abdalla Hassan (known to the British as the “Mad Mullah”) was waged from the eastern zone. The colonial administration did not become well established in the east until as late as the early 1950s even if the Darwish movement was defeated in 1921. As a matter of fact, Although Somaliland was then viewed as one entity, the “British Somaliland Protectorate”, it was administered with two different statuses. In the western zone, the local social elite’ entered into treaties with the colonial administration and were under proper “protectorate”. In contrast, the eastern zone was conquered and “colonized”.

The colonial top-down and militaristic regime found fertile terrain in the dictatorial tendency of cultural nature of the traditional leadership. The colonial administration began enlisting the traditional structures (traditional kings and Aqils) to a socio-political environment outside their constituent clan bases. Although they continued to covey and defend the interests of their clan constituencies and socio-territorial bases, they became more and more drifted towards the town-based local and national administrative and political structures and material wealth, as they became the “preferential stakeholders”.

4.2. Inheritance of the colonial political and governance structures at independence

At independence the colonial governance and administration style was inherited. Partly inherited from the colonial governance style and partly originated and orchestrated by the new political-administrative elite’, a highly corruptive political and governance system based on buying-offs, nepotism and favoritism evolved. This transformed the traditional clan (qabiil) culture that allowed to a certain extent social harmony and mutual and reciprocal relations between social groups into an urban practice of clanism (qabyaalad) through which kinship ties and clan sentimentalism was exploited to achieve economic, social and political capital.

The factors that facilitated and accele rated the post-independence socio-political transformations were several. The independence meant unification with southern Somalia that was under Italian colonial rule and the shifting of the administrative, economic and geopolitical capital to the south and especially to the capital Mogadishu where practically a “city-state” flourished. The social, economic, political and technical/administrative cream of the Somaliland clan-families was attracted and brain-drained into Mogadishu where they became absorbed into a wider and more sophisticated socio-political culture and administrative and government structures.

The culture evolved to a local “value parameter” whereby a politician would be esteemed by his constituency by the quantity of wealth he accumulated through the misuse of the public resources, the quantity he fed into the pockets of the handful of traditional elders and leaders and businessmen that would support him, the number of young people of his constituency for whom he secured employment in the government institutions, etc.

Following their drift to the urban socio-economic and political environment during the colonial era, the traditional kings and leaders also became part and parcel of the political machinery of the post-colonial governments established in the city-state of Mogadishu. They used to travel all the way from Somaliland (covering hundreds and thousands of kilometers, i.e. when departing from Hargeisa) to receive their shares of the cake through supporting this or that of the politic ians of their constituencies.

The socio-political transformations trickled down into the traditional structures and clan social bases further accentuating the heterogeneities (of kinship factionalisms, alliances, neighborhoods, etc.) that already existed. In addition to these social fractures, politically motivated proliferation of traditional kings and leaders and politically instigated inter-clan disputes inflicted irreversible changes upon the harmony and stability of the traditional governance patterns. The engagement of the traditional leadership in urban politics (which made them no more “neutral” to their clan constituencies) weakened their traditional statuses and legitimacy as super-clan authorities.

The ensuing governance system (linking national and local levels) was flawed with abuse of power, denial of rights, social stratifications and socio-clan fractures and bitterness. The grassroots masses remained unorganized and voiceless and were only to be exploited for political purposes. Their relationship to their traditional leaders (with the new acquired roles), governors and politicians was never defined. A devolution approach for an enhanced clan constituencies/populace participation in the decisions affecting their lives was never conceptualized.

The highest expression of the selfish matrimony between the sophisticated political corruption and clanism and engagement of the traditional leadership in politicking came during the last civilian election of 1969 when over 70 parties contested for the 123 parliamentary seats. The government party won the elections. However, it was more than winning as the then Prime Minister Mohamed Ibrahim Egal6 assembled an absolute majority (of 122 parliamentarians on his side) buying off and drafting in all the opposition seats (except for one) and practically formed the first one party state of Somalia. Many analysts miss that dictatorial tendency of the socio-political culture long before the military regime came to power.

4.3.The military regime and the ensuing civil strife

Against the background of the widespread popular dissatisfaction with the corruptive civilian administrations, the military took over the government through a coup lead by the military commander, Major General Mohamed Siyad Barre, in October 1969. The coup initially received popular support and embarked on an ambitious development program. As a matter of fact, the only significant developments of Somalia during both pre- and post-independence periods in terms of infrastructures, health, education (including the introduction of the first official Somali script) and other social service and development provisions were achieved during the 6 or 7 triumphant years of the military regime.

In an attempt to reverse the negative experiences of the system of governance based on corruption and clanism and inspired by its new socialism political agenda, the regime portrayed clanism as “public enemy number one” and a war was to be waged against the invisible enemy. At the peak of the campaign, “clan pictograms and symbols” were physically buried in public gatherings. Citing one’s clan or tracing clan genealogical ladders became a crime. The traditional structures and leadership were reformed to become part of the socialist political machinery and renamed as Nabaadoono (the peace-seekers), Samadoono (the good-seekers), etc.

However as the members of the revolutionary council were not a new offspring but the old guard that worked with the colonial and post-colonial administrations, soon they were to express their true socio-political nature built on clan manipulations and corruptive politics. The regime applied exponentially the same governance practices that it inherited including misuse of public resources, instigation of clans against one another and fashioning of new traditional leaders to “divide and rule”, and unfair distribution of national economic and political assets. It exceeded in making a reality the dictatorial nature of the socio-political culture gradually instituting one of the most authoritarian and repressive dictatorships of Africa.

As the political miseries of the regime grew and public discontent increased, successive rebel and opposition fronts, movements and congresses were formed. These did not start as grassroots movements, but were formed outside the country by political, military and business dissenters and fallouts from the regime. The dissident elite’ easily exploited (as was the political tradition) the clan social bases and enlisted the support of the traditional structures in instigating and divulgating (among the clan constituencies) the clan rebel ideology and inspirations.

Typically they exploited the clan sentimentalities and cohesion patterns that traditionally became compact when responding to an “external risk”. The dissident elite’ and the traditional leadership and Guurti would put together the discontents into clan ideology of complaints of injustice, emotions of the “targeted and oppressed”, and of “external (actual and imminent) risks” to the clan livelihoods and livelihood bases to be defended against.

These rebel movements included the Somali Salvation Front (SSDF) formed by the Majerteen of the Harti/Darod clan-family in the late 1970s, the Somali National Movement (SNM) formed by the Isaq clan-family in 1981, the Somali Popular Movemet (SPM) formed mainly by the Ogaden of the Absame/Darod clan-family in the mid-1980s and the United Somali Congress (USC) formed by the Hawiye clan-family in the mid/late 1980s.

