Brief Report for the World Bank
DRAFT REPORT
March 28, 2005

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Background 3
2. A Brief Historical Account 3
3. Democratic Transitional Process 4
4. Situation of the Democratic Transition at the National Level5
5. Today’s Traditional Structures “ 6
6. Traditional Legal Foundation 9
7. Organizational Structure 10
8. Functions and Powers “ 11
9. Traditional Law “ 11
10. Traditional Justice 12
11. Representation Mechanisms for Authorities 12
12. Local Development 13
13. Protection, Management and Allocation of Natural Resources13
14. Conflict Resolution 14
15. Local Perception of Traditional Structures “ 14
16. Sources Consulted 15

The Somali society, is known traditionally, to be organized into clans with clan lineages that have common culture, language and religion. Each Somali clan or group of clans is known to inhabiting in specific geographic area. Within this area, each clan or group of clans have a social structure with rules that govern their interaction and interaction with other Somali clans.

Much is not written about the rich traditional governance of Somalia but the strength and dispensation of it was altered by the introduction of an alien but modern governance system by the colonial powers. The introduction of this alien governance system to the Somali people could not take pace with the traditional structures. This paper examines the origins of the Somali traditional structures and governance. The paper will also look into the forces and factors that led it to its present status.

2. A Brief Historical Account

The Somali society employed effective traditional governance system (TGS) adoptable to run its mundane matters. An egalitarian in nature, the TGS handled all societal relations between communities, conflicts, resource sharing, and the provision of the rule of law through the traditional customary laws. Mostly pastoral and agro-pastoral communities, the Somalis observed and adhered to the codes and conducts of the TGS.

This traditional system of governance used to consist of a set of contractual agreements (xeer ), which defined the rights and the responsibilities of the individual within a group bound together by ties of kinship based on shared patrilineal descent from a common ancestor and of a similar set of agreements which regulated the group’s relations with other neighboring groups.

Two major events in history have had a drastic effect on Somalia’s TGS: The advent of Islam in the Somali society and The arrival of the colonial powers both of which have influenced the metamorphosis of the Somali traditional governance systems.

The advent of Islam in the Somali society completely purged most of the codes in the TGS that were not compatible with the Islamic Sharia. The Somali customary law bowed to the dictates of Sharia Law, and where the codes didn’t comply, the Sharia overruled.

Somali TGS fell under the domain of Sharia code confines. Although its attributes were indigenous in nature, the merger of the traditional customary laws of Somali society with that of the Sharia Islamic Laws remains until today to be the driving force of the traditional governance system, no matter how many changes were imposed on it.

The other factor that affected the TGS is the arrival of the different European colonial powers in Somalia at the end of the 19th century. The colonial powers have introduced an alien system of governance that did not accommodate the centuries old TGS. The Europeans have introduced a governing system that was incompatible with the then existing TGS. The areas within the territorial boundaries of Somalia, under the control of the European colonizers, were introduced with constitutional laws that either limited or completely obstructed the exercise of the traditional authorities within the communities.

The chief political legacy of the colonial rule was a system of centralized governance imposed on the already decentralized and egalitarian Somali society. Instead of trying to find mutually acceptable compromises between the two systems of governance (the Colonial and the Traditional Governing System of the Somali society), the colonial authorities, especially the Italians, have failed to appreciate the value of the traditional Somali system of governance, which they have undermined systematically and effectively.

The cosmic nature of the TGS, whose political structures were decentralized clan based communal administrations, was fundamentally an essential element of unity between community members. The cultural solidarity between the Somali people was too strong that the whole nation and people rallied to the common cause between communities.

The colonial political and economic interests had clashed with the merger of the TGS and Islamic Sharia of the Somali communities. The clash of the two governance systems created a confused merger of three systems: TGS, Islamic Sharia and the colonial governance systems.