In Somaliland, the only rebel movement was the SNM formed in London by the Isaq elite’. The rebel movement waged cross-border incursions into the central regions of Somaliland and into the main towns of Hargeisa and Burao. The landmark of the regime’s tyranny and brutality was its response of heavy ground and aerial bombardments of these towns following SNM offenses in May 1988.

In the same way as the dissident elite’ masterminded clan-based rebel movements,, the regime also strived to sign up the support of the other clans (i.e. not belonging to a given rebel movement) by exploiting the kinship divisions within the Somali society.

In Somaliland, the western clans and in particular the Gadabursi right away fell prey into the inter-clan violence provoked by the government in the northwest and Awdal regions. In the east, initially the government had been strongly resisted. In 1988 the Dhulbahante leaders in Las-Anod agreed on not to mobilize as a clan against either the SNM or the Isaq. However, exploiting the clan-structured divisions, buying-off support and engaging individuals to mastermind incursions (under the disguise of being waged by the militia of Dhulbahante subclan constituencies) into Isaq territories, the regime succeeded to incite inter-communal violence in certain areas.

The traditional and socio-political leadership of the Dhulbahante sub-clan that succeeded to restrain their constituencies from succumbing to the government interference, that strongly rejected the government warfare and worked hard to contain the violence were long-time opponents of the regime (long before the rebel movements were formed) and, therefore, were not only motivated by the need to maintain the traditional peaceful coexistence between clans but also to express their political goal of contributing to the fall of the regime. That sociopolitical and economic elite’ organized their resistance to the regime around the traditional icon of Gerad Abdigani Gerad Jama who was also one of the leaders who spearheaded the subsequent reconciliation processes in Somaliland.

Thus clanism could easily be exploited to win over the unorganized grassroots masses. The historically and gradually spiraling marriage between clanism and the socio-political aspirations of the upper-tier levels of society including the traditional structures dragged the unorganized clan constituencies into diverse and contrasting political platforms and into conflicts and awkward human rights abuses of killings, raping and lootings that did not spare the same clan communities.

5. The genesis and the thorny pathway for building a “national state” administration

5.1.The arrival of SNM militias into the main towns, the peacemaking conferences and the continuance of conflicts

Just at and following the fall of the regime (from its last enclave in Mogadishu), the Isaqbased rebel movement (Somali National Movement (SNM)) entered the main towns of Hargeisa, Burao and Berbera.

The movement was bound together by the crusade against an “external risk”. However, traditionally once the risk disappears (in this case the regime), the relations and interactions between clans and sub-clans within the same lineage become based on what separates and distinguishes them from one another. These distinctions do not become muted at any level of the lineage from the clan-family level to the lowest social strata. The conflicts that can develop between social groups at any level of the lineage ladder can be as marked and bloody as those between different clans even if they will be of a smaller scale.

Therefore, soon splits within the SNM (along clan-based coalitions) resulted in inter-clan violence, lootings and destructions, roadblocks, and SNM militia revenge incursions into the territories of the other lineage clans both to the east and to the west.

The SNM and other socio-political elite’ organized peacemaking conferences in Berbera, Sheikh and Burao. The secession and “regaining of independence” from Somalia was declared and SNM government formed in the Burao conference of 1991.

Abdirahman Ahmed Ali “Tuur” (of the Habar Yonis clan) was elected as the President for a transitional period of 2 years. In the mean time, the non-Isaq clans would be taken on board the government. This last meeting brought together the SNM political and military wings, traditional kings and elders, businessmen and Diaspora delegates. However, it did not go down to address the factionalisms within the Isaq socio-political elite’ and the outstanding issues between the eastern (Harti) and western (Isaq) socio-clan territories that would be crucial for eventual national reconciliation and political cohesion and stability. It was more inspired by the emotional pressures of the SNM militia and the masses that were previously incited and inspired to the dream of an “independent state” during the campaign against the regime.

Consequently, the peacemaking efforts and the formation of an administration did not lead to cessation of hostilities between groups and clans. The late Abdirahman Tuur’s administration that was to establish an administration did not take foot and soon the major towns of Hargiesa and Burao were reduced to total state of anarchy due to conflicts between clans-based coalitions of militias.

5.2. The Borame Conference of beels and the establishment of the “national state” administration

Later on, another conference (the Borame beel –clans/communities- conference) was convened in 1993 in Borame where a National Charter for state building was adapted and a new administration headed by late President Egal was elected. The Charter foresaw the establishment of two Houses: the House of Elders (Guurti) and the House of Parliament.

The inherent political divergences between the Isaq and other major clans (in particular the Harti) surfaced during this conference. The Harti political elite’ including Ali Khalif Galaydh7, a qualified politician and expert in governance and public administration, proposed a formula for power sharing (between a presidency and premiership). The Isaq rejected the proposal, opted for a strong central presidency and gained the support of the Dir (in particular the Gadabursi) who took the vice-presidency. This was a major initial setback to the national reconciliation process and to the Somaliland (as one entity) agenda.

Nevertheless, although the Harti traditional and political leadership cold-shouldered the critical issue of “secession” and were not fully affianced to the conference agenda, they did not rebuff the establishment of a transitional “Somaliland administration” that would be an umbrella and conduit for peace, reconciliation and development throughout the Somaliland region. The government structures that were adopted were a reprint of the old model of the late regime with a strong central presidency and very centralized system of governance.

Highlights of the government structures and state of decentralization are shown below in Box 2.

President Egal’s statesmanship and talent in clan-political mobilizations and the fatigue of the masses about the inter-clan conflicts and anarchy allowed him to engage the social, economic and SNM political and military elite’ to de-mobilize the free-roaming militias and to establish a functioning administration in the western towns of Berbera, Hargeisa, Gebiley and Borame.

However, the attainment of peace and political stability was still far away due to the politically motivated continual factionalism and mistrust between groups. By 1994 the tensions broke into full-scale war that continued for two years devastating the whole of Burao and large parts of Hargeisa from where the population was displaced.

The conflicts above all were for economic (towns, port, airports, etc.) and political (Somaliland/Isaq leadership) assets.

The Egal administration won the war and succeeded to maintain stability and administration structures in the western zone. However, the governance and political costs that would affect the destiny of the Somaliland “nation state” agenda were too high. President Egal established a political machinery and system of governance that was almost a reproduce of one party state. Dissidence would not be allowed and many politicians went into self-exile or were forced into exile, some of them later joining the (southern) Somalia peace and reconciliation conferences and successive Somalia transitional governments. The role of the judic iary was constrained. President Egal masterfully manipulated the Charter and gradually changed it to his political suit.

President Egal organized another beel conference in Hargeisa in 1997 to extend and give legitimacy to his administration (which was elected in 1993 for only a two year transitional period). Despite the questionable legitimacy of the conference as major clans (e.g. the Garhajis/Isaq and Harti clans) were totally absent or not genuinely represented, the conference was convened. The political catchphrase this time was “no one would be waited for” (la-isu-joojin-maayo) and hence the process was not based on building consensus and societal harmony. The elections and political eminence of the two Houses of Elders and parliament are summed up in Box 3.

Box 2: Government structures and state of decentralization

Apparently there are the three pillars of a state, i.e. executive, legislative and judiciary. However, the system can barely be described as a democracy. Because of the strong presidency that has easily operated through clan-political manipulations and institutional corruption (exploiting the perpetual and politically motivated clan factionalisms), the legislative and judiciary bodies have merely been apparatuses exploited by the presidency for its ends. There have been no effective checks and balances on the central government. The role of the judiciary has been constrained. The legislative bodies could be easily bought (and/or mobilized on clan-political basis) to endorse what the presidency wants.

As far as decentralization is concerned, it would appear that there are three levels of devolution of power (along the lines of the previous Somalia governments): national/central, regional and district. However, the regions and districts do not often function as structures enhancing responsiveness and accountability to the local level. The creation of many new districts and an additional region were not planned within the context of a decentralization political process or based on viable decentralized development zonal units or ensured interregional equity, but were more of geographical political expressions that would favor the government politics of the day. [In some African countries, the debate is still going on the suitable levels of de volution and whether it should be two (national and county) or four (national, regional, county and location). In Somaliland, the concept has still to be appreciated].

Instead of decentralization, Hargeisa has become the city-state (exactly as Mogadishu was in former Somalia) in which are concentrated all the effective political, administrative and decision-making resources. The political-administrative structures operating from there are too massive and highly bureaucratic, with over 50 ministers, assistant ministers and holders of other ministerial portfolios, in addition to managers of autonomous departments, agencies and statutory bodies. From the legislative side, there are the two Houses of Parliament and Guurti with over 180 members.

A mosaic of other socio-economic and political strata including urban-based traditional elders and leaders in the form of councils and platforms (re below), council of the local government and political parties blend together with that huge government in the political power plays and top-down administrative and development deliberations. The huge bureaucracy in the city-state (too massive for the governance of a small country) influences the events in the rural areas. It influences the elections of, say, a local council and mayor for any district. It exercises social control and brings round any changes (resource use, conflicts, etc.) in the rural areas. Aid implementing organizations that would implement a project in a location would have to pass through and be endorsed by that socio-political officialdom.

Box 3: Elections and political eminence of the two Houses of Parliament and Guurti (Elders)

The candidates for both the House of Parliament and the House of Guurti in 1993 and 1977 were supposedly to be elected via clan-based quotas. According to the 1993 Charter, as there were no census on which to base the distribution of the political resources between the clans, they would be shared on the basis of the 1960 (independence) ratios In this formula, the three major Isaq clans (Habar Awal, Habar Yonis and Habar Je’lo) and the major Harti clan (Dhulbahante) would be ranked as A categories and allocated equal quotas. The other clans, including the Dir (Gadabursi and Isse) and the other clans (of Isaq and Harti) would be B or C categories according to their 1960 weighing. Furthermore, the candidates from each clan would have to be endorsed by their traditional leadership.

Although there were discrepancies, the quota system was more or less followed in the 1993 Borame Conference. However, the sense and implication of the House of Guurti was deformed. It was not filled with genuine traditional leaders and elders (Guurti) representative of the clans but mainly with the socio-political elite’ and generic participants attending the conference.

The above tentative traditional formula of sharing political resources was radically distorted in the 1997 Beel Conference in Hargeisa. The government convened the conference although some clans were absent or not genuinely represented, and determined the clan quotas and candidates to the two Houses according to its political suit. The western clans were favored.

The eastern Dhulbahante (Harti) clan was reduced in rank to category B. Where the clans were absent or their candidates were judged to be potential opponents to the administration, their seats were filled with “unclassified elements” at hand from the ranks of these clan constituencies. For example, President Egal totally rejected the list of the candidates forwarded by the leading Dhulbahante Gerad, Gerad Abdigani Gerad Jama, whom he viewed as a formidable and potential political rival.

Subsequently the political statuses of the Houses were exchanged. In the 1993 Charter, the House of Parliament would hold the second position (to the presidency) in the protocol, political and decision-making hierarchy. The compromise reached in the Borame conference was upturned and the first hierarchical position transferred to the House of Guurti.

Anyhow as the two Houses have remained with limited political and technical resources, the presidency has continued to exploit them through the same old clan-political and corruptive practices and to play one against the other to achieve its political goals.

The House of Guurti is not practically a “traditional chamber” but another political layer parallel to and hierarchically above the House of Parliament. Its current President was a senior educator, SNM leaders, and senior politician who held key ministerial positions in various governments (past and present).

The Egal administration could not tackle the mounting problems including swelling corruption, failure of the smooth functioning of vital institutions such as the judiciary, decline of the economic fortunes (mainly because of livestock export bans imposed by the Gulf countries), development disparities between regions (especially between west and east), failure of the government to extend its administration effectively to the eastern regions, and the failure of the administration to solic it international “recognition”. More acutely the administration could not find a solution to the perpetual mistrust between socio-political groups that was by and large structured along clan segments.

Opposition was mounting during the latter years of Egal’s presidency. This was mainly coming from the SNM elite’ who felt that their rights to leadership and power (after so many years of struggle) was deprived by the talented and old politician who himself was not part to that crusade and struggle, in addition to traditional leaders who felt sidetracked and their positions in society given to unclassified Guurti.

One key issue in which the administration was contested was to introduce a multi-party system, draft a constitution and carry out a referendum on it. This would supposedly give ultimate legality to the “secession and regain of independence”. In preparations for the process, President Egal changed the geopolitics of Somaliland to strengthen his power base (From Berbera westward). He created many new districts mostly in the western zone, made Berbera District (the town of his clan social base) a new region (Sahil region), and determined the number and locations of polling stations, all geographical political expressions favoring the western zone.

However, the process proved self-defeating. The Harti clans rejected the referendum to be conducted in their eastern zone. There it was viewed as only an attempt of forced legalization of domination by the Hargeisa administration (and its clan social bases) over the Harti clan territories. More serious blunder that might question the validity of the referendum and the subsequent political processes was the referendum results allegedly obtained. It was estimated that little less than 1.2 million people voted and up to 98 percent supported the constitution. The Electoral Commission sponsored by the administration provided the most bizarre and “wide of the mark” electoral figures that could not reflect not only a logical (or even the most exaggerated) estimate of the “population base” of the zones were the referendum was supposedly conducted (i.e. excluding the eastern Harti zone) but also all of Somaliland.

President Riyale Kahin inherited the political and administrative machinery, confusion and growing opposition and dissidence left by President Egal. Being from the Gadabursi clan (Dir) he could not be more than a “compromise president”, as the vicious political rivalry and the latent long-standing mistrusts between the socio-political elite’ of the three main Isaq clans would not allow neither of them to fill straight forwardly the Somaliland/Isaq “political vacuum” left by the late Egal.