The political legacy of the colonial rule was to earmark the TGS as an obsolete governance system devoid of the necessary mechanisms needed in Urban Somalia. To consolidate the realization of that fact and in order to undermine the legitimate traditional chiefs, the Italians created a new set of paid chiefs loyal to their alien system. For instance, in 1914, there were 577 Chiefs and 72 Judges (Qadis) in south central Somalia, all of them on the colonial government’s payroll 1. The colonialists then went on gradually to erode the impact of the TGS in all the places within their reach. An Italian colonial minister proudly said: “… we can now rely upon the loyalty demonstrated by the clan chiefs to the government, and upon their performance in the interest of the colony”.2

3. Democratic Transitional Process

The subsequent governments that employed the imported colonial administrations laws come short of integrating the TGS into the constitutional democracy adopted by Somalia’s first civilian government. Ironically it followed the steps of the colonial administration.3

After independence, the new ly born republic Somalia inherited two centralized governance systems from the colonial powers, one Italian, and another British, both of which systems were alien and intolerant to the Somali culture. The new Republic politically followed a multi-party parliamentary system with administratively highly centralized governance system.4

The devolution of the Somali traditional governance structure and the rapid introduction of a European system of governance drove the Somali people to a dilemma where they could no longer successfully exercise either of the two systems of governance. For governance was confined to the urban areas. All the remote villages and the nomadic population were oblivious of government existence. Traditional “Xeer” was the only vehicle for governance in many parts of south central Somalia.

The collapse of Somali state, revitalized the role of traditional governance system in urban areas, and the application of “Xeer” became rampant throughout Somalia In the countryside it was life as usual since the collapsed state had no any impact on them.

In 1992, the intervention of the United Nations peace keepers in Somalia (UNOSOM II), soon after the collapse of the state of Somalia, became another milestone in Somalia’s governance history. Some of the external actors that served the UNOSOM II had introduced “the building blocks approach” that was intended to establish local grassroots governance system. This intervention of external peace keepers has also, somehow, evoked the revitalization of Somalia’s traditional governance system.

To foster sustainability of local administration in different towns and cities, the BBA encouraged the ownership of the governance systems by the local people. The involvement of the traditional elders in the building process was an instrumental shift to the previous initiatives. Although the UNOSOM II intervention approached a bottom-up process, it did not go forward to institutionalize and accommodate the inherited traditional governance systems. The process was dwarfed by the debacle between one of the armed factions of Mogadishu against the U.S. Led multi-national forces on October 3, 1993.

4. Situation of the Democratic Transition at the National Level

The traditional governance structures did not completely disappear nor have effectively thrived in the advent of the colonial administrations. The structures existed and they, at times, proved to be an alternative to the judicial establishments of the colonial administrations and the subsequent governments after independence at local levels. Yet there was no an explicit recognition on the part of the governments.

Moreover, the public trusted the traditional governance systems more than the introduced European governance systems.

The Italian colony in south central Somalia did not do much to encourage the vitalization and the development of the indigenous system. Except for establishing ‘Qadis’, local court judges employing a hybrid of customary law and sharia to deal with civil matters, the colonialists sidelined all the efforts to integrate the traditional governance system to the colonial administration system.

The colonial judicial systems, frustrated by the lack of a conceptual understanding by the colonial officers, have at times, accommodated for the local communities to resort to the traditional ‘Xeer’ systems at the discretion of the colonial court judge. This was the case during marriage, divorce and the payment of blood compensation where the colonial court judges delegated authorities to the local traditional governance system. This was also the case even after independence where traditional clan leaders were left to exercise their traditional governance authorities in the event of an inter-clan conflict.

The Somali traditional clan structures had nomenclatures given to each crowned clan leader, in this case a chieftain. Although each Somali clan had a special name for their clan chief, yet the authorities these clan chiefs exercised, wherever the clan may be, was the same throughout the country. For instance, a ‘Duub’ or an ‘Ugaas’, the chief of the clan, had the responsibility to legitimately represent the clan interests and could also take a final decision on behalf of the clan and his decision was always final.5 This step is called in Somali ‘Guddoon’. The process, though, starts at the grassroots level where each subclan leader ‘Nabaddoon’ convenes all the males of age among his subjects to brainstorm on the issue. Then the ‘Nabaddoonno (sub-clan leaders)’ move to another smaller congregation to finalize the consultation. This step is called ‘Talo (Congress)’.