The political discrepancies within the Isaq gave a window of opportunity for Riyale to hold onto the presidency. At the same time, however, he could not become a strong leader who could take glaring decisions. One of his initial steps was his ill-fated trip to Las-Anod where Dhulbahante groups rebuffed him with anti-demonstrations and armed confrontation. The misfortune catalyzed the coming out into the open of the political divergences and the mistrusts between clans and almost closed the chapter of Hargeisa/Somaliland administration’s make-believed extension to the eastern regions.

6. Recap of the implications of the traditional structures and Guurti in peacekeeping, reconciliation and “national state” building

The role of the traditional leaders and elders in the reconciliation, state building and peace making and keeping has often been analyzed with exaggerative and romantic views of a presumed historical and traditional past practices. These overlook the physiological transformations induced by both external influences and the new social and economic/livelihood systems to some extent discussed in the previous sections.

The limited clout of the traditional leadership per se was demonstrated by the events dating back to the military regime and the ensuing civil strife. From the colonial era, they became associated with and integrated into the urban political and administrative structures. They colluded with the corruptive civilian administrations (1960-1969) when profound clan sociopolitical fractures occurred and their status as super-clan authorities were weakened. They joined and were exploited by the military regime and the rebel movements and dragged their clan constituencies into the bloody conflicts.

Following the fall of the regime, they were powerless (or otherwise complacent) in the anarchy, inter-clan conflicts and atrocities that prevailed for over 7 years. Following Egal’s building of a “national state” administration, they did not show capabilities to become a voice for democratization, decentralization and devolution approach to development and participation. Instead they converged into the major towns of Burao and Hargeisa (becoming this time the city-states) to vie for their political appreciation by the administration. As they were riders of contrasting political platforms, they could not provide consensual legitimacy to the “nation state” administration. They could not resolve the perpetual factionalism within the socio-political elite’ of the Isaq clan family or engage themselves on a sustainable basis in a constructive political reconciliation with the eastern Harti clans to secure the Somaliland agenda or contain and prevent the actual and potential inter-clan conflicts and hostilities bubbling in the east. They are immobilized in the face of the latent conflicts in the Erigavo/Sanag belt and have failed to resolve the perpetual conflict (almost certainly also politically-sustained) on land issues between the Jibril Abokor sub-clan (Sa’ad Muse/Habar Awal) and Gadabursi sub-clans along the Gebiley/Borame belt in the west.

Instead, they have more and more shifted from their “traditional positions and functions” towards urban socio-political statuses. They have become and more linked both formally and informally to the government structures as explained in Box 4. It can be claimed by now that there is no more traditional Guurti in the classical sense in control of societal and clan constituency affairs as such. Over the years of transformations, they were joined in their roles, and often overpowered, by the military, political and economic elite’ with whom they constitute a new social and elite’ class. The peace-making and reconciliation meetings were convened, organized and implemented by this class spearheaded by the SNM political and military elite’ and later by President Egal’s administration. The idealistic and romantic traditional Guurti of which researchers on Somaliland reconciliation processes talk a lot about would not have the political and power assets to guide and implement such processes.

Box 4: Formal and informal linkages of the traditional structures with the government structures

As has also been highlighted in Boxes 2 and 3, the traditional structures have been absorbed into the urban-based top-down government and administrative structures. It has to be remembered that many of the current “traditional” leaders were ex-civil servants, ex-police or security officers, ex-militias, ex-traders, and so on and so on With the political contests increasing, they have also exercised and expressed their sociopolitical status. There have been further makings of new kings (Isimo) and chiefs (Aqils) as pros or cons to this or that political platform. Many middle -level elders have promoted themselves and joined the race of the traditional leadership for political appreciation and associated possessions. Over 20 Isimo formed their own council to referee and mediate the political processes but instead practically operated as a stern opposition group to the government. The administration from its side rehabilitated and furnished a house in Burao for over 80 Aqils to meet regularly, to form a new traditional political force parallel to that of the self-made “Council of Isimo”, and to support the government.

Therefore, the engagement of the traditional structures in the political-administrative and governance structures manifests in different and contrasting forms, with having members in the House of Guurti and Parliament, the self-made “Council of Isimo”, and the governmentsupported “Platform of Aqils”. After the elections of the councils of the local governments (where municipality elections were held), a fourth structure in which the traditional elders have become members together with the other associated socio-political elite’ are the “District Councils”. To these can be added the many other urban based traditional elders and leaders who operate as political middlemen, mobilizers and opinion makers.

In the final analysis, they are increasingly detached from their rural social functions and clan territories and more and more part of the urban political and governance machinery. Because of their new roles in this political-administrative machinery and limited direct and supportive involvement in their pastoral and rural clan territories, they are now often referred to as the koofiyad-ba’leyaal (Koofiyad-ba’le meaning the elder with the “plastic hat” and signifying fakeness and simulation) Their bareness of the idealist and romantic traditional virtues and ethics and their ultimate failure in that sense was demonstrated by their lack of reaction (or their passivity or complicity) to the imprisonment and cla imed abuses of a “16-year girl” as a “spy agent” from the adjacent Puntland regional state of Somalia by the Riyale administration. The case was handled outside any traditional code and strongly condemned by national and international human rights advocates and institutions.

7. Another illustration of the weakness of the traditional structures: Changes in resource use management in the agro-pastoral areas in the western regions

A brief review of resource use and associated socio-territorial dimensions have been discussed in section 2.2. Definable clan/sub-clan lineage segments (comprising more or less homogenous/heterogeneous groups) claimed ownership and rights to the use of common property resources and regulated the use of the given resource by their members. Otherwise free rider individuals would overexploit and misuse the resources leading to “tragedy of the commons”.

However, under the compulsion of the highly uncertain environment, every community/social group needed to access to a large area of land to ensure sufficient pasture and water across seasons. Therefore, each party was compelled to develop reciprocal social relationships with the adjacent groups in order to move across a series of eco-zones that complement each other in resource availability across seasons and years. This permitted loose and flexible resource use system allowing for mobility and overlaps between groups over a wide geographical area. The resource use was defined as “common property regime” whereby specific resources were managed and protected by user groups/communities in contrast to an “open access regime” whereby free riders would overexploit the common resources outside the traditional frame.

Due to increased aridity, recurrent droughts, socio-economic and demographic changes, inadequate policies, prolonged conflicts and loosened and weakened traditional institutions, there have been extensive changes in resource use management in the face of which the traditional structures have become powerless to control. The following example relates to the relatively high rainfall areas of the western areas (encompassing Hargeisa, Gebiley and Borame) where agro-pastoralism (i.e. livelihood system encompassing some form of cropping) is practiced.

Multiple factors had contributed to spur the population who were nomadic pastoralists to settle and take up farming. The trend initially owed much to an Islamic revival in the 19th century. Islamic holy men viewed that settled farming communities were a necessary prerequisite for keeping the ir students together and set up a number of small farming communities in the western zone. One of the first of such settlements was the Jame’a settlement near Gabiley.

Just at about that time, before the end of the 19th century, drastic geopolitical changes occurred that completely transformed the land use patterns as a result of the British colonial administration. By drawing borderlines between Ethiopia and Somaliland first in 1948 and then in 1954, large parts of grazing areas (then referred to as “reserved areas” and now partially corresponding to the southeastern rangelands of the Somali Region 5 of Ethiopia) came under full Ethiopian rule. The privileges and rights of access of the pastoralists to these grazing lands changed. The remaining grazing la nds (within the western zone of Somaliland) became narrower.

Within shrinking grazing resources and growing human population more and more people turned into cultivation, a trend that intensified in the 1950s. As pastoral livestock production in the communal ranges was still prevalent and agropastoral farming holdings were expanding, it was inevitable for the typical traditional conflicts over resources to increase. The trends were obviously kindled by external factors (Islamic practices and British colonial administration). At the same time, however, the demographic and economic pressure, which traditional structures could do not anything about, intensified. Gradually there was a change from the common property to open access regimes and conflicts over resources increased.

The traditional leadership and Guurti would not have contained the conflicts if not for the intervention of the colonial administration that introduced the concept of “clan grazing territories” defining borderlines between clan territories and drew a demarcation line (locally known as the “meter”) between farming areas and communal grazing areas. The area up to 10 km south of Hargeisa and widening to the west was earmarked for farming. The area beyond and to the south (towards the Ethiopian border) of the line was reserved for communal grazing.

Following independence the trends could not be halted, further pressure (including villagization, private water development in the form of water cisterns or berkads and private range enclosures) was placed on the wider remaining rangelands, and the “meter” was also surpassed. The economic policies of the 1970s of the military regime and aimed to achieve self-sufficiency in food production encouraged agriculturalization. This policy was misused by the socio-political elite’ that enclosed private lands both in the form of private enclosures and farm holdings in the very marginal lands. Both the government and the traditional structures could not address the land use changes, although the government extended the “meter” slightly to the south.

During the conflict and post-conflict periods, the transformations accelerated with a rapid pace. A chaotic system of rush for private land holdings evolved. The best grazing resources (e.g. fertile pasture valleys) were misappropriated and stock routes compromised, all at the expense of the wider pastoral and transhumant agro-pastoral communities. Successive droughts, sedentarization, uncontrolled expansion of water sources (e.g. berkads), and intensive exploitation on a wider scale of the declining resources (e.g. commercial firewood and charcoal production, private enclosures for commercial fodder production, etc.) as a form of income and employment have had adverse environmental impacts. The changes have provoked fear in the public who became deeply convinced that widespread land degradation occurred.

The concerns prompted the current Somaliland administration (like the previous administrations, both colonial and post-colonial) to embark on two activities: To redemarcate the “meter” to catch up with the changed land use patterns and to dismantle the private enclosures in the original communal ranges and open them for communal grazing.

This was to be implemented through the Ministry of Pastoral/Rural Development. The pastoral/rural communities were quite explicit about their desire to preserve the communal ranges and reverse the changes that affected them. This was a clear indication of the relevance of extensive livestock rearing for their livelihoods and food security. They received with enthusiasm the administration’s intervention but remained anxious about whether it would enforce and sustain the policy.

The administration’s efforts failed for several reasons despite the huge resources it allocated for and spent on the two exercises and despite the full support of the public:

- The pastoral and rural communities remained so unorganized and socially fragmented and lacked local functioning and effective traditional structures to adopt and hold onto the administration’s interventions of managing the resources.

- The demographic and economic pressures that were the spur of the changes were still there and had only increased; the whole complex issue of land use changes should be viewed within the context of population pressures, poverty and the people striving to get sources of income; it should also be looked at in relation to the increasing intracommunity economic stratification with the more powerful social and economic elite expressing a firm desire (and achieving) to acquire private land holdings in the communal areas.

- There were deep inter-community disparities entailing pursuance of diverse strategies (e.g. populations of high potential versus marginal areas); Even if a community strived to manage the vital communal resources of a specific micro-spatial area or tried to dismantle the private enclosure, this would not be viable and sustainable if the same strategies were not applied by the bordering communities given the multisocial and territorial dimensionality of resource use.

- The administration was so weak to enforce the laws or to devise and implement policies (social, institutional and economic) that would avert the very underlying causes that were catalyzing the negative trends in land use.

From above it can be deduced that the old customs and practices including the functions of traditional institutions were transformed through (and could not shield themselves from) historical processes of external influences including Islamic interventions, colonial rule and economic and development policies of successive post-colonial government administrations.

The unorganized populace and their traditional structures in the traditional sense could not also sustain the self-management of resources as they could not deal with and restrain the inevitable demographic and economic pressures and changes that have entailed inter- and intra-community social and economic differentiations and radical changes in land use patterns.

8. Other relevant non-state actors

8.1. Religious institutions and organizations

The religious organizations are a very highly respected and organized form of local structures that play among other things crucial dimensions in social relations and particularly in conflict management. They are the grassroots knowledge-based institutions and producers of the core values of the society.

Historically, the faith-lines or Dariiqooyin have been deeply rooted in society as the basis for spirituality, primary educators (mainly in faith) of the young, and key players in conflict resolution. In the recent past, the most highly evolved of these has been the Rabii’ya tracing its religious school of thought to the Qaadiriya line.

The peculiarity of the Rabii’ya is its built-in values and capacities of social mobilization and communality. There are religious settlements or campsites (Xer or Dariiqo settlements) not only in Somaliland but also throughout Somalia that lodge thousands and thousands of followers. An individual belonging to this Dariiqo will find accommodation and religious socialization almost in every town of Somalia he visits. The members communally share and manage resources and assets (livestock, farms, etc.). They provide services including teachings in Islam, holy blessings for people and animals, or ganization of religious prayer feasts (e.g. Alla- Bari), etc. They are well known for their rituals of Sufism and praises and blessings for Prophet Mohamed and religious heirs and descendants.

As with the Christian church organizations in Africa (for example, in Kenya and other eastern African countries), the Muslim religious institutions in Somalia were in the lead in cultivating nationalism and unity of purpose among the people in the struggle against colonialism. In Somaliland, The Darwiish (Salihiya) movement lead by Sayid Mohamed Abdalla Hassan waged a holy war against colonial Britain for over 21 years.

However, the Dariiqooyin, unlike their Christian equivalents in eastern Africa, have had their organizational eminence still remaining within the “traditional context” and their outreach capacity has not evolved to embrace and become engaged in the wider governance and development issues. Despite their distinguished role in society, both the colonial administration and post-colonial Somalia governments have alienated and marginalized them.

Specially donors and international aid implementing agencies have avoided interacting with them may be because they have not fallen with their window of worldview, or because of the marked sensitivity and phobic perceptions from both ends, or because the conservative religious institutions have not been receptive to the western organizations (presumably originating from Christian countries).