The ‘Nabaddoono’ then move to a congregation with the ‘Guddoon (Decision)’ to convey their ‘Talo’. The ‘Guddoon’ then, at the discretion of the chief, finalizes the process and announces a binding decision. Although the attributes of the TGS, given the egalitarian nature of the Somali society, are democratic, it has never been institutionalized.

5. Today’s Traditional Structures

The traditional governance structures (TGS) have existed in Somalia since pre-colonial times. They have survived the challenges of the forces of time by different dominating forces as detailed in the previous chapters. The TGS owes its existence and survival to the positive social capital (trust, accountability and honesty)6 of the Somali society towards the “x eer” The Somali society’s trust in the TGS is attributed to the following facts:

- The mechanisms embedded in the TGS and the “xeer ” are indigenous and every Somali can claim its rightful ownership.
- Alternative governance systems (Colonial) never reached the majority of the Somali society whose life has never been sedentary.
- The post-independence governments adopted the colonial administrations, but it never extended its authority to much of the countryside.
- The traditional Islamic values embedded within the Somali traditional structures strengthened the application of the TGS.

At the same time, the respect of the “xeer” is an integral part in the pride of any Somali clan. Members of one clan, who contest it without very good reasons, may face the contempt of others and be criticized by other kinsmen because keeping his word on such matters is seen as absolutely essential. “Xeer” has also other aspects that should be emphasized in a context of civil war. It is a territorial concept, which means that it is not related to one clan wherever its members are settled, but to groups settled in the same area. For instance, the “Diya (Blood Compensation)” among pastoral groups is generally expensive. The reason behind the “Diya” being expensive is related to the intent of deterring the committal of a crime. The traditional “xeer” dictates the blood compensation for a murder committed to 100 camels to be compensated to the family of the victim. That is not the case among agriculturist groups because the mode of production is different and the potentiality of feud less likely. The actual figure for blood compensation is not always collected some times because of the disparity of wealth ownership.

Following the collapse of the state of Somalia, with no governing institutions in place, the traditional governance structures of the different Somali clans became a major regulating force in the social interaction of the communities. The ‘Xeer’, which is the customary law, was not widely used in most of the urban areas of Somalia. During and after the civil war, the traditional leaders have been, since the collapse of the state, actively employing the ‘xeer’ as the only means of governance. The reasons of acceptance of the ‘Xeer’, employed in the urban centers, is the fact that the violent actors had this system embedded in their culture of war and respected it – with no alternative in hand. In the urban context though, the ‘xeer’ was shaped at an ad hoc basis.

The Mag (blood compensation), also known as ‘Diya’ is an indicative tool in the effective role of the ‘xeer’ in the urban setting Nevertheless, the ‘Mag’ is a good indicator of the balance of power and the respect of law between clans and the way by which elders of neighboring groups enforce the ‘xeer’ in the process of governing.

Egalitarian in nature, the nomadic Somalis, never let their traditional leaders unbridled on the exercise of power and other essential functions over the clan. 150 years ago, a British traveller Burton, in his diary, noted the following quotation: “Every free-born man holds himself equal to his ruler, and allows no royalties or prerogatives to abridge his birthright of liberty. Yet I have observed that with all their passion for independence, the Somali, when subject to strict rule as in Zayla and Harrar, are both apt to discipline and subservient to command .”7 This notion is an indicative of how the Somali traditional values are imbedded with an inherited traditional form of governance which observable in all Somali societies even in this contemporary world. Somalia, for instance, which is a country with no central government for over 15 years, and is yet functioning as a state, is bound together, as people and nation, is the respect of the traditional forms of governance between the Somali clans.