The Dariiqooyin have been viewed more or less as moderate religious-cultural institutions. In recent times and particularly during the conflict period, more fundamentalist religious organizations have developed. The most significant has been the Itihaad. Initially it had its leadership based in southern Somalia and most probably ha d external links from which it drew massive support. Other related fundamentalist sects include Ikhwaan, Tabliiq, Islaah, etc.

Following the authority breakdown and chaos as a result of the civil strife, most people including large numbers of internally displaced found refugee in the clanism structures and/or in the religious institutions and especially in Itihaad which had come with resources compared to the more traditional people -supported Dariiqooyin.

The Itihaad established strongholds in the Awdal (Borame) western region and in the eastern regions (Togdheer, Sool and Sanag) and in the adjacent Puntland regions. Initially it did not become so strong in the other western regions where SNM was establishing an administration. It intensified Islamic teachings, built schools, provided other social services, and supported orphanages and the poor. It soon grew in popularity. However, the people immediately realized that the organization had a more expedient political fantasy (i.e. establishing an Islamic state) as it amassed thousands of young men that would join the Islamic militants already brought from southern Somalia.

The Itihaad militants soon waged a military campaign against SSDF militia that regrouped after the fall of the regime and led by Col. Adbullahi Yusuf Ahmed8 who was then striving to establish an administration in Puntland regions. The conflict was bloody with heavy toll on both sides. However, the Itihaad organization as a military entity was destroyed and dismantled.

The militaristic venture and radical ideology of Itihaad backfired against it. The organization failed to motivate further subscriptions to its militant campaign and could not instigate an upsurge of the masses that were gradually losing their passion for radicalism. Subsequently it has self-transformed from the militancy structure to a highly efficient and self-supporting network of trade and business entrepreneurs, entities and associations.

It has also been joined in the crusade by the other associated cults (Islaah, Tabliiq , etc.) that would give a moderate face to the fundamentalist ideologies. The transformation has allowed the organization to attract the young desperately faced with unemployment. People that are more or less signed onto the Itihaad ideology presently run many of the mid- and large-scale businesses. However, many young people that join the network may not necessarily be true believers of that ideology but have to practice the Itihaad fundamentalist practices to ensure their affiliation to the remunerative network. In addition, as the network is more aggressively material and business oriented, the wider populace and the traditional social sectors are wary of the impact that the absolute materialization of relations would have on the social support networks and on the social culture of hospitality and communality. They also hardly accept the overturning by fundamentalism of the traditional religious rituals based on religious socializations and praises for the Prophet, Alla-bari, etc. that since times immemorial became part of the cultural construct of the society. The mistrust of their political fantasy and militancy also remains widespread.

Currently there are intense competitions and subtle clashes between religious ideologies promoted by different cults and sects. These have further disintegrated social structures and harmony. In addition, from the perspective of the uncomplicated understanding of religion and good governance, the religious organizations may be challenged to have a culture of centralization and to have not contributed to democratization processes.

On the other hand, they have managed and applied sharia law in criminal, civic and social disputes, and, thus, have had a major role in conflict resolution processes. They are knowledge-based institutions and the only traditional local organizations with “visible” organizational frames despite their wide variances and emphatic pursuance of diverse faith agendas. They are a thriving force in the private sector and provide social services.

Therefore, efforts to promote good governance and development should not overlook the opportunities to exploit enhanced faith based organizations and approaches.

8.2.Civil society organizations

“Civil society” is defined as one of the three ‘spheres’ (together with state and market) that interface in the making of democratic societies. Civil society is the sphere in which social movements become organized. In the classical sense, these include church (religious) related groups, trade unions, cooperatives, service organizations, community groups and youth organizations, as well as academic institutions and others.

Somaliland and Somalia as a whole at present (as well as in the past) has had no “in democratic terms” such societal structures or other permanent representative committees of other constituent interest groups and the like operating in a regular pattern and whose nature can be described, in the classical sense, as CSOs. The only exception may have been the religious institutions.

In the Somali context, when talking about civil society organizations (CSOs), reference is typically made only to newly fashioned and introduced organizations such as Local Non- Governmental Organizations (L-NGOs) and Community-based Organizations (CBOs), and to other civic groups (e.g. human rights groups) which are still in the formation to have meaningful profile.

8.2.1. Local non-governmental organizations (L-NGOs)

Within that background and following the civil strife and breakdown of authority and security, donors and aid implementing organizations and agencies have worked for the last 15 years through CSOs (mainly L-NGOs) to deliver aid projects and to fill the gaps in social service and development provisions in the Somali failed state and, consequently, provided the motifs and incentives for the unlimited proliferation of such local organizations. However, the L-NGOs have mainly been created as survival strategies for few individuals and groups, have seldom developed themselves legitimate governance and management structures, have displayed limited professionalism, have not social base or constituency to represent or account to, and have mostly operated as private entities or contractors (and, therefore, cannot be attributed voluntary or charity qualities).

For their own sustainability, they have been project-dependent and, therefore, a component of the aid system. Simply in the classical sense and in terms of international development philosophy, it would be easier said than justified to define them as genuine CSOs as they have not evolved into or provide the terrain and sphere around which social movements are organized to create a democratic society.

The limited progress made by aid projects that attempted to promote strong civil society (comprising their brand of L-NGOs) can be demonstrated by assessing these local organizations through a basic and simple checklist of attributes that most of them will hardly reach the pass mark. These include (in addition to professionalism and development leadership): Links to local traditional institutions and accountably to social base; Level of uptake of the civil society concept, good governance, participation, etc.; Obligations (and/or experiences) to partner with other organizations; Capacity to mobilize local resources and provide own inputs to local initiatives and provide services on a charitable basis; Contributions or challenges to public policy; Ability to transcend the alternative employment or demise of founding managers/leaders, etc.

Overall the communities and other local stakeholders view the L-NGOs as an urban-based social elite’ and contractors (i.e. far away from the local social environment) seeking out opportunities and implementing aid projects on behalf of patron aid implementing organizations.

In addition, the approach of using L-NGOs as the sole local aid partners has fostered the dependence of the rural communities on these intermediary organizations and this has resulted to the “de-empowerment” of the communities themselves. The L-NGOs develop only transient, operational and project-dependent relations with the communities and rarely carry for them capacity building works (as they themselves are already underprovided). The capacity of the communities and their organizations (CBOs) to undertake local initiatives by themselves or make appropriate claims on the other aid stakeholders remains as limited as ever.

Finally the approach of pumping aid only through the local intermediary organizations (LNGOs) has created a climate of mistrust between the sectors/stakeholders (communities, local organizations and local/civil authorities) and rendered disservice to building social harmony and good governance between and within the stakeholders.

In practical terms, civil society should be built on those local organizations (e.g. L-NGOs) that show capacities and potentials to evolve as effective CSOs gradually and progressively acquire and adopt the attributes of a legitimate civil society and that become linked to local societal structures for representation and transparency. It should also address the civic responsibility and accountability at the local leadership and socio-economic elite’ levels that directly affect the communities. Taken as a whole it should positively influence the traditional practices towards more participation, inclusiveness, accountability and transparency and foster and strengthen the “linkage” structures and self-regulating capabilities of stakeholder institutions. In other words, the traditional and modern institutional structures should reciprocally support each other to effect the necessary social change.

8.2.2. Community based organizations (CBOs)

The other organizational structures that have been introduced into the society social fabric are the CBOs including Community Development Committee –CDC and/or Village Development Committee –VDC and their technical sub-committees such as water, health, livestock, etc. committees. The following discussions have been partially reported in Hashi (2004) 9: The functions of the CBOs have included facilitating and coordinating community development processes, selecting community workers (health, water, veterinary, etc.), supervising community service provisions, and ensuring the sustainability of the community services.

Looking into the structural base of the CBOs and in particular the CDCs or VDCs, they have not necessarily been “formal representatives” of the wider community in the absolute sense. Particularly in the predominantly pastoral areas, the village based community structures cannot be all inclusive as the larger portion of the pastoralists may not be accessible at any one time. Therefore, the CDCs generally comprise members from the relatively elite’ and village-based sections of the pastoral/rural communities.

In terms of intra- community social stratification, the peripheral pastoral communities view the CDCs (in terms of representation and accountability) no different from the town-based socio-economic elite’ including traditional leaders and elders. In contrast, the village-based social sectors express the need for and support the existence of CDCs as their local development structures and extended arm interacting with organizations and agencies providing assistance and resources. From this angle, the CDCs would convey and defend the interests of their pastoral/rural social bases and interact with other stakeholders on behalf of them.

The CDCs, therefore, tend to have dual roles naturally within the confines of the local power plays and authority domains. On one hand, they are “intermediary” grassroots development/support organizations. On they hand, they express to have “representational” functions as they convey the interests of their clan social bases. At times, they confront traditional leadership and social elite’ when the latter mismanage resources to be channeled to the clan-territorial areas and villages.

It would be interesting to formalize and enhance these structures as both “development” and as more “inclusive and representative” entities of the socio-territorial constit uencies and of all social segments (including migratory pastoralists, women and the poor and marginalized).

For that scope, their institutional capacities would strengthened in such areas as governance, participatory approaches, problem identification/solving, advocacy, and negotiations and communications.

8.2.3. Professionals and their associations

In developing civil society, another significant sector are the professional associations that are better positioned to interface with and face up to local governance structures and aid implementing organizations while at the same time operating at the bottom-tier level of society (i.e. at community levels).

The professionals and their associations (education/teaching, medical, veterinary, agronomy, etc.) are placed in a privileged position in society due to the members’ higher education and to their direct link to the community (both rural and urban) providing the essential services. With their professionalism (and if properly organized and mobilized) they can assume enough power to protect themselves individually and collectively against inappropriate political pressures. They can grow up to have a common collective stand and take risks (as pressure groups) to promote the interests of their clients and the wider public. This may give them a more productive and valuable status compared to other CSOs.

Therefore, a civil society development program should emphasize this sector (perhaps more than the newfashioned organizations) and:

- Build their capacities in organizational and development leadership, good governance, advocacy, etc. in addition to their specialist technical expertism and competence

- Empower them to undertake credible advocacy role for the public interest

- Support them to create “forums” where public and private sectors communicate and communally support each other for the wider public interest, and through which key principles such participatory approaches and democratic principles are promoted

9. Position of women in local governance and development

In previous sections (3.2 and 3.3), the traditional and cultural dichotomies in the status of women have been briefly discussed. From one side, women are historically to the present day esteemed as indispensable social components of household management and livelihoods. Inter-marriage has been a key strategy for resolution of bloody conflicts and for communal and reciprocal use of resources and for building mutual trusts between social groups and communities. The most serious offenses have included those carried against women.

On the other side, they are excluded by a conservative tradition and culture of gender barriers. Often their basic rights have been violated to the extent of valuing them half of men in the traditional homicide compensation system. They have been excluded from the local power play and not “counted” (mainly because of the patriarchal nature of the society but also may be as a manifestation of their second class citizenry) in the most binding and quantifiable social factor, i.e. the dia/jifi-payment that has been based on the male size population of clans and social segments.

Women should be viewed as key players in the development process. There are widely held inferences on the role of women and on gender relations that are even acknowledged by the most traditionally conservative men, including the following (partially extracted from Hashi, 2004):

- Women are the effectual working force in pastoral/rural areas sustaining household livelihoods. In villages and towns, estimates indicate that women support over 60 percent of households.

- If the male passes away from a household it is very likely that the female -headed household will endue and continue to exist as a household. If the female dies, it is very unlikely that the male -headed household protracts and carries on for long.

- Women are very active (and more productive compared to men) in trade and business.

- Women are more devoted to family social support and network systems.

- Women have run women NGOs and umbrella organizations at times more dynamically compared to those managed by men. From the above inferences, women are fully exposed to and are key players in the difficult social and survival challenges. At the same time, they are restrictive to the traditional leadership, decision-making and participation at the community level and excluded from the administrative and political structures.

In the building the “nation state” administration, they have not been included in the two Houses of Elders and Parliament. In the few cases they have been considered (e.g. as members of Local Government Council), their representation has been only nominal.

Recently a lady from one of the clans of Toghdeer region ventured to seek publicly the position of “traditional queen” from her clan base and from women constituencies. There was an outcry from the male population and especially from the traditional elite’. Her case was turned into comedian and mocking romance.

The dichotomy of the traditional culture is summed up by the conservative rural men’s acknowledgement that “ even within the confines of culture and faith, women are overexploited, and for most of their actions towards women they would be judged negatively and doomed in the Final Day”.

Taking into account the above acknowledgement of the traditionally conservative men and women’s successful exposure as traders, professionals and managers of NGOs that interface with the male-dominated society (both rural and urban), their new roles should be strengthened and expanded to generate wider diffusion effects on women’s consciousness and recognition of their indispensable roles and statuses in the traditional culture.

10. Challenges and trends: Engaging and going beyond the traditional leadership and Guurti for local governance and development

The report stresses that governance and peace and stability have been conditioned and often constrained by the marriage of corruptive political and governance systems and clanism. The traditional virtues and fortunes have been absorbed into a top-down socio-political and administrative system where the corruptive aspirations of the few social, economic and political elite’ (including traditional leadership and Guurti) reign supremacy over the interests of the wider public. The social structures based on the clan system have been so transformed, deformed and manipulated to be currently one of the major constraints to good governance and development.