After the state collapse, on January 1991, the governance situation in south central Somalia went from bad to worse. The contending politically motivated groups struggling to profiteer from the debris of the collapsed state have uprooted all the signs of a governance system. This caused the disintegration of the rudimentary social fabric of rationality resulting widespread confusion of who is with whom and who is against whom.

Today one can distinguish the following five different authority systems with varying degree of effectiveness and social acceptance in the south central regions of Somalia.

1. The most common of these systems, which were formed at the district level, were the remnants that survived from the regional and district councils established by the United Nations Office for Somalia (UNOSOM II) in the first part of the 1990s. Some of this governance administration still exists in number of regions, with minimal authority and functions to exercise, in south-central Somalia. Nevertheless, these administrations provide limited services to the people in the area.

2. Various political factions and militia leaders have also established a number of administrative structures immediately after the major civil wars subsided. An example of this kind of administration exists in both the Middle and Lower Shabelle regions with minor differences between the two administrations.

3. Islamic courts also hold a degree of control in a number of localities within south central Somalia. This system only provides relative security in the areas they control.

4. Governance structure established by the local communities in consultation with the traditional and religious leaders. Such administrations exist in Haradheere district of Mudug region, Diinsoor of Bay region, Garbaharrey of Gedo region and Gori-el of Galgudud region.

5. There are also areas where no formal administrative structures exist and elders, using traditional xeer system, have managed to keep peaceful relations between and among many communities. This kind of administration has many similarities to that established by the Sharia Islamic Courts where the issue of security is a priority.

None of these structures function properly. Some of them impose taxes on locals ostensibly to guarantee a provision of security. The revenue generated in such cases is not utilized for any other public service provisions. However, exceptions can be fo und at limited areas where a share of these tax collections is put aside for certain basic public service delivery such as education and health.

Another exception is the case of the Islamic courts that have met people’s need for security in the areas und er their control.

Since Somalia was under the rule of the gun for decades, the culture of using the gun as the means to govern is a popular method used to establish a power base by the politically motivated armed faction leaders. Such exercise creates a rift between the government and its subjects. This system is a tyranny where the locals have no say and are ruled at the mercy of the gun. A portrayal of such situation is poignantly expressed by an elder in Buur-Hakaba of Bay region: “We are hostages! We are not free to establish our own administrative authority. Those who are calling themselves the authority are the armed militia 8 who rule us with the barrel of their guns”.

The root cause of the situation that the elder described is the process through which the said administrative structures are formed, if any. In the initial stages of their formation, the grassroots involvement was either very limited or non-existent at all.

The issue of ownership and legitimacy are fundamental ones that need serious considerations among the Somalis in the south-central regions. Nevertheless, many people, who have a dominant voice in some of the regions, lack the basic understanding in the formation of a governance system.

Throughout south central Somalia, governing Mogadishu, the capital city of Somalia, is the most enigmatic challenge that demands cautious and creative alternative to the previous failed solutions.

6. Traditional Legal Foundation

The traditional Somali society’s governance structures have always been decentralized clan-based communal administrations that covered specific geographic areas with customary law, known as ‘Xeer’, as the legal reference. The traditional leaders derive their authority from the traditions and the religion. The customary law, ‘xeer’, is not written. It is however kept in the minds of experienced tribal elders, who pass the torch to the next emerging ‘nabaddoono’.

The customary law passed through the test of the times and it is inherent in the traditional and the religious values the society adheres to. Moreover, since the colonial and the post-colonial administrations were confined to limited areas, and did not extend to the large number of Somali population, the demand for the TGS has always been high.