The traditional structures in the form of traditional leadership and Guurti have become part of the socio-political system that has been subdivided into contesting and allying factions and which exploiting clanism have dragged the clan constituencies into hostilities and conflicts beyond their cultural boundaries. They have been unable to resolve the perpetual factionalism, to prevent actual and latent conflicts, to become engaged in constructive political reconciliation processes and to provide consensual legitimacy to the attempts to establish a “nation state” administration. In this last aspect, the endeavors of Hargeisa/Somaliland administration’s make-believed extension to and inclusion of the eastern regions has not materialized. In addition, it is obvious that they cannot cope with the demographic and economic pressures and increasing poverty and the consequent social stratifications, transformations and irreversible resource and land use changes.

From the other side, through a bottom-up natural process, the Somali traditional and cultural practices including domineering elements and dictatorial tendencies and the culture of domination, division of roles and exclusion has emanated from the pastoral/rural base to the urban socio-politics where they are exponentially applied and perpetually resist to go along with efforts to adapt modern and democratic manage ment of society. The marriage between clanism and corruptive political and administrative structures results in abuse of power, denial of rights of all to fair and equal opportunities and profound socio-economic differentiations.

The other crucial factor that impacts on local governance is that it is difficult to draw a demarcation line between pastoral/rural and urban social sectors. The rural-urban link is so well built and physiological that events in rural areas cannot occur without a significant influence from the urban social sectors. The close integration of the rural production and livelihood system to the market economies of the trading centers (makeshift camps, villages and towns) has been pointed out. At the same time the urban-based socio-political elite’ has direct interests in the clan-territorial bases and influences the events and changes (resource use, conflicts, etc) there. They exercise social control, shape trade transactions, influence would-be beneficiaries of development resources, guide local political evolutions and, consequently, influence the opportunities for the wider peripheral population and especially for the poor.

From the above explanation of the constraints of the traditional culture and social structure, it is unavoidable to go beyond the idealist and romantic views of the role of traditional structures for local governance and development. Examples have been cited showing the inevitable need for some form of (government) authority system, e.g. in resource management, containing and preventing conflicts, sustaining rule of the law (embracing both customary and civil laws), and devising and implementing governance and development policies (social, institutional and economic) that would avert the very underlying causes of the negative social transformations.

It has to be recalled that the relationship between the wider public and their governors, politicians and governance structures have never been defined and the issue of participation and accountability never been adapted from the local to the national levels. The creation of numerous administrative units, sub-districts and districts has been only geographical political expressions and not intended to be different layers of governance (e.g. central and country/local) that would allow decentralization and devolution approach to development and participation.

The local governance structures that might have been developed by the wider public and the rural masses are under the strong influence of that socio-economic and political elite’ that expresses itself in the form of urban-based traditional leadership and Guurti, businessmen, members of “Councils of Districts”, “House of Guurti”, “House of Parliament”, “Council of Isimo”, “Platforms of Aqils” and other urban elders and political middlemen, and administrators, governors and politicians. This mosaic of social strata flourishes to reach their aspirations of social, economical and political statuses on the backs of the unorganized clan/populace constituencies. These are enslaved into a perpetual state of mobilization and divisiveness at their sacrifice for the benefit of those social strata.

For promotion of local governance and development, therefore, the first question coming into mind is how to engage and bypass those reactionary and politically corrupt social strata and reach out the wider public and rural masses to work for good governance, societal harmony and sustainable development. In fact, promotion of local governance if local-centered, i.e. targeting a locality, village, social segment or community, cannot realize social and development changes at the very localized contexts if the needed practice changes are not also facilitated at the higher institutional levels (social and economic elite’ at the district, regiona l and national levels) that are affecting the same local communities.

Certainly the socio-economic elite’, other non-state actors and local government structures will not adopt and apply good governance and accountability overnight. However, the pivotal local government structures (e.g. at a district level) are irreplaceable as the nucleus and focal point with which the other stakeholders (socio-economic elite’ including traditional leadership and Guurti, CSOs and private sector) will interface to promote and sustain peace, stability and a democratic society, and to coordinate and realize sustainable development. A key priority, therefore, would be to regenerate the local government institutions and provide strategic technical assistance packages aimed at their human resources development and institutional development. It should also be at this level to stress civic responsibilities, good governance and accountability.

The efforts at these relatively higher institutional levels and framed around participatory and transparency practices should simultaneously be descended down the beneficiary hierarchies to the target communities whose capacities should be built to adapt good practices and rekindle bottom-up development processes. A key strategic objective here would be to facilitate and support the pastoral/rural communities to organize themselves, have an effective voice in the institutions affecting their lives, achieve their civil and political rights and plan and implement their development needs.

The experiences and lessons learnt at the local level and the opportunities identified shall be scaled up to inform the stakeholders (socio-economic elite’, other non-state actors, administrators, policy makers, development leaders and planners) at higher district, regional, sub-national and national levels to promote policy and practice changes and to induce the institutions at these levels to become more responsive to good governance and better and sustainable development strategies and programs.

The above recommendations that may appear to be redefining the local governance and development paradigm revolve around two issues:

- The traditional (already romantic, archaic and often a bottleneck to a civilization of social harmony and good governance) and modern institutions should be facilitated and supported to reciprocally support each other to effect the necessary social change.

- The bottom-up principles more saluted in the contemporary international development language should be coupled with top-down approaches engaging the social actors and institutions affecting the livelihoods and the self -governance capabilities of the wider pastoral/rural communities

Finally, priority should be placed on those social sectors and especially “linkages” (to be facilitated and supported) that would have an immediate impact on the wider community and through which good governance and sustainable development could be promoted. A schematic representation of some of the actors (including also CSOs, professional associations and the business community) is provided Figure 1 below. A thorough analysis would identify the “linkages” that would be most productive in the immediate future and those that are now structurally weak (but with relevance and potentiality) to effect social and development changes.

NOTES

1 “Guurti” refers to traditional elders
2 CODE comprises a small group of local consultants with long-term experience in education, research and development who operate on ad hoc basis and provide consultancy services to generate knowledge base and formulate develop programs on the complexities of pastoral and rural environments in the Somali ecosystem.
3 Locally referred to as Gerad, Sultan, Ugas, etc. and generically to as Isin (Isimo, pl.)
4 Classified as the ally/supporter (nin-garbeed), the competent (nin-karmeed), the expert in traditional xeer (gar-yaqaan), etc.
5 Including Qaadiriya, Ahmadiya, Saalihiya, etc.
6 Egal would then become the President of Somaliland from 1993 to 2002
7 Galaydh would later become the first Prime Minister of Somalia (since the fall of the military regime in January1991) in the Transitional National Government (TNG) established in Djibouti
8 Col. Abdullahi Yusuf became the first President of the Puntland Regional State of Somalia. He is now the President of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia (established in Nairobi)
9 Final Evaluation Report of Civil Society Expansion Program (CSEP) – Livestock Sector Sub-grant in Somaliland and Puntland, carried for CARE USA