The customary law, also known as ‘xeer’ is a traditional contractual agreement applicable in the social grid of clan-subclan structure that constitute the Somali society. The customary law had been shaped and influenced by the Islamic sharia law. Sharia law played a pivotal role in the evolution on the Somali communities’ traditional laws. It shaped the ‘xeer ’ through amalgamation of the traditional Somali custom and that of the Islamic Sharia, and has projected it in its domain. The Sharia, not only provided the means to qualify a new code in the ‘xeer’, but it is also served to strengthen the believe of the Somalia people since the Islamic religion is written and codified compared to the traditional ‘xeer’ which is not written In the advent of an unprecedented problem, which ‘Xeer’ does not accommodate, the Sharia provides the source.

The Somali customary law, albeit not uniform throughout the Somali communities, has diversity in nature depending on the Mode of Production (MOP). The dominant MOP in Somali society has always been pastoralism and agro-pastoralism. The MOP shapes the typical ‘xeer’ essential for the interaction of the communities. Both pastoral and agro - pastoral communities, the ‘xeer’ covers all aspects of life. Thus the following nomenclature for MOP based ‘xeer’ is summarized under the categories:

- ‘Xeer Qodato’ stands for the farmer’s customary law.
- ‘Xeer daaqsato’ stands for the pastoralists customary law.
- ‘Xeer dabato’ stands for fisherman’s customary law.

The selection/nomination of the leaders of the traditional structure of the Somali clans is hereditary. The names given to a clan leader differs from one clan, in a specific territory, to another. The general names can be summarized as: Ugas, Garad, Boqor, Sultan, Wabar, Malaaq, Issin etc. Each of these clan leaders, in the event of death, is replaced by his heir apparent from the same sub -clan. The patrilineal kinship ties, based on descent from a common ancestor, are at the base of the clan system and determine individual clan members’ loyalty and respect to the clan. In the process of crowning a new clan leader, following the death of a predecessor, it is attended by all other major clan leaders to legitimize nomination. These kingly individuals, although they can exercise full authority, they invite the ‘Nabaddoonno (sub -clan leaders)’ to endorse a decision taken.

The nomadic life style of the Somali people, not restricted by governmental authority, injected in them the qualities of self-reliance, independence of mind and the believe in the social-cultural harmony. However, the ‘xeer’ and the Islamic religion were fused together over the centuries, effectively maintaining internal peace and social stability.

Islam and the traditional legal contracts also gave rise to a set of political authorities and legal or moral rules to which all Somalis conferred their voluntary obedience.

The contractual ‘xeer’ observed by the clan leader motivates clan leaders and elders to maintain peace and stability in the community and the respect of the Islamic moral values. The result is a strong sense of communal solidarity and mutual support to each other at times of adversity. Also, the traditional governance structure sets the rule of engagement in war which prohibits the killing or attack of the elderly, women, children, the elderly and the sick. There were no institutions or authorities to physically enforce compliance with these rules. Internal conviction of their veracity and, possibly, fear of social ostracism and knowledge of communal punishment assures obedience.

The voluntarily observed rules that have served the Somali society so well for so long, were unfortunately compromised by the authoritarian military regime of Somalia from 1969 – 1990. Rather than respecting the inherited traditional leadership with local legitimacy, the authoritarian military regime chose to appoint loyal chieftains who responded to the interests of the regime. This was further exacerbated to a certain degree by the ensuing civil war. Some parts of Somalia, the traditional leaders had lost respect and could not wield any moral or political authority within their own clans. Some of the traditional leaders are pushed aside by the present armed warlords who exercise authority by the barrel of the gun. This phenomenon can be observed in a number of districts through south-central Somalia.

7. Organizational Structure

The traditional Somali governance system had its own structures and hierarchy. In most parts of Somalia, clans have their own separate hereditary crown families called Duub. These families, who enjoy special privileges, have different nomenclature in different areas and among different clans i.e. Reer Ugas, Boqor, Sultan, Imaam, Issin, Malaaq, Wabar, Garaad etc. The main responsibilities and roles of these traditional leaders in the society are, in most cases, similar. The ‘Duub’ acts in the exercise of his responsibilities like the modern constitutional monarchies that exist today in many developed countries. In the realm of his many responsibilities include the convention of meetings or clan congress (shir-beeleed) when ever there is a good reason to do so.9

The convention of such conferences or congress can be necessitated by unexpected cases of conflict, or mundane community matters related to resource sharing, the accommodation of guests from other clans and the necessity for exploring new grazing grounds, in the case of the Somali nomads.

Among the activities also include the blessing of and the final seal of agreements reached in the cessation of hostilities. Under him are the Nabad-doonno (sub-clan heads), whose main responsibilities include the management and supervision of the day-to-day business of the clan. Their deliberations, in the exercise of their authority, include the arbitration of sprouting differences within the clan and/or negotiating with other clans when needed.

Within the structure of the Nabad-doonno are the Ulimo (religious leaders) whose primary responsibilities include the congregation of the communities, conducting religious education and enlightenment for the general public. This indicates the cohesiveness of the traditional Somali system of governance with clear rules and regulations from top - down within clan- subclan social grid.10

Although this type of governance structures is centuries old, it is still active throughout Somalia. It became more salient after the collapse of the government in Somalia in 1991 although the appointment of multiple clan leaders, for political reasons, has hampered some of their primary responsibilities. Even under the different governments some conflicts resorted to the traditional ‘xeer’ in solving conflicts or mundane matters, thus sparing the government’s judicial institutions of much complicated problems that demanded historical background. The government judicial institutions were not able to accommodate problems that had historical roots.

8. Functions and Powers

The functions and powers are not concentrated in the hands of the traditional clan leaders. The ‘Guddoon’ takes decision on the acts and deliberations of the grassroots consultations passed over through the ‘Nabaddoono’ (subclan elders). The process is generally consultative and has a lifeline of inputs from the subjects.

The social grid that accommodates the traditional structures represents decentralized social representations in clanàsubclanà sub-subclanà etc. until one reaches a unit of family. This network of lineages has network representations along the nodes of the grid.

Equally there are also corresponding consultations emanating from such nodes through bottom-up channels.

9. Traditional Law

There is no accommodation of the customary law in the government institutions. The first post-colonial government sidelined the traditional law in the constitution and did not give a chance to the traditional leaders. Italian, English and Arabic became the language employed by the first governments. This in effect sidelined the role of the traditional leaders who had no a codified and written customary law.

Traditionally, the customary law, the xeer, has been one of the major ways that regulated the social relations between communities. To a large extent, the colonial State and the post-independent State mainly relied on it to address certain issues where the modern system of laws had no strong legitimacy, especially in the peripheries mainly consisting of the rural and pastoral areas. Customary courts undertook the responsibility of judicial organs where the state courts failed to reach. Courts employed customary law on family matters and some civilian cases throughout south-central Somalia. The majority of the nomadic and agropastoral communities have retained the TGS in effect.

10. Traditional Justice

The customary court-like congregations are very popular through out Somalia. Since there is no government, for instance at the present time, such customary courts are very popular in many urban areas. Along with Islamic Sharia courts, the traditional court -like congregations address most of the problems that occur within the community during the civil war years. Local regional administrations or neighborhood groups, some of the warlords, seek the support of the traditional leaders to intervene some of the cases. In a customary court, the ‘Guddoon’, nominates the Judges known as the ‘Garsoor’, and an equivalent of today’s attorney general named ‘Xeerbeegti’. The ‘Xeerbeegti’ in this case, is a study group scrutinizing the issue in hand and the relevant codes in the customary law. One essential component of the ‘xeer ’ is the “Mag or Diya’. The ‘Mag or Diya’ (blood money), is a procedure by which clans use to maintain justice within the communities and this is organized mostly but not exclusively through genealogical lines. As Mr. I. M. Lewis argues, that the Diya paying group ‘is pledged to support each other in collective and jural responsibility, and in particular, in the payment and receipt of compensation with respect to actions committed by or against their group".11 The ‘Diya’ paying process can resolve feuds for instance a diya is collected to compensate the relatives of a victim for the loss of another victim's life. The payment of the diya is a good indicator of the willingness of groups to stay together. There are also other procedures that may be very useful in the future for the main urban centers.

The compensation of a ‘Mag’ between two clans, it is intended to build trust among clans and keeping communities to live in harmony. The decision made during a judicial process, the ‘Mag’ compensation, certification of marriage and divorce in the case of family matter, are taken collectively with the ‘Nabaddoonno’ witnessing the process. Decisions taken through this process are binding.

11. Representation Mechanisms for Authorities

The chief of the clan has the authority to select and mandate the decision of appointing an envoy ‘Ergo’ to undertake assignments foreseen as necessary. As a member of the ‘Guddoon’, decision makers, the chief can also delegate authority to someone within his clan to represent him. Authority of this kind is not transferable to another individual from another clan. Cases that address wider issues outside one clan, a chief can include in his ‘Ergo’ with other clan members.

The authority of a clan is representative, and their social grouping is based on ‘Diyo’ paying. The clan-subclan structure is grouped to balance the equity of ‘Mag or Diyo’ payments. The intent is to achieve a fair and equal contribution from each subclan. A less numerous and poorer ‘Jifo’ may be grouped with larger and wealthier ‘jifos’ to help them with additional resource to supplement the load of the diyo payment exercise.. There are cases where minority clans, which might have migrated from other areas, may join to coexist peacefully with a major clan in a specific area. The new-comer will officially be reintegrated to the host clan and shall abide the local ‘xeer’ of the host clan. The minority clan obtains not only the re-integration but also protection. In this case, the chief of the host clan can delegate authority to a member of the new-comer clan. Most of the Somali clans, assign the responsibility of leadership mainly to a smaller jifo, dubbed Reer Ugas. The ‘Reer Ugas’ is equivalent to royalty and they command respect and authority among community and clan members. The rationale behind the choice is based on clan lineage. Most of the cases it is hereditary. The inheritance can be both vertical and horizontal. The current ‘Ugas’ may and can recommend his successor in his lifetime.

In most of the cases, the ‘Ugas ’ chooses from his peers and/or from his close associates to succeed him after death. Generally, he declares his successor before death. The following factors determine the choice of the successor:

- Wisdom and Religious knowledge
- Grace among the subjects
- Integrity

In the Somali Traditional Laws, women have no explicit role or representation at all. Women cannot assume authority or representation from a clan. They can assume roles and may influence decisions behind the scene.

12. Local Development

As is demonstrated in the preceding chapters, the successive Somali governments have not seriously engaged to institutionalize the TGS thus failing to encourage the evolution of the TGS. Its survival can be attributed to its indispensability of the majority of the rural and pastoral communities. When it comes to national politics, the TGS has never been accommodated. Their role was limited to the local community engagements within their respective territories.

13. Protection, Management and Allocation of Natural Resources

Sharing of pasture and water is a common feature appropriated in the traditional governance systems. The ‘Xeer ’, in agro -pastoral communities accommodates protection, management rights to the traditional settlers/owners of the land. There is though predatory nature in the appropriation of the land in times civil strife. In southern farmlands of Somalia, the new comer would only be accommodated if they decide to peacefully integrate with the hosting clan in a specific locality.

‘Qaaraan – (Social Safety Net) is mandatory collection of money and valuables for and from every member of the clan. It is managed and mandated by the authority ostensibly to be utilized for the good of the community. The authority also mandates workforce mobilization for various reasons. These reasons include:

- recruit the fighting forces
- mobilize forces to counter natural disasters; to engage in community activities

14. Conflict Resolution

The Somali customary law accommodates mechanisms for handling and managing conflicts between and among clans. The mainstay of ‘Xeer’ is based on conflict prevention codes to avert the confrontations that may arise from resource sharing and land disputes.

If two parties are embroiled in conflict, the traditional elders and/or the, ‘Guurti’ of the two conflicting parties, co nvene ‘Shir Beeleed or (Clan Assembly)’ to discuss the contending issues at stake. During this kind of conference, other clan members can also be invited to give an impetus to the ‘Shir Beeleed’ and the decisions that may at end emerge. The elders explore the codes in the ‘xeer’ that can curb the contentious issues addressed in order to avoid the recurrence of conflicts. If none is found, the issue becomes ‘Ugub’ – Virgin. Then the elders resort to the Sharia for reference. If reference is obtained from the Sharia, it is then integrated into the codes and becomes part of the ‘Xeer’. Members of the clan memorize the established code as ‘xeer’ between conflicting parties. If, however, the contentious issue is found to have precedence in the ‘xeer’ it is dubbed as ‘Curad’.

Generally speaking, the occurrence of conflicts within communities is a major lifeline for the initiation of a code in the ‘xeer’.

15. Local Perception of Traditional Structures

As noted in the previous chapters, the social capital of the Somali society is the integral component that guaranteed its survival against a backdrop of negligence on the part of the colonial and post-colonial governments. The local ownership eases its use. It is inherent in the culture of the locals. Despite all these, the ‘xeer’ still lacks the essential component of fairness. For example, if a robber or a criminal, belonging to a clan, is killed, the clan demands ‘Mag or Diyo’. Legitimate self-defense has no place in the ‘xeer ’. If a crime happens and some one is murdered, the victim has to be compensated with a ‘Mag or Diya’ if he/she or the clan if the victim reputes to take the ‘Mag or Diya’, the offender must be brought to the family of the victim physically and they (the victim) can choose to avenge for killing a family member.

The perception of women towards the traditional justice system is that they feel the structures do not accommodate them fairly.

NOTES

1 Hess, Robert L. “Italian colonialism in Somalia” The university of Chicago press, Chicago & London, 1966, p.108
2 ibid
3 The government institutions were not extended to the country side and like many African governments,
4 In 1960, two parts of the Somali territories (British Somaliland Protectorate and Italian Somaliland, a UN trust territory) attained independence on June 26th, and July 1st, respectively, and formed the Somali Republic. The example, the early civilian governments were mired with corruption and electoral malpractices. Political competition soon degenerated into clanism and gave rise to kinship based political parties and a tribalized political culture. More than 80 clan-based political parties were formed to compete in the 1969 elections.
5 The gender of a chieftain of a clan is always a Male, not a female. A female judge is not allowed in the Somali traditional governance system and that of the Islamic Sharia.
6 Globalization and Values: John Whalley, University of Western Ontario and peking, p.6.
8 CRD group discussion in Diinsoor District March 19, 2002
7 UNDOS/LAS Unit “Let us talk about governance in Somalia” Research studies on governance commissioned by UNDOS/LAS Unit. It contains three papers written by Prof. Roland Marchal, Prof. Bernhard Helander and Prof. Ken Menkhaus. July 1998
9 Somalia and Somaliland: Strategies for dialogue and consensus on governance and democratic transition. Paper Prepared for the UNDP Oslo Governance Centre January 2003
10 The nucleus of the Somali clan structure is the family known as ‘Qoys’. Few families create a unit called ‘Jifo (sub-clan)’. Several ‘Jifos’ form a larger social grouping known as ‘Reer’. Likewise, several units of Reers form ‘Beel (Clan)’. This is the case for the four major ancestral clans: The Dir, Darod, Digil & Mirifle, Hawiye and Others.
11 I M. Lewis. A pastoral democracy: a study of pastoralism and politics among the Northern Somali of the Horn of Africa. London, Published for the International African Institute by Oxford University Press, 1961.

SOURCES CONSULTED

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Hess, Robert L. “Italian colonialism in Somalia” The university of Chicago press, Chicago & London, 1966,
I M. Lewis. A pastoral democracy: a study of pastoralism and politics among the Northern Somali of the Horn of Africa. London, Published for the International African Institute by Oxford University Press, 1961.
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